

① LEVEL II

STUDY ON MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

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
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30 June 1970


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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17018

IN REPLY REFER TO:

30 June 1970

STUDY ON MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

PREFACE

This study of military professionalism was conducted by the US Army War College at the direction of the Chief of Staff. The study began on 21 April 1970 and this report was submitted to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel on 30 June 1970. All agencies and installations that were asked to contribute to the formulation of the data base for the study gave this project their immediate and enthusiastic support. We are particularly indebted to the Commanding General, COMARC and the Commanding Generals at Forts Benning, Eustis, Knox, Leavenworth, and Sill; and the Commandant of the US Army Chaplains School at Fort Hamilton.


This study deals with the heart and soul of the Officer Corps of the Army. Its subject matter--involving ethics, morality, and professional competence--is filled with emotional overtones. Necessarily, the derivation of reliable and useful conclusions and recommendations involves imprecise definitions, as well as subjective evaluations and relative value judgments. Nonetheless, spontaneity and personal perception are essential to portray the prevailing climate of professionalism within the Officer Corps. While attempting to retain the essence of these qualities, the study was so designed as to minimize the intrusion of emotionalism and individual or group bias.

The subjects of ethics, morals, technical competence, individual motivation, and personal value systems are inextricably related, interacting, and mutually reinforcing. All of these aspects of the professional climate, taken together, produce a whole which is greater than the sum of its separate, component parts. Consequently, the study looked at the total picture. It follows that corrective action must be based on comprehensive programs. Piecemeal actions will not suffice.

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The matters addressed in this study are broad, complex, and interdisciplinary in nature. They could, therefore, form the basis for extended investigation along a number of different lines. The design and rigor of this study, however, are such that it is considered to describe reliably the prevailing professional climate, to identify some significant causes of the problems which exist, and to provide a solid basis for proposed corrective measures.

It may be argued that this report poses a choice between mission accomplishment and professional ethics. The thrust of this report is that there is really no choice. Measures can and must be found to ensure that a climate of professionalism exists in the Army. The attainment of such a climate is the essential prerequisite for genuine effectiveness.



G. S. ECKHARDT
Major General, USA
Commandant

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ABSTRACT

ABSTRACT

1. The Traditional Professional Standards. The traditional standards of the American Army officer may be summarized in three words: Duty-Honor-Country. The Officer Corps of today espouses this statement of professional ideals. Junior officers--lieutenants and captains--as a group profess acceptance of the code of Duty-Honor-Country as strongly as do their seniors. Junior officers are deeply aware of professional standards, keenly interested in discussions about the subject, and intolerant of those--either peers or seniors--who they believe are substandard in ethical or moral behavior or in technical competence.
2. The Existing Climate. Officers of all grades perceive a significant difference between the ideal values and the actual or operative values of the Officer Corps. This perception is strong, clear, pervasive, and statistically and qualitatively independent of grade, branch, educational level, or source of commission. There is also concern among officers that the Army is not taking action to ensure that high ideals are practiced as well as preached. In fact, there is extensive preoccupation among the younger officers with this condition but, fortunately, little evidence of cynicism or negativism on their part.

The climate, as perceived and described with uncommon similarity by the sample of 450 officers directly queried, as well as by other segments of the Officer Corps who had participated in recent surveys and studies on related matters, is one in which there is disharmony

between traditional, accepted ideals and the prevailing institutional pressures. These pressures seem to stem from a combination of self-oriented, success-motivated actions, and a lack of professional skills on the part of middle and senior grade officers. A scenario that was repeatedly described in seminar sessions and narrative responses includes an ambitious, transitory commander--marginally skilled in the complexities of his duties--engulfed in producing statistical results, fearful of personal failure, too busy to talk with or listen to his subordinates, and determined to submit acceptably optimistic reports which reflect faultless completion of a variety of tasks at the expense of the sweat and frustration of his subordinates.

3. Composition of Study Sample. In some respects, many of the officers who provided input to this study represent an elite rather than a cross section of the Officer Corps as a whole. Certainly, a large and properly stratified random sample would be required to provide a statistically representative description of the entire Officer Corps. However, much of the quantitative and qualitative data was generated from six different service schools; the service school environment encourages an objectivity and breadth of view greater than can be expected from other assignments where unit or individual loyalties abide; and the sample of officers represents a broad spectrum of experience, grade, and branch. These facts support the belief that the views expressed by these officers are representative of an important cross section of the Officer Corps. More significant,

and in fact striking, is the consensus in viewpoint and near unanimity of the descriptive responses. These responses, reinforced by the statistical data and related studies, depict a climate which is sufficiently out of step with our time-honored aspirations and the traditional ethics of the professional soldier to warrant immediate attention at the highest echelons of the Army.

4. Causative Factors. a. The primary causative factors are unclear. It is difficult to distinguish between cause and effect. There is widespread feeling that the Army has generated an environment that rewards relatively insignificant, short-term indicators of success, and disregards or discourages the growth of the long-term qualities of moral and ethical strength on which the future of the Army depends. Communications between junior and senior officers are tenuous on this as well as other matters. There appears to be inadequate upward communication of reliable data to keep the senior accurately informed and both inadequate and unfeeling downward communication to keep the junior contented. Senior officers are often perceived as being isolated, perhaps willingly, from reality.

b. There is no direct evidence that external fiscal, political, sociological, or managerial influences are the primary causative factors of this less than optimum climate. Neither does the public reaction to the Vietnam war, the rapid expansion of the Army, or the current anti-military syndrome stand out as a significant reason for deviations from the level of professional behavior the Army acknowledges as its attainable ideal.

5. Corrective Measures. a. The pervasiveness of this climate, and the understandably human motives--such as drive for personal recognition--which tend to perpetuate the distortion of the professional ethic, indicate that the situation is probably not self-correcting. The strong desire expressed almost unanimously by officers to make the operative system more nearly perfect represents a healthy reservoir of energetic idealism. But the individual officer is greatly hampered in any local crusade for adherence to ideal methods by the need to produce results in order to remain competitive for future advancement. Change, therefore, must be instituted from the top of the Army. Admonition is not enough. The implementation of corrective measures must be comprehensive, and the system of rewards (for example, promotion, selection for advanced education, and desirable and challenging assignments) must in fact support adherence to traditional ethical behavior.

b. A number of recommendations appear appropriate. These are presented in three categories:

For Prompt Implementation:

1. Disseminating the pertinent findings of this study.
2. Adding the subjects of interpersonal communication and professional ethics to service school curricula.
3. Promulgating an Officer's Creed (such as that shown at Inclosure 2).
4. Making all command assignments of lieutenant colonels and colonels directly from Headquarters, Department of the Army.
5. Giving stability in command assignments precedence over all other reassignment considerations.

6. Removing from the optimum career patterns for combat arms officers the requirement that to advance rapidly in grade they must command both at battalion and brigade level as well as serve on high level staffs.

7. Placing higher priority for assignment of USACGSC and SSC graduates to service schools, training centers, and ROTC staffs at the expense particularly of Headquarters, Department of the Army assignments.

8. Modifying promotion policies by extending "primary zones" and eliminating the "secondary zone" concept, while still retaining provisions for those officers who are definitely competent in grade but who are not suited for further promotion to remain on active duty.

9. Returning the authority for selection of officers for promotion to captain to Headquarters, Department of the Army; and lengthening the time in grade requirement from first lieutenant to captain, by increments, to what it was prior to the Vietnam buildup.

10. Providing to outstanding colonels (perhaps 10 percent of those retiring in any year group) at retirement a promotion to the grade of brigadier general ("Tomatone Promotion"); and making the selection by a Headquarters, Department of the Army board.

11. Taking immediate disciplinary action against officers who violate ethical standards.

12. Providing each officer upon commissioning with a hard-bound copy of a special textbook which would include The Armed Forces Officer, the Officer's Creed, a message on the subject of professional standards from the Chief of Staff, and other suitable documents which set enduring guidelines for an Army officer.

13. Establishing uniform standards for those practices which are now subject to interpretation and vary between units or posts, and which are amenable to Army-wide policies. (The recent haircut standard prescribed by Headquarters, Department of the Army is one example of a step in the right direction.)

For Implementation on a Trial Basis:

14. Including as a supplementary input to officer efficiency files the results of peer ratings which would be compiled from periodic solicitations, by mail, from Headquarters, Department of the Army, of comments from selected officers on those contemporaries with whom they had served in past assignments.

15. Having students at the USACGSC and the USAWC submit confidential comments on prospective selectees for brigadier general and making a

tabulation of the results available to the president of the promotion board for use as he sees fit.

For Further Study:

16. Reassessing as a matter of continuing priority all facets-- including basic assumptions--of the system of officer evaluation, including: the role of the efficiency report in making assignments; the possible role of the indorsing officer as an evaluator of the rating officer as well as an evaluator of the rated officer; the weight and nature of the indorsing officer's comments and entries when his duties obviously preclude intimate knowledge of the rated officer; and the possibility of designing different efficiency report forms for different officer grade level groupings (such as one rather concise form for O-1 through O-3, another form for O-4 and O-5, one for O-6, and one for general officers).
17. Requiring completion of a written examination on common and branch material subjects prior to selection for attendance at USACGSC or equivalent schools.
18. Providing for attendance at special short courses at branch schools and the USACGSC for selectees to brigadier general.
19. Upgrading the academic challenge at Advanced Courses and eliminating from the service those students who fail to meet reasonable academic or traditional ethical standards.
20. Developing a written questionnaire on officer value systems to be administered over the years at Advanced Courses, USACGSC, and USAWC to generate a data base, assess trends, and keep the issue of individual and group values alive.
21. Providing instruction in counseling subordinates at the Advanced Courses and the USACGSC.
22. Publishing a suitable text, possibly in Department of the Army Pamphlet format, outlining the need and explaining the methods for counseling subordinates and permitting them to participate in the dialogue.
23. Having promotion boards serve also as screening boards for candidates for elimination from the service.
24. Simplifying the administrative procedures for elimination of officers from the service.

25. Reducing to a minimum, or eliminating entirely for all grades below O-6, the "nominating" of officers for assignments and the honoring of "by name" requests.

26. Removing wherever possible statistical competition within organizations, and resorting wherever practicable to a "pass-fail" system of ratings without numerical scores in organizational inspections.

27. Ensuring that promotion boards receive comprehensive instructions which are compatible with announced policies of career pattern and assignment priorities, and which do not in effect validate "ticket punching" as the unique route to rapid promotion.

28. Eliminating Junior Officer Councils except for those groups of officers who are in student or essentially transient status and have no regular chain of command.

29. Encouraging initiative and learning by experience through public recognition that human activities are not susceptible to complete statistical measurement, that mistakes in training are expected, and that--while perfection may be a long term goal--the concept of "zero defects" is not applicable to all aspects of management.

30. Including an additional grade--such as senior captain--between the present O-3 and O-4 grades and authorizing that grade level for positions of command at company level.

31. Including the substance of this study as a topic for the next Army Commanders' Conference.

PART

I

INTRODUCTION

STUDY ON MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

30 JUNE 1970

PART I - INTRODUCTION

A. AUTHORITY.

This study was directed by the Chief of Staff, US Army, by letter dated 18 April 1970. See Inclosure 1.

B. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY.

The study was designed to assess the professional climate of the Army, to identify any problem areas, and to formulate corrective actions. Its goal was to produce a product which could be usefully and directly applied, as compared with a dissertation that would be primarily theoretical or philosophical.

C. NATURE OF THE STUDY.

The subject explored in this study is highly complex. Military professionalism involves a whole panorama of disciplines of varying precision and sophistication. Exactly what it encompasses--either quantitatively or qualitatively--is a matter of widely differing opinion. But the focal point of the profession is clearly man himself: as an individual, a member of a number of groups and sub-groups, and a product of his culture. The behavioral sciences, with their reliance on intuitive judgment and their preoccupation with being as unemotional and non-subjective as possible, represent the primary

disciplines which would be the theoretical framework for further and more abstract exploitations of the content of this report. The foundations of this study were the perceptions of the existing climate by members of the Officer Corps. Regardless of whether all of these are in accord with the facts, they appear to reflect accurately the widespread convictions within the Officer Corps as to what the facts are.

D. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT

The body of the report provides a concise review of the problem definition and methodology, findings and discussion, conclusions, and recommendations. Additional details are included in the annexes.

PART

II

METHODOLOGY

PART II - METHODOLOGY

A. MISSION.

The mission assigned for this study was to assess the existing climate of professionalism in today's Army, giving particular attention to the prevailing standards of professional competence and moral/ethical behavior. Also included was the requirement to outline measures for the solution of any problems which were identified.

B. PROBLEM DEFINITION.

1. It was assumed that the professional climate in the Army today could be assessed by properly obtaining the opinions, perceptions, and attitudes of a selected sample of the Officer Corps.

2. Problem definition led to the conclusion that the research effort should be designed around five basic questions:

FIRST: WHAT ARE THE PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS OR IDEAL VALUES WHICH TRADITIONALLY HAVE BEEN SET FORTH FOR THE ARMY OFFICER?

SECOND: WHAT ARE THE ACTUAL STANDARDS--AND, IF DIFFERENCES EXIST BETWEEN THE IDEAL AND THE ACTUAL, WHAT ARE THEY?

THIRD: OF THE EXISTING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN IDEAL AND ACTUAL STANDARDS, WHICH HAVE MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE ARMY?

FOURTH: WHAT FACTORS, CONDITIONS, AND SITUATIONS (BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL) UNDERLIE THE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN IDEAL AND ACTUAL STANDARDS?

FIFTH: BY WHAT MEANS CAN THE ARMY, THE OFFICER CORPS, AND THE INDIVIDUAL OFFICER MAKE THE IDEAL AND THE ACTUAL STANDARDS MORE NEARLY IDENTICAL?

C. STUDY DESIGN. (See Annex A, Methodology, for details.)

1. Concept of Research.

This effort was designed as an exploratory study to probe the depth and breadth of the five basic questions derived from problem definition. The focus of the research effort was on the value system of today's Army officer. The major portion of the data base was derived from interviews, seminars, and questionnaires conducted and administered in May 1970. The participants were a cross section of the students and faculty of the US Army Chaplains School, the Advanced Courses at Forts Benning, Eustis, Knox, and Sill, and USACGSC at Fort Leavenworth. Approximately 250 officers from these posts participated. Additionally, all of the Army members of the class of 1970 at the USAWC along with Army members of the faculty and USACDCIAS were queried by questionnaire, and many participated in seminars at Carlisle Barracks which addressed selected areas of the study. Additional parts of the data base consisted of a literature survey, including a review of recent Department of the Army studies; informal interviews with senior officers assigned to OPD, OPO; and brief, informal visits to the USMA Office of Research and the US Army Behavioral Science Research Laboratory. A conceptual model of the data base is at Figure II-1. (A bibliography is included as Annex C; results of data compilation and analysis are included in Annex B, Findings and Discussion.)

2. Conceptual Model of the Study.

Figure II-2 depicts the conceptual model of the study. It starts with an analysis of professionalism, shows the theoretical derivation

DATA BASE MODEL




Figure II-1

CONCEPTUAL MODEL, STUDY OF PROFESSIONALISM




Figure II-2

of an individual's value system, and symbolizes how the answers to the questions contained in problem definition determine the angle or the divergence between the idea and the actual patterns of behavior.

D. PLAN FOR ANALYSIS.

The quantitative data obtained from the questionnaires were subjected to a computer-assisted analysis. Questionnaire narratives were analyzed for content and recurring themes by a panel of judges selected from the USAWC student body. Seminar leader teams of two officers each--one USAWC faculty member and one student--were debriefed separately shortly after their return from visits to other installations. (Representative extracts from these taped debriefing sessions and the questionnaire narrative are included in Appendix 1, Anecdotal Input, to Annex B.)

Perceptions of the attitudes of seminar participants as well as content summaries of seminars were inserted into the data matrix along with the other information. Pertinent remarks from experienced officers in OPD along with the findings of recent studies, such as the Franklin Institute Research Laboratories Career Motivation Study published in 1969, USAWC student research papers, and preliminary findings by the USMA Office of Research on a study of attitudes of selected junior officer resignees, were used as background or corroborative information. In order to ensure that these various sources did not contaminate each other, and that one primary source did not prejudice the total analysis, the different inputs (questionnaire

multiple choice; questionnaire narrative; seminar leader debrief; background interviews at OPD, BESRL, USMA; related studies) were analyzed first separately, than as a whole.

E. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE.

The 415 officers who responded to the questionnaire and the 250 among them who participated in seminars (group discussions) represent a variety of grades, branches, and experience. They were generally representative of the officers who will be the middle and senior grade leaders during the next decade. However, the sample was not designed to be, and does not purport to be, a statistical representation of the entire Officer Corps. The sample is heavy in military and civilian education, and heavy in officers who have given evidence of above average ratings of performance as evidenced by their selection for USACGSC and USAWC. The sample was designed to obtain collective judgment, rather than to provide comprehensive representation of the Officer Corps as a whole.

During the analysis, the responses of the different characteristic groupings--source of commission, grade, branch, etc.--were analyzed separately as well as in the overall group. (As the analysis developed, it became apparent that the content of the different responses depicting the climate was strikingly uniform and significantly independent of the variables of grade, branch, education, and source of commission.)

F. THE HANDLING OF BIAS IN ANALYSIS, AND MISPERCEPTION IN VIEWPOINT.

1. Screening of Bias.

The study group endeavored to screen preconceptions, emotionalism, and bias from data interpretation and analysis. This guideline was fundamental in both study design and execution. There was no attempt by anyone in the chain of command to prejudge or prejudice the findings. Inputs to the study described above were analyzed separately. These analyses were performed by multiple judges. Quantitative analysis was initially held separate from qualitative analysis. Analysis of causative factors and development of solution concepts were done at two separate levels--by the interview teams and by the permanent study team members. Analysis of cause and concepts for solution were subjected to review and debate by discussion groups of students and faculty at the USAWC.

2. Perception vs Reality.

a. Impact on the Data Base. Much of the data base was constructed by weaving together the perceptions of the officers in the sample. Sometimes perceptions equate to reality. Sometimes--in reflecting feelings about the climate in which one exists--the perception is by definition the reality. At other times an individual views incompletely or emotionally the actions or motivations of others.

These principles were considered in the design and execution of the study. (Most of the perceptions of the participants in this study were supported by other evidence--such as similar independent perceptions by observers with different perspective, findings of other studies, and the results of recent OPD and USMA interviews on similar topics. The consensus which developed in terms of nearly identical themes being contributed

by a variety of officers of disparate backgrounds and present assignments also tended to confirm the validity of individual perceptions.)

b. The Limitations of Individual Perception. There are good reasons to be suspicious of the assumption that members of any organization, particularly at the lower echelons, can accurately judge the merits of the total system or the adequacy or quality of the behavior patterns of others in the organization. Complaints about superiors and about limitations on one's initiative could be, and often are, convenient rationalizations for personal inadequacies. Logically, some of the derogatory comments from junior officers stem from their incomplete knowledge of the larger scheme of things or their discomfort with the many arduous tasks that necessarily confront the Army today. These proclivities were considered by the study group when the qualitative inputs were assessed.

G. CONSISTENCY OF CONTENT WITHIN THE DATA BASE.

As the data base developed, one of the most significant features was the complementarity of the various inputs. Divergence of opinion on the magnitude or prevalence of the defects in the present climate, and descriptions of examples of deviation from the ideal standards, or ideas on the basic causes for the flaws in the professional climate was less than one might expect.

The quantitative data were used primarily to assess the climate by discrete increments such as "setting a good example," or "being loyal to superiors," or "developing the skills required for present

assignment." These data were also indexed to biographical data, permitting correlation between such characteristics as grade and education level and each of the responses to the forced choice type of question. The writers' narrative responses and the discussions were used to interpret some of the quantitative data, to provide background for diagnosis of the more basic causes of the prevailing climate, and--particularly during the latter phases of the study--to generate ideas for solution concepts.

Where there were minor conflicts or apparent contradictions between quantitative and qualitative input, the members of the study group evaluated the evidence and decided which indicator appeared to reflect most accurately the perceptions and attitudes of the respondents and the underlying factors of causality. In no instance were the inconsistencies irreconcilable. For example, in Figure B-9, Causation Themes, Annex B, the theme of "permissive society" appeared a greater number of times than the theme "requiring expertise in too many areas." Yet a comprehensive analysis of all the input resulted in a conclusion that for a number of reasons the Army's tendency to honor the training of "generalists" to the point of condoning if not dictating rapid turnover of officers for "career development" reasons was a much more important consideration than was the impact of a "permissive society." Each increment within the data base must be viewed within the entire context of the report.

PART

III

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

PART III - FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

A. THE PREVAILING PROFESSIONAL CLIMATE. (See Annex B, Findings and Discussion, for further elaboration and tabular data.)

1. Attitude toward Professionalism.

The officers who provided information for this study were an impressive group. There is good reason to believe that they represent an important section of that part of the Officer Corps which will provide the key leadership in the next decade. Especially reassuring for the future was the vigorous, interested, intelligent outlook of the captains and junior majors--individuals who had been commissioned in the past three to seven years. They reflected as a group a deep commitment to the ideal of Duty-Honor-Country. They were intolerant of others--be they subordinates, peers, or seniors--who transgressed. They were insistent that the inept, dishonest, or immoral officer be eliminated from the Service. The junior officers did not question--either in seminar, personal interview, or on the questionnaire responses where their anonymity was guaranteed--the traditional, essentially authoritarian mode of the military organization, or its vital and unique responsibilities which could result in an officer's accomplishing a particular task at the cost of his life. They were frustrated by the pressures of the system, disheartened by those seniors who sacrificed integrity on the altar of personal success, and impatient with what they perceived as preoccupation with insignificant statistics.

2. The Characteristics of the Climate.

a. General. There is a significant, widely perceived, rarely disavowed difference between the idealized professional climate and the existing professional climate.

b. The Ideal and the Existing Climate. The idealized climate is characterized by: individual integrity, mutual trust and confidence, unselfish motivation, technical competence, and an unconstrained flow of information. It is epitomized in the words, Duty-Honor-Country. The existing climate includes a wide spectrum of performance. Some performance conforms closely to the ideal. But a widespread, officially condoned or institutionalized portion of the performance of individuals varies significantly from the standards that the Army espouses as an organization, and that the officers subscribe to as being the proper standards for their personal behavior. As a result, the existing climate includes persistent and rather ubiquitous overtones of: selfish behavior that places personal success ahead of the good of the Service; looking upward to please superiors instead of looking downward to fulfill the legitimate needs of subordinates; preoccupation with the attainment of trivial short-term objectives even through dishonest practices that injure the long-term fabric of the organization; incomplete communications between junior and seniors which leave the senior uninformed and the junior feeling unimportant; and inadequate technical or managerial competence to perform effectively the assigned duties. A scenario that was repeatedly described in seminar sessions and narrative responses includes an ambitious, transitory commander--marginally skilled in the complexities of his

duties--engulfed in producing statistical results, fearful of personal failure, too busy to talk with or listen to his subordinates, and determined to submit acceptably optimistic reports which reflect faultless completion of a variety of tasks at the expense of the sweat and frustration of his subordinates. The junior officer bears a particularly heavy part of the burden. He is the executor of command decisions and bears the brunt of the burden of executing simultaneously and flawlessly all the policies conceived by all the echelons above him.

The following are representative remarks extracted from the narrative comments of questionnaires. (Additional extracts from narrative comments are included in Appendix 1, Anecdotal Input to Annex B.)

These are from officers at various posts.

CPT: . . . overemphasis on zero defects. . . .
Commanders must realize that mistakes are human,
. . . they should be used as lessons learned and
not vehicles for destroying an individual.

LT: I have observed that the willingness of an
officer to assume responsibility for his own plans
and actions seems to vary inversely with rank up to
the rank of general. While obviously a gross
generalization, this behavioral pattern is consistent
with . . . cover your ass.

CPT: . . . reluctance of middle grade officers to
render reports reflecting the true material readiness
of their unit. Because they and their raters hold
their leadership positions for such short periods,
they feel that even one poor report will reflect
harshly upon their abilities.

CPT: . . . fear in the subordinate of relief and
a bad OER if he admits that his unit is less than
perfect or he is presenting a point his superior
doesn't want to hear. . . . The subordinate must
have the integrity to 'tell it like it is' in spite
of fear for his career, etc., while the superior
owes it to his subordinates to help him as much as
possible as opposed to the attitude of 'you get it
squared away or I'll get someone who will' over a
one-time deficiency. . . . It takes a great deal

of personal courage to say 'the screw up occurred here' rather than passing the blame down to a lower level. The only solution would again be the development of personal integrity and moral courage. . . . Perhaps an emphasis on these traits as opposed to the sledgehammer of, 'you screwed up once and now it will haunt you forever on your OER.'

CPT: In other words, the CO who allows his subordinates to make certain mistakes in order to increase their proficiency and ability even though it makes the CO look bad is the officer zapped by the OER. Reduce this . . . by effective leadership.

CPT: Military personnel, primarily career types, are too concerned with promotions, efficiency reports, and conforming to the wishes of their commander. . . . Many times a good soldier is . . . treated unfairly by his superiors for maintaining high standards of professional military competence.

CPT: Too many officers place the value of a high OER over the welfare of their men. . . . The Army should select men for command positions who have some backbone and who care about the unit and the men more than they care about their career. Relieve officers who fail in these areas. . . . Too many officers will go to any means to receive a high OER.

COL: Endless CYA exercises create suspicion and distrust on the part of juniors for the integrity and competence of their superiors. . . . 'Buck passing' has always been a problem, but reluctance to accept responsibility at high level is increasingly evident, as viewed by the juniors.

COL: Across the board the Officer Corps is lacking in their responsibilities of looking out for the welfare of subordinates.

COL: Chaotic conditions in the Army permit unprincipled officers to work undetected.

COL: We appear to live in an environment which does not tolerate less than total success, with the result that delegation of authority to subordinate levels cannot be accepted since the commander cannot afford to be 'smeared' by the taint of even possible failure. Subordinates reared in such an environment can do no more than perpetuate . . . this practice . . . It is a trend which needs to be reversed before the initiative of the junior officer is completely subverted.

COL: Everyone is afraid to make a mistake with someone always looking over his shoulder. . . . Authority and ability are diluted at every level. . . .

When senior officers let their personal ambitions show through in their actions and decisions, this weakens ethical standards throughout that portion of the Officer Corps who know of this

Many, many young officers who realize that personal ambition and not the long range good of the organization is the 'why' of certain decisions leave the Army. Hence, example tends to keep in the Army those who are willing to follow that example.

COL: It appears to me that we want only to impress people with what we do right . . . with a result that reports are shaded and do not reflect the true state of an organization. . . . I feel that many senior officers need exposure to modern concepts of personal management, communication techniques, motivation, and the need for self-actualization that young officers . . . possess.

COL: Officers do not know their own jobs well enough and . . . they are afraid that if they delegate authority to subordinates, . . . they themselves will suffer . . . the present day commander looks upon his command tour as a mechanism to help him get ahead provided he does not rock the boat or make waves . . . As a result, subordinates are not being properly developed and there is a general feeling among junior officers that seniors are untouchable, unapproachable, unreasonable, and constantly looking for mistakes A commander who takes a genuine interest in the welfare and the training of his subordinates is getting rarer, indeed. . . . I continue to be impressed by the potential and desire of officer candidates who are being commissioned.

COL: Many of these young officers are exceptional and in my experience come much closer to the 'ideal' than did junior officers in the period 1945-1955 It appears the greatest single factor working against the ideal is excessive career competition among upper and senior officers. At Battalion Commander level this problem becomes acute and continues from Battalion to Brigade to Division The below zone promotion scheme should be reconsidered (I had one to O-6). Better would be a higher passover rate and no below zone promotions The capable, ambitious officer must be protected from himself but more importantly the junior officers and EM beneath him [them] must be protected.

MAJ: I am concerned with honesty--trust--and administrative competence within the Officer Corps. . . . Command influence impairs calling a 'spade a spade.' . . . One of my raters exemplified the subject concept . . . His primary interest was 'No. 1'; everything else (including the welfare of the command) was handled on a 'two-faced' basis. He would 'bleed' his troops dry to make a good impression--then stab his subordinates in the back when they were no longer useful . . . I'm not attempting sarcasm, but the concept of 'getting your ticket punched' has gone too far.

It is of more than passing interest to note how these themes recur in allied literature. In May 1970 several officers from the USMA class of 1971 who were resigning were interviewed by the USMA Office of Research. Included in the preliminary draft of a paper summarizing the interviews were the following:

Their first complaint was based on the perception of senior officers, particularly colonels and lieutenant colonels who were in command positions, that as a result of the 'system' the latter officers were forced to abandon their scruples and ignore the precepts of duty and honor; and if necessary to lie and cheat in order to remain successful and competitive . . .

A second complaint was that no one had shown any real interest in them, their careers, in their opinions. Without exception, each of the [ten] resignees states that this interview was the first time that any senior officer had ever sat down and talked with them as opposed to talking at them.

This theme--of a senior not listening--permeated the seminar sessions conducted at the schools by the USAWC study group. Many officers, including those up to the grade of lieutenant colonel, expressed the view that the seminar sessions conducted by the USAWC teams were the first time their opinions had ever been solicited by their seniors.

Many of the junior officers stated that it was not ultimately important whether or not their individual recommendations were placed into effect because they did not presume to understand all of the big picture. Of vital importance to them was the fact that a senior officer would or would not give them a chance to express their views, including bad as well as good news.

Another interesting by-product of the seminars conducted with the younger officers was the reaction of the USAWC team members. They were impressed with the insight, energy, maturity, and outlook of the captains and majors particularly. And some of the team members felt that had they been somehow exposed to the barrage of unfiltered, straightforward perceptions of the junior officers a few years ago they would have done a better job as battalion commanders.

It is also noteworthy that the conditions described both in the written narrative and the seminars are practically identical to parts of the situation revealed by the Franklin Institute Study and published in Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-20, Personnel--General: Junior Officer Retention, dated August 1969.

c. The Elements of Imperfection. Variance from the ideal was perceived by and attributed to officers of all grades. The more senior the officer, the less he perceived variations from the ideal. The junior officers were perceived by all grades including their own as departing slightly more from ideal standards than were senior officers. The senior officers were held more responsible for everyone's deviations because they play such an influential part in the design

and operation of the system. Hypocrisy in a junior officer is often perceived as an individual aberration; hypocrisy in a senior officer is perceived as a basic flaw in the system. The poor example of senior officers--in matters of ethics and technical competence--was a recurring theme, particularly in the qualitative data.

Officers of all grades indicated that there was a greater deviation from ideal standards in "professional military competence" (referred to within this paper as "technical competence," meaning the aspects of proficiency in assigned duties) than in "ethical behavior." In attempting to construct a paradigm that would refine the cause-effect cycle, it became apparent that ethical behavior and technical competence are tightly interlaced. (See Figure III-1, p. 22.)

3. Determination of the Causal Factors.

a. The Interdependence of Apparent Cause and Effect. Early in the study two preliminary findings became clear: the subject of professionalism is all-encompassing, and the entire spectrum of Army activities and officer duties must be examined in order to get anything close to an accurate view; and the cause-effect ingredients are so intermixed and circuitous as to defy separation of one from the other. These two findings are especially significant when formulating and implementing corrective actions. For example, whether the misuse of statistical indicators is a cause of dishonest reporting or simply an effect of incompetent or inexperienced management is unclear. What is clear is that the misuse of statistical indicators is part of a much

larger puzzle that includes such things as inexperience stemming from rapid personnel turnover (much of which the Army imposed on itself), a quest for a perfect record, and increasingly complex technical environment, and the existence of data processing equipments.

Inaccurate reporting--rampant throughout the Army and perceived by every grade level sampled from O-2 through O-7--is significant and representative of the interdependence of a number of factors. First, it is a logical by-product of data processing technology: the need to quantify progress and compare efficiency, the need to allocate scarce resources, the tendency to apply the "commercial ethic" which equates success with measurable output, and the desire to make decisions at the highest possible level where more of the complete picture can be appreciated--where political or fiscal nuances can be viewed in better perspective. Second, it is a result of our failing to recognize the importance of the non-quantifiable variables in a valid equation of personal or organizational success. This is particularly true of barely perceptible environmental changes which can be tolerated day by day, but which accrete to counter-productive forces over the long haul. While giving lip service to the Army's being "people oriented," we have in fact rewarded the non-people part of the equation.

Statistical indicators deserve particular attention because they are present as a factor in so many of the perceived variances between the ideal and the operative standards. They represent a crutch on which the inexperienced or transient commander can lean in judging his own or his subordinates' progress. Being incomplete, but the

focus of attention because they are measurable over the short term period, they can cause a diversion of effort from substantive matters to trivial or symptomatic indicators. They are susceptible to manipulation and frequently go unchallenged because of lack of time and technical competence along the chain of command, or because of a fixation on good news without regard for fact. The generation and analysis of these "indicators" create a force within the institution that is self-perpetuating: thus commanders and staff officers live for peripheral success indicators such as the comparative DR figures, the savings bond scores, and the reenlistment rate. We then generate organizational eroding procedures and incidents, all done under the guise of "mission accomplishment" or the "can do" spirit. Still, two relevant points should be mentioned which were made clear by many of the respondents:

Statistical indicators are legitimate management tools and should not be disregarded summarily. It is their misuse, not their existence, to which there is loud objection.

The "can do" spirit is indispensable in a military unit. Mission accomplishment is the reason for being. However, not all short term missions may be worth the sacrifice of people, sweat, loyalty, or other precious commodities. The "can do" spirit must be tempered with unselfish good judgment and sometimes held in abeyance.

b. Schematic of the Cause-Effect Cycle. The diagram on the next page (Figure III-1) shows one concept of the flow of cause and effect.

POSSIBLE CAUSE-EFFECT CYCLE




Figure III-1

A basic cause appears to be the striving for personal success. Such striving is desirable within bounds, and is an expected trait among the type of aggressive, dynamic, goal-oriented competitors the Army attracts and relies upon. Therefore, the solution to uninhibited and unethical adventurism for personal gain must be to structure the reward system and educate the executors of the system so that personal ambitions are kept within bounds. This is not done by directing an officer to submit honest reports. It is done by setting realistic goals that can be met by reasonable, dedicated people, whose methods and attitudes can be monitored by superiors who have the experience and expertise to be able to recognize inaccurate reports when they see them. It is done by building mutual trust and confidence, and loyalty that comes from being in one assignment long enough to be able to recover from mistakes; and to have genuine concern--as a practical matter--about the impact which expedient methods will have on the unit next year. As one captain wrote in his questionnaire, "Loyalty applies to personnel on both ends, and is based on mutual respect and trust. Loyalty cannot be developed in many occasions in today's Army because of the rapid movement of personnel. . . . True loyalty among men is not developed overnight." As these remarks correctly illustrate, there is direct interrelation between officer assignment policies and the enhancement of an optimum professional environment. And other interrelationships--between material readiness, post work details, selection board actions, service school graduation standards, and many others--all contribute to the climate. It is their

total impact--the "system"-- that drives much of the actual ethical standards of the Officer Corps. Some will fight the system, and survive, on opposite ends of the scale: the incorruptible idealists and the ethical/moral bums. But because most are carried along by the operating system of reward and punishment, it is the modification of that system which appears to be a primary key to improving the professional climate in the Army. As custodians of the "system," it is again to the senior officers that one must turn for viable solutions.

c. Areas Requiring Examination. Findings of this study indicate that at least three factors which may contribute to unethical behavior need close scrutiny:

(1) The Unrealistic Demand for Perfection. Faultless performance may be a suitable immediate goal for production line workers who have routine tasks or for skilled technicians who have nearly infinite time. For those who deal with complex organizations, changing missions, and people of various aptitudes, perfection or "zero defects" is an impossibility. It is a simplistic approach that appeals to few people on the working end of the organization. It is especially unappealing to those who take things seriously, who want to accomplish their mission, and who are prone to report the truth. It is antithetical to the Army's proclamation that it is people-oriented. Pressures to achieve unrealistic goals, whether imposed by design or generated through incompetence, soon strain the ethical fiber of the organization.

(2) The Method of Evaluating Officers. Findings of this study cast doubts that our present method of efficiency ratings is adequate. The basic assumptions of the evaluative process as well as the mechanics of the system have questionable validity. That the rating system is operated by humans and thereby imperfect is not the point. One point is whether or not the system of having only a superior's evaluation of an officer's performance recognizes realistically the nature of human relationships. With all the imperfections in the professional climate that this study and other studies reveal, the present system of ratings that emphasizes "efficiency" instead of perhaps "efficiency plus the quality of the man" seems to be part of the problem and of little help in the solution. The battalion commander who as one captain described in a discussion group " . . . had always his mission in mind and he went about performing that mission with the utmost proficiency. His mission was getting promoted . . . " frequently fools the boss but rarely fools his peers or his subordinates. Peer or subordinate input, inserted so as not to disturb unduly the chain of command, should be examined. A second point to ponder is whether or not a performance-evaluating system in a large organization can be expected to discriminate between those top quality people sufficiently so they can be placed in any reliable numerical order. The present system purports to do that--in selection for general officer in particular. Perhaps after a certain plateau is reached, the Army must admit publicly that chance and the personal preference of selection boards are the only real discriminators.

(3) The Essentiality of Command or High Level Staff. The perceptions of the group of officers queried during this study left no doubt but that we have created a climate in which "doing certain jobs" takes precedence over developing expertise. It apparently has been some time since the Army questioned the assumption that a wide variety of assignments, including command at every possible grade level, is the most desirable career pattern for officers of the combat arms. The implications of this assumption are so far-reaching that possibly no single personnel management concept--save that of the uninhibited quest for the unblemished record--has more impact on the future competence of the Officer Corps

d. The Role of External Forces On the Contemporary Professional Climate.

Doubtless many factors outside the control of the Army helped to set the stage for our toleration of expedients and less-than-optimum techniques. Some of these might be: the knowledge and technological explosions that made the practice of management more complex; data processing technology that permitted--if not demanded--centralized control of expensive resources; a prolonged period of marginally-funded force levels where over-extended manpower was substituted for new equipment or for inadequate O&M funds; and a number of important and sensitive missions--Berlin buildup, Cuban crisis, and parts of the buildup and conduct of the Vietnam War--where getting the job done quickly was the thing that mattered most.

However, neither singularly nor grouped together do these appear to be prime causative factors of those conditions within the Army's professional climate which represent deviations from ideal standards. These external events did not present the Army with such unremitting and constraining pressures as to demand exterior perfection regardless of the importance of the mission, or the means used to get the job done. There is no externally imposed rationale for the seemingly prevalent uninhibited quest for personal success at almost any price. There was no outside force that directly caused the isolation of senior officers; no obvious excuse for the seeming penchant for rewarding those who don't "rock the boat."

The military is not immune from the intrusion of parts of the changing value system of society. Indeed, the intense competition for promotion, the preoccupation with maintaining an image of personal success, and the interest in accumulating a pile of statistical evidence of efficiency are commonplace in the world of American commerce. These facts of life were considered in both the design and execution of the study.

However, these larger trends, as well as more transitory ingredients of societal change such as the anti-war, anti-establishment movements, did not appear to be primary causative factors to such a degree that they were truly consequential in this assessment of the professional climate. One can draw this conclusion from three portions of the data base. First, the young officers who are most directly affected by recent societal changes still profess to accept the

traditional ideal of Duty-Honor-Country. They also complain with seeming sincerity about any deviations they see between ideal and actual standards. Also, and consistent with the outlook of the stereotype of the better informed and somewhat skeptical youth of today, the junior officers are prompt to criticize substandard performance. And some of them, according to their own perceptions, are willing to accommodate to the norm of the group even though the norm be less than ideal. Second, the military has not lately changed its traditional ideal standards and there was no suggestion put forth from the officers queried that it should. Third, the system which touts "zero defects," "ticket punching," and preoccupation with "measurable trivia" that most officers seemed concerned about was devised by senior officers, not by junior officers. If recent trends from the outside have affected directly the value scale of senior officers, the mechanism for such change did not surface during this study. One must therefore conclude that there appears to be little justification for blaming the bulk of the imperfections extant in our profession on the general trends which some sociologists discern in our society or which plague the outside world in general.

4. Possible Impact of the Climate on the Future of the Army.

The existing climate includes a hardy potential for improvement in that there is public acceptance of the traditional ideals of the professional soldier, and an apparently genuine dissatisfaction with imperfections. However, the present climate does not appear to be self-correcting. The human drives for success and for recognition by

seniors, sustained if not inflamed by the systems of reward and management which cater to immediate personal success at the expense of a long term consolidation of moral and ethical strength, would appear to perpetuate if not exacerbate the current environment. Time alone will not cure the disease. The fact also that the leaders of the future are those who survived and excelled within the rules of the present system militates in part against the initiation of any self-starting incremental return toward the practical application of ideal values. It is impossible to forecast future institutional climates with any degree of reliability. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to state as consequences of the present climate: it is conducive to self-deception because it fosters the production of inaccurate information; it impacts on the long term ability of the Army to fight and win because it frustrates young, idealistic, energetic officers who leave the service and are replaced by those who will tolerate if not condone ethical imperfection; it is corrosive of the Army's image because it falls short of the traditional idealistic code of the soldier--a code which is the key to the soldier's acceptance by a modern free society; it lowers the credibility of our top military leaders because it often shields them from essential bad news; it stifles initiative, innovation, and humility because it demands perfection or the pose of perfection at every turn; it downgrades technical competence by rewarding instead trivial, measurable, quota-filling accomplishments; and it eventually squeezes much of the inner satisfaction and personal enjoyment out of being an officer.

**PART
IV**

CONCLUSIONS

PART IV - CONCLUSIONS AND CONCEPTS FOR SOLUTION

A. CONCLUSIONS.

1. The ideal standards of ethical/moral/professional behavior as epitomized by "Duty-Honor-Country" are accepted by the Officer Corps as proper, meaningful, and relevant for the Army of today.

2. There are widespread and often significant differences between the ideal ethical/moral/professional standards of the Army--as epitomized by Duty-Honor-Country--and the prevailing standards.

3. The variances between the ideal standards and the actual or operative standards are perceived with striking similarity by the cross section of officers queried during the conduct of this study.

4. The officers queried, in general, and the junior officers in particular, were concerned about the unethical practices they observed and were eager to do their part in correcting the situation.

5. The junior officers as a group were vigorous, energetic, intelligent, and dedicated; and were intolerant of substandard performance by their subordinates, peers, or superiors.

6. There was no significant evidence that contemporary sociological pressures--which are everpresent--were primary causes of the differences between the ideal and the actual professional climate in the Army; the problems are for the most part internally generated; they will not vanish automatically as the war in Vietnam winds down and the size of the Army decreases.

7. "Ethical behavior" and "military competence" (knowledge of assigned duties) are closely interrelated, and inadequate performance

in one area contributes to inadequate performance in the other. This demonstrates the importance of professional ethics to long range mission accomplishment.

8. The Army rewards system focuses on the accomplishment of short term, measurable, and often trivial tasks, and neglects the development of those ethical standards which are essential to a healthy profession.

9. The degree of deviation below ideal standards is greater in "military competence" than in "ethical behavior."

10. The most frequently recurring specific themes describing the variance between ideal and actual standards of behavior in the Officer Corps include: selfish, promotion-oriented behavior; inadequate communication between junior and senior; distorted or dishonest reporting of status, statistics, or officer efficiency; technical or managerial incompetence; disregard for principles but total respect for accomplishing even the most trivial mission with zero defects; disloyalty to subordinates; senior officers setting poor standards of ethical/professional behavior.

11. The communication between junior and senior is inadequate; the junior feels neglected and the senior is often out of touch with reality. Junior officers believe that lieutenant colonels and colonels in particular do not listen to them; they talk "to" rather than "with" them.

12. The present climate is not conducive to retaining junior officers who place strong emphasis on principle rather than expediency.

13. Variances between ideal and actual standards are condoned, if not engendered, by certain Army policies regarding officer evaluation, selection for promotion, career concepts and assignment policies, and information reporting systems.

14. The present climate is not self-correcting, and because of the nature and extent of the problem, changes must be credibly instituted and enforced by the Army's top leadership.

15. Correcting the climate will require more than superficial, transitory measures. The climate cannot be corrected by admonitions. Concrete modification of the systems of reward and punishment to support adherence to the time-honored principles of an Army officer is required.

B. CONCEPTS FOR SOLUTION.

1. General.

Any organization must perform three functions to survive:

a. It must accomplish its day-to-day tasks with effectiveness and efficiency.

b. It must select and train competent and dedicated people to be its future leaders.

c. It must accomplish the above through means that are consistent with its basic philosophy, its ideals and traditions, and its self image.

The professional climate of the Army today indicates that item c is being handled inadequately, and the adequacy of the system for supporting item b may be in doubt. Item a is also suffering to some

degree, in that there is presently a gap between real accomplishments and reported accomplishments in many areas of activity including such variety as: readiness status of aircraft, body count, status, AWOL rate, and CMNI scores. There is a close relationship between military competence and ethical behavior.

Corrective measures which are designed to improve the present climate must be attentive to each of the three listed functions.

2. Criteria for Corrective Measures.

- a. The need for change, plans for change, and consequences of change must be known to all officers.
- b. Each corrective measure must be compatible with all other elements of the total package of corrective measures.
- c. Corrective measures should be identifiable so that their implementation can be monitored and periodic feedback provided.
- d. Corrective measures should be reasonably self-sustaining--enduring without constant admonition--if designed to effect long term changes.
- e. If designed to cause dramatic short term gains, measures should be capable of being clearly enunciated, easily understood, and free of significant counter-productive side effects.
- f. If designed to cause immediate results, they must be compatible with the predicted domestic and fiscal environments of the next few years: they cannot be extraordinarily expensive or counter to the realities of contemporary society.


g. Corrective measures must be so clearly stated that they cannot be misinterpreted as an additional statistical burden instead of a healthy part of a worthwhile solution.

h. Changes cannot be predicated upon any fundamental changes in human behavior or basic value scales.


3. Areas for Implementing Corrective Measures.

a. The Isolation of Possible Areas for Corrective Actions.

Analysis of the data revealed variances between ideal and actual standards. These variances had components, intermixed, of both ethical and job-skill derivation.



The attempt to isolate causative factors confirmed the difficulty of differentiating between cause and effect.



However, certain characteristics of the professional climate appeared to warrant special attention as being important and susceptible to change by the Army. Areas of particular interest as possible areas for corrective action included:

- ° Improving honest communication between junior and senior.
- ° Providing stability in assignments.
- ° Placing emphasis on development of expertise.
- ° Rewarding important, ethical behavior and de-emphasizing the importance of short term trivial accomplishments.

- ° Taking some of the edge out of competition for promotion.
- ° Revising the officer efficiency reporting system.

From these broad areas, specific recommendations--each formulated to address one or more of the undesirable facets of the existing climate--were developed.

b. Applicability of Corrective Measures. Some of the factors which contribute to the perceived differences between ideal and actual standards are amenable to rather quick change through nothing more than alteration of Army policies or procedure. (Time in grade for promotion to captain is an example of this type of corrective measure.) Other factors may be partially susceptible to administrative or procedural solution within the Army, although the results of the corrective measures may not be felt for months or years. (Modification of the efficiency report form, or altering service school curricula to include subjects on ethical behavior are examples of this type of corrective measure.) Other contributing factors, such as the intense ambition to succeed, may not

be amenable to change, or may not be totally bad. Corrective factors must be designed around unalterable behavioral or societal trends in order to canalize the force of such trends into productive, ethical patterns or at least to minimize their deleterious impact by not rewarding their continuation. (Not rewarding the winner of contests where the only yardstick is the accumulation of trivial or meaningless statistics, regardless of the means used to generate the statistics, is a fitting example.)

Because of the previously mentioned interrelationships among the many facets of ethical and technical performance, there should be positive side effects from all properly framed corrective measures. Some of these side effects will be subtle and not subject to short term quantification. (As an example, some form of peer rating as an adjunct to the present efficiency report system might eventually dampen selfish behavior and sharpen technical skills among competitors, as well as provide a better picture of the quality of the officer being evaluated.)

Based on the type and magnitude of the perceived variances from ideal standards, analysis by the study group of those Army policies and practices most susceptible to being modified without unacceptably counter-productive side effects, suggestions derived from solution-oriented seminars at the US Army War College, and the specific criteria listed in paragraph 2 above, a variety of corrective measures should be considered. Some will appear suitable for immediate implementation. Some should be tested with a view toward later acceptance, modification,

of rejection. Some will require further study to determine their potential before a test or implementation is worthwhile.

PART

V

RECOMMENDATIONS

PART V - RECOMMENDATIONS

A. GENERAL.

The variables addressed in this study are human value systems and individual motivations. Defects in the existing professional climate defy simplistic solution. These recommendations, therefore, are not presented as a panacea. Nevertheless, each of the items listed appears to warrant consideration. They are grouped in three categories and identified as being: recommended for implementation soonest (RFI); recommended for implementation in some form on a trial basis (ITE); or recommended for further study to determine feasibility and practicality (RFS). The rationale, feedback system, and pertinent remarks for each recommendation are included in Table V-1. Specific recommendations are listed under broad headings but each recommendation has ramifications which cover other parts of the solution spectrum.

B. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Disseminate to the Officer Corps the pertinent findings of this study by means such as:

a. Sending this report, or appropriate portions of it, suitably indorsed by the Chief of Staff, to key general officers in the Army. (RFI)

b. Including the subject of professional ethics in the curricula of the service schools, using appropriate sections of this study as part of the background material. (RFI)

c. Including the substance of this study as a topic for the next Army Commanders' Conference. (RFS)

d. Developing, through use of suitable professional agencies, a written questionnaire which focuses on officer value systems. Administer the questionnaire over a period of years at the Advanced Courses, USACGSC, and USAWC to generate a data base, assess trends, and keep the issue of individual and group values alive. (RFS)

2. Promote an atmosphere conducive to honest communication between junior and senior officers by means such as:

a. Providing instruction in individual and group communications at USACGSC and USAWC.

b. Removing wherever possible statistical competition or fixed quotas within organizations (bond and fund drive competitions, OCS/USMA applicant quotas); and resorting wherever practicable to the "pass-fail" system of formal rating without numerical scores for organizational inspections or tests. (CMMI-TPI-AGI-ORI ratings, etc.) (RFS)

c. Eliminating Junior Officer Councils except for those groups of officers who are in student or essentially transient status. (RFS)

3. Outline standards for counseling of subordinates by means such as:

a. Providing instruction on counseling subordinates (defined in the broad sense of providing aid and guidance across the whole range of professionalism through personal communication of ideas and attitudes) at the Advanced Courses and the USACGSC. (RFS)

b. Publishing a suitable text, possibly in Department of the Army Pamphlet format, outlining the need and explaining the methods for counseling subordinates and permitting them to participate in the dialogue. (RFS)

4. Provide continuing motivation for the competent and facilitate elimination of the substandard performers by means such as:

a. Providing to outstanding colonels (perhaps 10 percent of those retiring in any year group) at retirement, a promotion to brigadier general ("Tombstone Promotion"). (Have a Department of the Army selection board make the list of promotees.) (RFI)

b. Simplifying the administrative procedures for elimination of officers from the Service. (RFS)

c. Having promotion boards also serve as screening boards for candidates for elimination from the Service. (RFS)

d. Upgrading the academic challenge at Advanced Courses and eliminating from the Service those who fail to meet reasonable academic or traditional ethical standards. (RFS)

5. Enforce adherence to standards, with senior officers setting the example by means such as:

a. Taking immediate disciplinary action against officers who violate ethical standards. Facilitate this by simplifying judicial procedures as appropriate. (RFI)

b. Providing each officer upon commissioning with a hard-bound copy of a special text which will include The Armed Forces Officer, the Officer's Creed, a message from the Chief of Staff, and other

appropriate documents which set enduring standards of professionalism.

(RFI)

c. Establishing uniform standards for those practices which now are subject to interpretation and vary between units or posts, and which are amenable to Army-wide policies. (The recent haircut standard prescribed by the Department of the Army is one example of a step in the right direction.) (RFI)

d. Promulgating an Officer's Creed which will serve to highlight and summarize the ethical standards of the Officer's Corps. (Attached as Inclosure 2.) (RFI)

e. Providing for attendance at special short courses at branch schools and the USACGSC for selectees to brigadier general to enhance their skills relevant to communication with junior officers as well as to ensure their currency on technical matters. (The example of these brigadier general selectees is especially meaningful in determining the value systems of the professional climate.) (RFS)

6. Focus on the development of measurable expertise by means such as:

a. Including acceptable completion of a written examination on common and branch material subjects as a prerequisite to attendance at the USACGSC or equivalent schools. (RFS)

b. Including an additional commissioned grade--such as senior captain--between the present O-3 and O-4 grades. Modify the TOE grade levels so that this grade would be authorized for the commander of company size units. (RFS)

c. Encouraging initiative and learning by experience through public recognition that human activities are not susceptible to complete

statistical measurement, that mistakes in training are expected, and that--while perfection may be a long term goal--the concept of "zero defects" is not applicable to all aspects of management. (RFS)

7. Revise certain officer assignment priorities and policies, to include policy regarding the duration and essentiality of command tours by means such as:

a. Assigning all lieutenant colonels and colonels to TOP command positions by name from OPD after suitable OPD selection board action. (RFI)

b. Placing higher priorities for assignment of USACGSC and SSC graduates to service schools, training centers, and ROTC staffs; and spreading the concentration of talent now in Headquarters, Department of the Army out to the field. (RFI)

c. Requiring commanders to submit a letter of explanation--after the fact--whenever a commander is removed prior to his completing the prescribed minimum tour. (All command assignments will be made by OPD.) (RFI)

d. Making stability in command positions at battalion and brigade level first among assignment and military education priorities. (OPD will not reassign battalion or brigade commanders before completing a prescribed minimum tour unless relieved for cause by the local commander. Continuity in command will take precedence over attendance at any military school for which the officer is selected. His schooling will be deferred without prejudice.) (RFI)

e. Removing from the optimum career patterns for combat arms officers the requirement that to advance rapidly in grade they must command both at battalion and brigade level as well as serve on high level staffs. (This permits longer command tours, while still giving equal advancement opportunity to officers specializing in other areas of vital importance not associated with tactical operations or high level staff.) (RFI)

f. Reducing to a minimum, or eliminating entirely for all grades below O-6, the "nominating" of officers for assignments and the honoring of "by name" requests. (RFS)

g. Revising the officer evaluation system by means such as:

a. Including as a supplementary input to officer efficiency files the results of peer ratings. These ratings would be compiled from periodic solicitations by mail from Headquarters, Department of the Army of comments from selected officers (none of whom would be serving in the same organization at the time of solicitation) on those contemporaries with whom they have served in past assignments. Integrate the peer evaluations with the ratings of the rater and indorser. (ITB)

b. Reassessing as a matter of continuing priority all facets--including basic assumptions--of the system of officer evaluation, including: the role of the efficiency report in making assignments; the possible role of the indorsing officer as an evaluator of the rating officer as well as an evaluator of the rated officer; the weight and nature of the indorsing officer's comments and entries when his duties obviously preclude intimate knowledge of the rated officer;

and the possibility of designing different efficiency report forms for different officer grade level groupings (such as one rather concise form for O-1 through O-3, another form for O-4 and O-5, one for O-6, and one for general officers). (RFS)

9. Revise the concept of officer career patterns by means such as:

See other items.

10. Revise promotion policies by means such as:

a. Eliminating or modifying the "secondary zone" promotion so that the opportunity for accelerated promotion of certain officers is retained but the "5 percent" aspect is omitted by extending the "primary zone," reducing the rate of selection, and omitting the "secondary zone." (Provisions will remain for retaining on active duty in grade those officers who are competent but who are not suited for further promotion.) (RFI)

b. Returning the authority for promotion to captain to Headquarters, Department of the Army; and phasing back to the pre-Vietnam time in grade requirement for promotion to captain. (RFI)

c. Enacting and announcing a policy that selection boards for brigadier general will send partial lists of a group of final candidates for selection to students at USACGSC and USAWC for comments. The total list would be 3 or 4 times the size of the authorized number of selectees. Each student would--anonymously and holding his list in confidence--mark one of five possible responses beside each name: "I do not know this colonel well enough to give my opinion, or I do not want to express my opinion; I know this colonel and he would make a superb general officer; I know this colonel and I would concur in his selection for general

officer; I know this colonel, and I wouldn't have much confidence in him as a general officer; I know this colonel and he should never be promoted to general officer." These results would be compiled and returned to the president of the selection board for such use as he sees fit. (ITB)

d. Ensuring that promotion boards receive comprehensive instructions which are compatible with announced policies of career pattern and assignment priorities, and which do not in effect validate "ticket punching" as the unique route to rapid promotion. (RFS)

NO.	RECOMMENDATION	OBJECTIVE OF THE RECOMMENDATION	RATIONALE (STUDY BASIS) FOR
1	<u>Disseminate to the Officer Corps the pertinent findings of this study by means such as:</u>	To improve understanding of the contemporary professional climate of the Army.	Both behavioral theory and the empirical data of this study show that the group climate of the professional ethic must be in a state of affairs and must support
1a	Sending this report, or appropriate portions of it, suitably indorsed by the Chief of Staff, to key general officers in the Army. (RFI)	To make general officers aware of their unique and absolutely essential role in improving the professional climate.	Seniors set the standards; they are a part of the problem because they set a standard which in some cases deviates from ideal; the pressures for perfection and good ethical behavior.
1b	Including the subject of professional ethics in the curricula of the service schools, using appropriate sections of this study as part of the background material. (RFI)	To focus attention on both the fundamental nature of the problem of professional ethics and some of the means of implementing solutions.	Awareness of the entire group requires recognition of reality and acceptance of responsibility; implementing corrections in essential service schools are conducive to the Officer Corps.
1c	Including the substance of this study as a topic for the next Army Commanders' Conference. (RFS)	Same as 1b above.	Same as 1b above.
1d	Developing, through use of suitable professional agencies, a written questionnaire which focuses on officer value systems. Administer the questionnaire over a period of years at the Advanced Courses, USACGSC, and USAMC to generate a data base, assess trends, and keep the issue of individual and group values alive. (RFS)	To focus attention on the problem as both a practical and an academic matter for serious study by members of the Officer Corps.	Development of continuing interest in ethical behavior is needed; professionalists should study the problem; term data base will facilitate future study. Little factual information in usable and reliable form.
2	<u>Promote an atmosphere conducive to honest communication between junior and senior officers by means such as:</u>	To improve communications within the Officer Corps, particularly between junior and senior.	That senior officers don't listen to prevalent complaints among junior officers; results is that seniors are often uninformed. Instruction in communications is one method of increasing interest in the subject, and introspection and empathy for others.
2a	Providing instruction in individual and group communications at USACGSC and USAMC.	Same as 2 above.	Many senior officers are considered to be poorly informed. The senior officers are listening--of talking "at" not "to."
2b	Removing wherever possible statistical competition or fixed quotas within organizations (bond and fund drive competitions, OCS/USMA applicant quotas); and resorting wherever practicable to the "pass-fail" system of formal rating without numerical scores for organizational inspections or tests. (CMI-TPI-AGI-ORI ratings, etc.) (RFS)	To encourage honest communication (reporting) by minimizing unhealthy, non-productive competition in areas that are of little long-term importance, or that consume inordinate amounts of time and energy getting those last few points to keep the commander's record clean; and by assisting in creating a climate that is conducive to using initiative and being free from constant fear that a single mistake will end a "career."	Competition over "measurable" or "quantifiable" results is debilitating because it saps energy and compensation save on the commander's side; conducive to lowering ethical standards, particularly the junior officers. It is one rationale for saying that scores so high in the descriptive of the present ethical

Figure V-1

RATIONALE (STUDY BASIS) FOR THE RECOMMENDATION	COMMENTS ON IMPLEMENTATION AND FEEDBACK	REMARKS
<p>Both behavioral theory and the specific findings of this study show that the group that is the custodian of the professional ethic must be aware of the true state of affairs and must support any required changes.</p> <p>Seniors set the standards; they are a major source of the problem because they set standards which in some cases deviate from ideal; they also create pressures for perfection and good news which subvert ethical behavior.</p> <p>Awareness of the entire group regarding the need to recognize reality and accept responsibility for implementing corrections is essential to change. The service schools are conduits to the heart of the Officer Corps.</p> <p>Same as 1b above.</p> <p>Development of continuing interest and study of trends in ethical behavior is needed; professional behavioral scientists should study the problem in depth; long term data base will facilitate future studies of this type. Little factual information is available today in usable and reliable form.</p>	<p>The attitude of senior officers toward the idea that constructive change is necessary will indicate prospects for improvement.</p> <p>Will start in USAWC in AY 71. Discussing the problem is part of the solution. Feedback can come in part through faculty observation of student reaction.</p> <p>Will provide added emphasis to the subject and permit discussion of details and priorities.</p> <p>Professional analysis of the results of such a questionnaire is a major element of the entire feedback process.</p>	<p>No other corrective action can be implemented adequately if support does not come from the top leadership of the Army.</p> <p>This study or portions thereof could serve as text material for part of the course. Discussion is the preferred teaching method.</p> <p>The conclusions of the study are more important to understanding the climate than are the recommendations.</p>
<p>That senior officers don't listen is one of the most prevalent complaints among juniors. One of the results is that seniors are often removed from the facts--uninformed. Instruction in interpersonal communications is one method of developing a personal interest in the subject, to include a feel for introspection and empathy for others.</p> <p>Many senior officers are considered by their juniors to be poorly informed. The senior is accused of not listening--of talking "at" not "with" his subordinates.</p> <p>Competition over "measurable trivia" is professionally debilitating because it saps unit energy with no compensation save on the commander's OER. It is conducive to lowering ethical standards. Officers of all grades, particularly the junior officers, recognized this. It is one rationale for the dishonest reporting that scored so high in the specifics of the description of the present ethical climate.</p>	<p>Listening is an art that can be taught. In the process, the subjects of self-image and personal values often arise. These are particularly relevant topics.</p> <p>Successful implementation will depend on a combination of senior commanders not insisting on unnecessary statistical progress reports; and on the officer evaluation system operating so that constant measurable progress is not necessary to judge commanders.</p>	<p>Recognition of the problem is essential.</p> <p>Attitude is important. This instruction should foster a more receptive attitude on the part of seniors.</p> <p>Keeping officers in command long enough so they can have time and freedom to train juniors, to fail in training and recover from it, and to learn their jobs so they can evaluate by "feel" is a prerequisite to success in this area.</p>

Figure V-1

NO.	RECOMMENDATION	OBJECTIVE OF THE RECOMMENDATION	RATIONALE (STUDY BASIS) FOR THE RECOM
2c	Eliminating Junior Officer Councils except for those groups of officers who are in student or essentially transient status. (RFS)	To emphasize that taking care of subordinates is a responsibility of the chain of command.	Looking out for the welfare of subordinates as communicating with them, were major verbal ideal standards described in both quantitative and qualitative data.
3	<u>Outline standards for counseling of subordinates by means such as:</u>	To give recognition to the problem of counseling and to outline techniques.	Junior officers in particular expect to receive in both technical and ethical matters.
3a	Providing instruction on counseling subordinates (defined in the broad sense of providing aid and guidance across the whole range of professionalization through personal communication of ideas and attitudes) at the Advanced Courses and the USACGSC. (RFS)	Same as 3 above.	Counseling is a method for imparting standards and opening channels of communication. Both areas were described consistently as requirements. Effective counseling techniques are subject for any level of education.
3b	Publishing a suitable text, possibly in Department of the Army Pamphlet format, outlining the need and explaining the methods for counseling subordinates and permitting them to participate in the dialogues. (RFS)	Same as 3 above.	Same as 3a above.
4	<u>Provide continuing motivation for the competent and facilitate elimination of the substandard performers by means such as:</u>	To improve the overall quality and effectiveness of the Officer Corps.	Officers of all grades complained that substandard officers were being retained. Junior officers were intolerant of peers as well as seniors who were not performing up. Logically, there should be promotion and reward for those who continue in an outstanding manner; and prompt action for those who are inept or disinterested.
4a	Providing to outstanding colonels (perhaps 10 percent of those retiring in any year group) at retirement, a promotion to brigadier general ("Tomato Promotion"). (Have a Department of the Army selection board make the list of promotees.) (RFI)	To provide recognition as well as an additional incentive for colonels of outstanding quality who are not selected for promotion to general officer grade while on active duty.	Same as 4 above.
4b	Simplifying the administrative procedures for elimination of officers from the Service. (RFS)	To improve the quality of the Officer Corps by facilitating the relief from active duty of those officers whose professional competence or moral/ethical behavior is below standard.	Officers believed that cumbersome administrative procedures hampered the elimination of unproductive officers. "Deadwood" at the O-6 level and junior officer level was mentioned repeatedly.
4c	Having promotion boards also serve as screening boards for candidates for elimination from the Service. (RFS)	To provide a regularly scheduled procedure for determining which officers were not performing well enough to justify retention on duty.	Same as 4b above.
4d	Upgrading the academic challenge at Advanced Courses and eliminating from the Service those who fail to meet reasonable academic or traditional ethical standards. (RFS)	To improve the quality of the Officer Corps by eliminating those officers who, early in their career, do not display the aptitude or the desire to meet minimum standards.	Officers at the Advanced Courses complained that those who were not academically challenged, that among them who were recognized by the standards and that in some instances disciplinary action had been taken against those who had been recognized for superior behavior.

Figure V-1 (Continued)

RECOMMENDATION	RATIONALE (STUDY BASIS) FOR THE RECOMMENDATION	COMMENTS ON IMPLEMENTATION AND FEEDBACK	REMARKS
<p>care of ability of</p> <p>problem of techniques.</p>	<p>Looked out for the welfare of subordinates, as well as communicating with them, were major variances from ideal standards described in both quantitative and qualitative data.</p> <p>Junior officers in particular expect to receive guidance in both technical and ethical matters.</p> <p>Counseling is a method for imparting standards as well as opening channels of communication. Both of these areas were described consistently as requiring attention. Effective counseling techniques are a suitable subject for any level of education.</p> <p>Same as 3a above.</p>	<p>This change must be made with the announced intention of improving communications with junior officers.</p> <p>The text should be suitable as a reference at the service schools.</p>	<p>Actions should be taken to ensure that channels are open in the chain of command before the JOC's are eliminated.</p> <p>An initial routine counseling session immediately upon arrival and oriented to detailed job requirements seems particularly appropriate.</p>
<p>policy and War Corps.</p> <p>well as an colonels of are not general give duty.</p> <p>the Officer relief from ears whose moral/ standard.</p> <p>cheduled which ing well on duty.</p> <p>the Officer e officers r, do not be desire to</p>	<p>Officers of all grades complained that substandard officers were being retained. Junior officers were intolerant of peers as well as seniors who did not measure up. Logically, there should be public recognition and reward for those who continue to perform in an outstanding manner; and prompt action taken against those who are inept or disinterested.</p> <p>Same as 4 above.</p> <p>Officers believed that cumbersome administrative procedures hampered the elimination of unacceptable officers. "Deadwood" at the O-6 level as well as at the junior officer level was mentioned repeatedly.</p> <p>Same as 4b above.</p> <p>Officers at the Advanced Courses complained that they were not academically challenged, that there were those among them who were recognized by the class as unfit, and that in some instances disciplinary action had not been taken against those who had been unethical in behavior.</p>	<p>Each year a board should select from those colonels retiring in the next year the outstanding officers who will receive the promotion to brigadier general (without the pay) upon retirement.</p> <p>This will further complicate the work of selection boards. Extending the time they are in session might be a necessary price to pay.</p>	<p>Several officers remarked that they would prefer to be without officers than saddled with the unfit. The unfit not only do not get the job done but also detract from the atmosphere of professionalism.</p> <p>This action is also a concession to the idea that there are many more outstanding officers than there are vacancies for generals. This promotion at retirement will not appeal to all officers, but for many it should add to their personal satisfaction at no cost.</p> <p>The problem of how to deal with Regular Army officers who are neither misbehaving nor producing results needs particular attention.</p> <p>The possible cheating in service schools reported by some officers, and loudly condemned by them, is closely allied to the problem of seniors' dis-regarding bad news.</p>

Figure V-1 (Continued)

NO.	RECOMMENDATION	OBJECTIVE OF THE RECOMMENDATION	RATIONALE (STUDY BASIS) FOR
5	<u>Enforce adherence to standards, with senior officers setting the example by means such as:</u>	To improve the ethical and professional climate of the Army.	Failure of officers in the grade and above to set personally the example they in theory subscribed was a key cause for disillusionment with the Army's professional climate.
5a	Taking immediate disciplinary action against officers who violate ethical standards. Facilitate this by simplifying judicial procedures as appropriate. (RPI)	To narrow the gap between ideal and actual standards by enforcing publicly strict adherence to accepted ethical standards.	Officers of all grades, but particularly senior officers, perceive tolerance of behavior as a basic hypocrisy.
5b	Providing each officer upon commissioning with a hard-bound copy of a special text which will include <u>The Armed Forces Officer, the Officer's Creed, a message from the Chief of Staff, and other appropriate documents</u> which set enduring standards of professionalism. (RPI)	To improve the professional climate by providing more specific guidelines for daily conduct than now exist; and to provide a personal textbook which can serve repeatedly as a convenient reference in individual study as well as for lesson preparation.	Although Duty-Honor-Country is many officers felt that additional needed. Several remarked that for more specific and definitive
5c	Establishing uniform standards for those practices which now are subject to interpretation and vary between units or posts, and which are amenable to Army-wide policies. (The recent haircut standard prescribed by Department of the Army is one example of a step in the right direction.) (RPI)	To preclude different units, posts, and training activities from having to grapple with the problem of mixed standards that confuse the troops or complicate enforcement.	There were numerous remarks that standards was greatly complicated by interpretation of those regulations which should be uniform. Other, more subjective standards mentioned as suitable targets of local criteria: awards and of punishment for infractions.
5d	Promulgating an <u>Officer's Creed</u> which will serve to highlight and summarize the ethical standards of the Officer's Corps. (RPI)	To provide an easily understood reference by which an officer could be guided, along with other written and unwritten codes, in the performance of his duties and the acceptance of his responsibilities.	Same as 5b above. Also specific letter which directed this action.
5e	Providing for attendance at special short courses at branch schools and the USACGSC for selectees to brigadier general to enhance their skills relevant to communication with junior officers as well as to ensure their currency on technical matters. (The example of these brigadier general selectees is especially meaningful in determining the value systems of the professional climate.) (RFS)	To increase familiarity with the current subject matter at the junior level and to assist in maintaining communication with junior officers at the service schools.	The problem of senior officers' ideas, attitudes, and differences surfaced repeatedly. Both the technical and psychological offered as one solution to the issuing orders with which com
6	<u>Focus on the development of measurable expertise by means such as:</u>	To improve both technical performance and ethical behavior by developing skills and concentration on subject matter.	The quantitative analysis indicate a slightly greater variance in actual standards in "military" "ethical behavior." Further interrelationship between the
6a	Including acceptable completion of a written examination on common and branch material subjects as a prerequisite to attendance at the USACGSC or equivalent schools. (RFS)	To define required knowledge and to stimulate essential learning.	Same as 6 above.

Figure 7-1 (Continued)

CATEGORICAL	RATIONALE (STUDY BASIS) FOR THE RECOMMENDATION	COMMENTS ON IMPLEMENTATION AND FEEDBACK	REMARKS
<p>Professional and Publicly Ethical</p> <p>Standards by which can be referred as well as</p> <p>State, having of mixed cops or</p> <p>Good could written patriot-accept-</p> <p>the unit training officers</p>	<p>Failure of officers in the grade of lieutenant colonel and above to set personally the standards to which they in theory subscribed was widely perceived as a key cause for disillusionment with, and degradation of, the Army's professional climate.</p> <p>Officers of all grades, but particularly the junior officers, perceive tolerance of ethical/moral misbehavior as a basic hypocrisy in the environment.</p> <p>Although Duty-Honor-Country is the accepted standard, many officers felt that additional guidance was needed. Several remarked that they had searched for more specific and definitive discussions.</p> <p>There were numerous remarks that the enforcement of standards was greatly complicated by policies of local interpretation of those regulations of dress and personal appearance which should have Army-wide acceptance. Other, more subjective standards, were also mentioned as suitable targets for narrowing the variety of local criteria: awards and decorations, severity of punishment for infractions, etc.</p> <p>Same as 5b above. Also specifically requested in the letter which directed this study.</p> <p>The problem of senior officers being out of touch with the ideas, attitudes, and difficulties of junior officers surfaced repeatedly. Greater awareness of both the technical and psychological realities was offered as one solution to the problem of seniors issuing orders with which compliance was impossible.</p>	<p>Nothing is more critical to the successful implementation of corrective measures.</p> <p>Officers at service schools should be issued a copy until the pipeline is filled.</p> <p>There is a fine line here between promulgating convenient standards and usurping local initiative. The thrust of the argument for this recommendation is that communications, rapid movement of personnel, and some trends toward legalistic maneuverings trap the junior leader.</p> <p>No written creed can stand without support in practice.</p> <p>Comments of the selectors after association with the students could become part of the data base for future studies of this type.</p>	<p>Junior officers in the discussions and questionnaire response indicated their strong views on this point.</p> <p>The feeling persists that the officer who is caught going five MPH over the limit will receive stiffer punishment than one who is obviously lying about the ADOL rate.</p> <p>Texts have been issued to new officers from time to time in the past. Use of the documents in service schools should maintain interest in keeping the text handy.</p> <p>The Creed could become part of commissioning ceremonies, and by insertion in texts, speeches and pre-commission indoctrination it could enter into the traditional realm eventually.</p> <p>Seminar groups at USAWC strongly urged this recommendation, seeing double returns--the junior officers at the schools also benefiting.</p>
<p>Performance</p> <p>Developing subject</p> <p>and to</p>	<p>The quantitative analysis indicated that officers perceive a slightly greater variance between ideal and actual standards in "military competence" than in "ethical behavior." Further analysis showed a close interrelationship between the two.</p> <p>Same as 6 above.</p>	<p>A written examination should be prepared suitable for local administration several times a year. Officers selected for or in the grade of major would be eligible to take the test. The subject matter for each branch would be widely distributed, as the enlisted MOS tests are now.</p>	<p>Taking the test would be voluntary but a passing grade would be necessary for selection for CGSC schools.</p>

Figure V-1 (Continued)

NO.	RECOMMENDATION	OBJECTIVE OF THE RECOMMENDATION	RATIONALE (STUDY BASIS) FOR THE RECOMMENDATION
6b	Including an additional commissioned grade--such as senior captain--between the present O-3 and O-4 grades. Modify the TOE grade levels so that this grade would be authorized for the commander of company size units. (RFS)	To permit greater experience and competence at the company level without precluding frequent opportunity for promotion during early years of service.	The complexities and responsibilities at the company level have increased while the experience level of company officers have decreased. Job skills at company level are necessary to ensure that ethical standards are supported by technical competence.
6c	Encouraging initiative and learning by experience through public recognition that human activities are not susceptible to complete statistical measurement, that mistakes in training are expected, and that--while perfection may be a long term goal--the concept of "zero defects" is not applicable to all aspects of management. (RFS)	To reduce the pressure to obtain perfection in all measurable activities and thereby facilitate learning and honest reporting.	The striving for immediate perfection and a perfect record were viewed as stifling initiative, focus loyalty primarily upward, and discouraging the passing of bad news. Perversion of the role of statistical indicators set the stage for poor senior-subordinate relations and put emphasis on form instead of content.
7	<u>Revise certain officer assignment priorities and policies, to include policy regarding the duration and essentiality of command tours, by means such as:</u>	To improve stability in assignments; assist in the development of expertise; apply officer talent where it is most needed; and improve interpersonal relationships by reducing turbulence.	Rapid rotation of officers is a primary cause both ethical misbehavior and technical incompetence. (See Figure III-1, p 22.) There was a consensus among officers queried that more talent should be assigned to the field, particularly to the initial entry points and standard-setting posts such as training centers, ROTC, and service schools.
7a	Assigning all lieutenant colonels and colonels to TOE command positions by name from OPD after suitable OPD selection board action. (RFI)	To ensure stability in command duties at battalion and brigade level; place selected officers in command positions and relieve the field commander from having to make these selections.	Rapid rotation of commanders was seen as a primary cause of many of the variances from the ideal. One of the problem stems from the need to complete a command tour, or "get that ticket punched."
7b	Placing higher priorities for assignment of USACGSC and ESG graduates to service schools, training centers, and ROTC staffs; and spreading the concentration of talent now in Headquarters, Department of the Army out to the field. (RFI)	To place a greater number of outstanding officers in positions where they can set standards for junior officers.	Many officers indicated that the clustering of talent in Washington was depriving the field of essential leadership and at the same time was isolating future senior officers from the real of the times. Junior officer retention seems closely related to the quality of field grade officers assigned to training centers, etc.
7c	Requiring commanders to submit a letter of explanation--after the fact--whenever a commander is removed prior to his completing the prescribed minimum tour. (All command assignments will be made by OPD.) (RFI)	To reduce any arbitrary relief of commanders while still retaining the local prerogative of removing from command those officers who are not performing satisfactorily.	Measures that give at least psychological security to commanders should relieve some of the pressure for daily perfection which now pervades in many organizations and is the source of some dishonest reporting and unrealistic demands on subordinates.
7d	Making stability in command positions at battalion and brigade level first among assignment and military education priorities. (OPD will not reassign battalion or brigade commanders before completing a prescribed minimum tour unless relieved for cause by the local commander. Continuity in command will take precedence over attendance at any military school for which the officer is selected. His schooling will be deferred without prejudice.) (RFI)	To provide maximum stability in command assignments.	Stability in command assignments means both technical competence as well as improved senior-subordinate relations.

Figure V-1 (Continued)

RATIONALE (STUDY BASIS) FOR THE RECOMMENDATION	COMMENTS OR IMPLEMENTATION AND FEEDBACK	REMARKS
<p>The complexities and responsibilities at the company level have increased while the experience levels of company officers have decreased. Job skills at company level are necessary to ensure that ethical standards are supported by technical competence.</p> <p>The striving for immediate perfection and a perfect record were viewed as stifling initiative, focusing loyalty primarily upward, and discouraging the passing of bad news. Perversion of the role of statistical indicators set the stage for poor senior-subordinate relations and put emphasis on form instead of content.</p>	<p>Time in grade for captain and major could be compressed to insure the "senior captain" grade.</p> <p>This is in actuality a subtle change which requires both a modification of attitude and a revision of statistical reporting requirements from higher headquarters.</p>	<p>This grade change could be implemented with or without a pay grade adjustment; the senior captain might be paid in the O-3 scale, if needed, to initiate the program.</p> <p>Officers did not question the need for certain statistical indicators; it was the misuse of the statistics that prompted the complaints that were nearly universal.</p>
<p>Rapid rotation of officers is a primary cause of both ethical misbehavior and technical incompetence. (See Figure III-1, p 12.) There was a consensus among officers serving that more talent should be assigned to the field, particularly to the initial entry points and standard-setting posts such as training centers, ROTC, and service schools.</p> <p>Rapid rotation of commanders was seen as a primary cause of many of the variances from the ideal. Part of the problem stems from the need to complete a command tour, or "get that ticket punched."</p> <p>Many officers indicated that the clustering of top talent in Washington was depriving the field of essential leadership and at the same time was isolating future senior officers from the realities of the times. Junior officer retention seems to be closely related to the quality of field grade officers assigned to training centers, etc.</p> <p>Measures that give at least psychological security to commanders should relieve some of the pressure for daily perfection which now pervades in many organizations and is the source of some dishonest reporting and unrealistic demands on subordinates.</p> <p>Stability in command assignments means both technical competence as well as improved senior-subordinate relations.</p>	<p>This action also requires a change in the assumption that command is necessary for rapid promotion. (See item "e" on next page.) Within certain latitude, to accommodate to personal preferences of senior field commanders, DA makes all the assignments.</p> <p>This action can only be implemented successfully if DA selector boards do not in fact reward Washington duties at the expense of other duties.</p> <p>If an officer is removed from command his replacement would be designated by OPD.</p> <p>Stability in command assignments also means a reduction in the number of command positions available over the years. The implementation of this action requires therefore an accompanying change in the career pattern concept of the centrality of command for combat arms officers.</p>	<p>One assumption pertinent to this recommendation is that OPD command selection boards have greater competence in selecting commanders than do individuals in the field who may have incomplete information on which to base these key actions.</p> <p>Performance of duties in the field sets standards for the junior officers and indirectly sets the professional tone of a large part of the Army.</p>

Figure V-1 (Continued)

NO.	RECOMMENDATION	OBJECTIVE OF THE RECOMMENDATION	RATIONALE (STUDY BASIS) FOR THE RECOMMENDATION
76	Removing from the optimum career patterns for combat arms officers the requirement that to advance rapidly in grade they must command both at battalion and brigade level as well as serve on high level staffs. (This permits longer command tours, while still giving equal advancement opportunity to officers specializing in other areas of vital importance not associated with tactical operations or high level staff.) (RFI)	To enhance the development of expertise; permit longer command tours for those selected to and desirous of commanding; permit concentration of top talent on other than command and high level staff assignments; and to derive from an overall pattern of greater assignment stability the improved interpersonal relationships which should accrue.	Transitory commanders fearful of making and not well grounded in applicable management, technical, or operational procedures were subject of comments from officers of all ranks. Command is viewed more often as a necessary "ticket" (with satisfying moments interspersed among frustrating and unrelenting pressures) as an opportunity to demonstrate leadership and refurbish skills.
77	Reducing to a minimum, or eliminating entirely for all grades below O-6, the "nominating" of officers for assignment and the honoring of "by name" requests. (RFS)	To permit OPD to apply officer talent in the most effective manner in order to meet the needs of the service as well as develop future senior officers.	Officers appear preoccupied with the "next assignment, and "getting exposure." Within context of being as responsive as possible an officer's preference for <u>type</u> of assignment OPD should make all but the extremely special assignments on the basis of record and not by "name."
8	<p data-bbox="289 814 683 863"><u>Revising the officer evaluation system by means such as:</u></p> <p data-bbox="289 873 727 1167"><u>8a</u> Including as a supplementary input to officer efficiency files the results of peer ratings. These ratings would be compiled from periodic solicitations by mail from Headquarters, Department of the Army of comments from selected officers (none of whom would be serving in the same organization at the time of solicitation) on those contemporaries with whom they have served in past assignments. Integrate the peer evaluations with the ratings of the rater and indorser. (IIB)</p> <p data-bbox="289 1209 743 1661"><u>8b</u> Reassessing as a matter of continuing priority all facets--including basic assumptions--of the system of officer evaluation, including: the role of the efficiency report in making assignments; the possible role of the indorsing officer as an evaluator of the rating officer as well as an evaluator of the rated officer; the weight and nature of the indorsing officer's comments and entries when his duties obviously preclude intimate knowledge of the rated officer; and the possibility of designing different efficiency report forms for different grade level groupings (such as one rather concise form for O-1 through O-3, another form for O-4 and O-5, one for O-6, and one for general officers.) (RFS)</p>	<p data-bbox="737 810 1149 852">To refine the objectives and methods of the system of evaluating officers.</p> <p data-bbox="737 873 1166 1031">To obtain a more accurate evaluation of the total officer than is derived from ratings by superiors alone; and to focus some attention on the need to consider to some degree the methods an officer uses to accomplish his missions.</p> <p data-bbox="737 1209 919 1230">Same as 8 above</p>	<p data-bbox="1175 800 1624 863">The officer evaluation system was the source of more specific comments than any other during the period of this study effort.</p> <p data-bbox="1175 894 1624 978">Officers noted that superiors get only one side of the picture, and that a man's ethical behavior is more often known to his subordinates than to his seniors.</p> <p data-bbox="1175 1199 1357 1220">Same as 8 above.</p> <p data-bbox="1175 1272 1624 1325">The efficiency report system drives many of the decisions in the formulation of the professional climate.</p>

Figure V-1 (Continued)

METHOD	RATIONALE (STUDY BASIS) FOR THE RECOMMENDATION	COMMENTS ON IMPLEMENTATION AND FEEDBACK	REMARKS
<p>Order for and to tips</p> <p>Order as officers</p>	<p>Transitory commanders fearful of making an error and not well grounded in applicable management, technical, or operational procedures were the subject of comments from officers of all grades. Command is viewed more often as a necessary "ticket" (with satisfying moments interspersed among frustrating and unrelenting pressure) than as an opportunity to demonstrate leadership and refurbish skills.</p> <p>Officers appear preoccupied with the "next" assignment, and "getting exposure." Within the context of being as responsive as possible to an officer's preference for <u>type</u> of assignments, OPD should make all but the extremely sensitive assignments on the basis of record and potential, not by "name."</p>	<p>In light of the increased complexity of the subject matter of the profession, the capabilities of the Army officer schooling system, and the need for effective performance of duties in "peacetime" as well as in wartime, the perennial assumption that officers need command and high level staff to perform, understand the "big picture," and be ready for promotion should be re-examined. Implementation of any change must be supported thoroughly by senior officers.</p>	<p>"By name" requests possibly generate some unhealthy potential for favoritism.</p>
<p>Methods</p> <p>Officers</p> <p>Method</p> <p>Method</p>	<p>The officer evaluation system was the subject of more specific comments than any other item discussed during the period of this study effort.</p> <p>Officers noted that superiors get only one side of the picture, and that a man's ethical behavior is more often known to his subordinates and peers than to his seniors.</p> <p>Same as 8 above.</p> <p>The efficiency report system drives many aspects of the formulation of the professional climate.</p>	<p>Peer rating forms, prepared for brief objective responses, would be mailed periodically to all officers. Names listed would include officers with whom the respondent had served in the past years, but would not include names of any officers with whom the respondent was serving at the time of the query.</p>	<p>A number of subjects, many of them studied at some time in the past or being studied now, warrant examination: What weight should be given the comments of the indorser? Should the indorser rate the rater's capabilities and include such remarks along with the report? Does the company grade officer require the same lengthy report as a colonel? Could there be two sections to the report, one regarding performance that is shown to the rated officer, and one concerning potential that is not made available locally?</p>

Figure V-1 (Continued)

NO.	RECOMMENDATION	OBJECTIVE OF THE RECOMMENDATION	RATIONALE (STUDY BASIS) FOR THE RECOMMENDATION
9	<p><u>Revise the concept of officer career patterns by means such as:</u></p> <p>See other items.</p>		
10	<p><u>Revise promotion policies by means such as:</u></p> <p>10a Eliminating or modifying the "secondary zone" promotion so that the opportunity for accelerated promotion of certain officers is retained but the "5 percent" aspect is omitted by extending the "primary zone," reducing the rate of selection, and omitting the "secondary zone." (Provisions will remain for retaining on active duty in grade those officers who are competent but who are not suited for further promotion.) (RFI)</p> <p>10b Returning the authority for promotion to captain to Headquarters, Department of the Army; and phasing back to the pre-Vietnam time in grade requirement for promotion to captain. (RFI)</p> <p>10c Enacting and announcing a policy that selection boards for brigadier general will send partial lists of a group of final candidates for selection to students at USACGSC and USAWC for comments. The total list would be 3 or 4 times the size of the authorized number of selectees. Each student would--anonymously and holding his list in confidence--mark one of five possible responses beside each name: "I do not know this colonel well enough to give my opinion; I do not want to express my opinion; I know this colonel and he would make a superb general officer; I know this colonel and I would concur in his selection for general officer; I know this colonel, and I wouldn't have much confidence in him as a general officer; I know this colonel and he should never be promoted to general officer." These results would be compiled and returned to the president of the selection board for such use as he sees fit. (ITS)</p>	<p>To ensure that the promotion system is geared to the needs of the service and that counterproductive side effects are minimized.</p> <p>To retain the concept of rapid advancement of outstanding officers while reducing to some degree the intense drive for a "perfect record."</p> <p>To standardize criteria for promotion and to allow officers to serve longer as lieutenants so they can better learn their jobs.</p> <p>To improve the selection process for brigadier general by making available to the promotion board the results of the assessment of prime candidates by successful field grade officers.</p>	<p>Promotion policies, or officers' understanding of promotion policies, are the basis for a individual and institutionalized activity "ticket punching" syndrome derives primarily what officers perceive to be the required rapid advancement in grade.</p> <p>Most officers queried believe that the officers should receive recognition in of relatively fast promotion. However, the "secondary zone" format appears to competition for "ticket punching" and p among the top quality officers who would eventually through a less instantaneous process.</p> <p>The lieutenants and captains themselves principal advocates of this recommendation.</p> <p>Peers and subordinates are often perceived of the motivations and character of the particularly when their comments are c. There were frequent overtones of conce officers in the sample that some of the pulous "ticket punchers" were advancing rapidly than the more deserving and ju competent "solid citizens."</p>

Figure V-1 (Continued)

RATIONALE (STUDY BASIS) FOR THE RECOMMENDATION	COMMENTS ON IMPLEMENTATION AND FEEDBACK	REMARKS
<p>Promotion policies, or officers' understanding of promotion policies, are the basis for a variety of individual and institutionalized activities. The "ticket punching" syndrome derives primarily from what officers perceive to be the requirements for rapid advancement in grade.</p> <p>Most officers queried believe that the better officers should receive recognition in the form of relatively fast promotion. However, the present "secondary zone" format appears to foster competition for "ticket punching" and perfection among the top quality officers who would emerge eventually through a less instantaneous and traumatic process.</p> <p>The lieutenants and captains themselves were the principal advocates of this recommendation.</p> <p>Peers and subordinates are often perceptive judges of the motivations and character of their seniors, particularly when their comments are consolidated. There were frequent overtones of concern among the officers in the sample that some of the unscrupulous "ticket punchers" were advancing more rapidly than the more deserving and just as competent "solid citizens."</p>	<p>Some of the anticipated long-term gains, such as taking some of the unhealthy edge off competition, would be difficult to assess.</p> <p>Students would receive lists of names -- or partial listings to maintain some close-hold aspects to the proceedings-- and would return their remarks in confidence. Information derived therefrom would not be available to anyone but the president of the board.</p>	<p>Officers who had received secondary promotions appeared to be as disenchanted with the method as those who had not been selected in a "secondary zone."</p> <p>It is acknowledged that a peer rating system or a rating by subordinates raises the specter of "popularity contest." However, it appears that the potential benefit might warrant whatever condescension to subordinates might be generated by this approach. Keeping the ratings within student bodies is designed to remove any impact from chains of command.</p>

Figure V-1 (Continued)

NO.	RECOMMENDATION	OBJECTIVE OF THE RECOMMENDATION	RATIONALE (STUDY BASIS) FOR THE RECOMMENDATION
10d	<p>Ensuring that promotion boards receive comprehensive instructions which are compatible with announced policies of career pattern and assignment priorities, and which do not in effect validate "ticket punching" as the unique route to rapid promotion. (RFS)</p>	<p>To assure that the actual reward system, of which promotion is a major element, is compatible with the ideal standards of the Army.</p>	<p>Many officers believed that part of the reason for the variance between ideal and actual standards, particularly in terms of ethical behavior but also in terms of military competence was caused by the Army's failure to keep the rewards system in line with the long-term ideal professional standards. Expertise and integrity are perceived as being frequently less important in the eyes of promotion boards and rating officers than the ability to produce a flood of perfect statistics.</p>

Figure V-1 (Continued)

ION	RATIONALE (STUDY BASIS) FOR THE RECOMMENDATION	COMMENTS ON IMPLEMENTATION AND FEEDBACK	REMARKS
	<p>Many officers believed that part of the reason for the variance between ideal and actual standards, particularly in terms of ethical behavior but also in terms of military competence, was caused by the Army's failure to keep the rewards system in line with the long-term ideal professional standards. Expertise and integrity are perceived as being frequently less important in the eyes of promotion boards and rating officers than the ability to produce a flood of perfect statistics.</p>	<p>The execution of this recommendation supports many others.</p>	<p>Officers receive a great deal of their guidance from personal examination of the apparent criteria used by boards in their selection of officers for promotion and schooling. Board selection actions, not the announced personnel policies, are the determinants of individual goals in career development and quest for assignments.</p>

Figure V-1 (Continued)

2

INCLOSURES

UNITED STATES ARMY
THE CHIEF OF STAFF

18 April 1970

SUBJECT: Analysis of Moral and Professional Climate in the Army

Commandant
United States Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

1. Several unfavorable events occurring within the Army during the past few years have been a matter of grave concern to me. These have served to focus attention on the state of discipline, integrity, morality, ethics, and professionalism in the Army.
2. By no means do I believe that the Army as an institution is in a moral crisis. However, these incidents have emphasized the need for a thorough review of certain areas and practices within the Army, and an analysis may indicate that prompt, corrective actions are necessary.
3. To ensure that an analysis of the moral and professional climate is conducted with the utmost thoroughness and mature perspective, I am assigning the task to you. Using selected members of your own staff, faculty, and students, I should like you to determine if we have problems in these or related areas, and if so, how we might correct them.
4. In making your study, I should like particularly to have developed an "Officers Code." If feasible, it would serve as a concise, easily understood reference by which an officer would be guided in his daily performance of duty. It would also serve to make him aware of the value and need for unquestioned integrity, as well as be a guide for recognizing and contending with compromising pressures. The "Officers Code," as I envision it, would not be a substitute for regulations, directives, or the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Its only purpose would be to guide officers in exercising their authority and performing their duties.
5. The study is to be conducted basically by your people, as I have mentioned, but I should like it to incorporate the views of junior as well as senior officers. To facilitate this, I suggest you contact

Inclosure 1

SUBJECT: Analysis of Moral and Professional Climate in the Army

the commandants of the Command and General Staff College and the service schools at Benning, Sill, Knox, Burtis, and Hamilton and request that they convene a selected small group of officers with varied experience from the advanced courses to address the central issues affecting discipline, professionalism, integrity, ethics, and morality in the Army. The opinions of the faculty members and students will provide information from a wide cross section of ranks and experiences. I have informed the CG CONARC and the Chief of Chaplains of this study and the fact that you and your staff will deal directly with the commandants of the six schools.

6. I should like the results by 1 July 1970. . . .

/s/ W. C. Westmoreland
/t/ W. C. WESTMORELAND
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

AN OFFICER'S CREED

I will give to the selfless performance of my duty and my mission the best that effort, thought, and dedication can provide.

To this end, I will not only seek continually to improve my knowledge and practice of my profession, but also I will exercise the authority entrusted to me by the President and the Congress with fairness, justice, patience, and restraint, respecting the dignity and human rights of others and devoting myself to the welfare of those placed under my command.

In justifying and fulfilling the trust placed in me, I will conduct my private life as well as my public service so as to be free both from impropriety and the appearance of impropriety, acting with candor and integrity to earn the unquestioning trust of my fellow soldiers--juniors, seniors, and associates--and employing my rank and position not to serve myself but to serve my country and my unit.

By practicing physical and moral courage I will endeavor to inspire these qualities in others by my example.

In all my actions I will put loyalty to the highest moral principles and the United States of America above loyalty to organizations, persons, and my personal interest.

ANNEX

A

METHODOLOGY

ANNEX A - METHODOLOGY

RESEARCH DESIGN.

MISSION. The mission assigned for this study was to assess the existing climate of professionalism in today's Army, giving particular attention to the prevailing standards of professional competence and moral/ethical behavior. Included also was the requirement to outline measures for the solution of any problems which were identified.

PROBLEM DEFINITION. An extensive problem definition effort concluded that the focus of the research effort should be upon the value system of today's Army officer, "value system" being defined as follows:

A personal value system is viewed as a relatively permanent perceptual framework which shapes and influences the general nature of an individual's behavior. Values are similar to attitudes but are more ingrained, permanent, and stable in nature. Likewise, a value is seen as being more general and less tied to any specific object than is the case with many attitudes. 'Value' as used here is closer to ideology or philosophy than it is to attitude. (England, 1967 b, p. 54)

Problem definition further led to the conclusion that, in order to point to solutions as well as assess value systems, the research effort should be designed around five basic questions. These questions, and amplifying comment, follow:

FIRST: WHAT ARE THE PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS OR IDEAL VALUES WHICH TRADITIONALLY HAVE BEEN SET FORTH FOR THE ARMY OFFICER? (Any profession has a set of standards or code which serves to guide the decisions, establish the competence levels, and direct the behavior of the members of the profession. These values define what should be done, how one should act, what one should know, and so on.)

SECOND: WHAT ARE THE ACTUAL STANDARDS OR VALUES WHICH CHANNEL THE OFFICER'S THOUGHT AND BEHAVIOR? (For a variety of reasons, what should be done and what is done do not always correspond. One must ask if, realistically, there is a second set of actual values differing from the traditional or ideal.)

THIRD: OF THE EXISTING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN IDEAL AND ACTUAL STANDARDS, WHICH ARE OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE? (Some differences between ideal and actual values may be relatively insignificant, reflecting tolerable or temporary variations. Other differences, however, may have major implications for the Army, both today and in the future.)

FOURTH: WHAT FACTORS, CONDITIONS, SITUATIONS (BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL) UNDERLIE THE MAJOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN IDEAL AND ACTUAL STANDARDS? (Many factors, both internal and external to the Army, cause differences between ideal and actual standards. Some of these factors impact on only a few officers, as individuals; others, on the Officer Corps as a whole. It is difficult to identify and categorize these factors. Some are simultaneously cause and effect. Others act only in combination. Nevertheless, these factors must be identified and studied if one is to troubleshoot the "standards and values" aspect of professionalism.)

FIFTH: BY WHAT MEANS CAN THE IDEAL AND ACTUAL VALUES OF THE OFFICER CORPS BE MADE MORE NEARLY IDENTICAL? (The Army, through policy, procedure, and practice, has the capacity to influence some of the factors which underlie the variance between ideal and actual values. Consider, for example, the present system of rewards and punishments and the actions or behavior to which they are applied--or, consider the congruity and relative importance of individual and organizational goals.)

CONCEPT OF RESEARCH. The present study was designed as an exploratory study, its purpose being neither to test hypotheses nor to serve as a "pilot" study for a more concerted research effort, but rather to probe the depth and breadth of the five basic questions derived from problem definition. This concept recognizes the ever present difficulties in defining and studying the abstract concepts associated with the subject of "values." (La Pierre, 1954)

Perspective varies greatly as a function of rank and position. Where appropriate, therefore, the study looked at questions from the

various grade levels shown in the data base model (Figure II-1), as well as from the viewpoints of the three prime positions involved in the assessment of military man--senior, subordinate, and peer.

In terms of the conceptual model for this study (Figure II-2), an officer receives his value system from society and from his profession. During the period of time normally preceding and including the act of commissioning, the aspiring officer, through the process of indoctrination, receives or is exposed to the ideal values of the profession. There then follows a much longer and indefinite period wherein, through the functioning of a system of rewards and punishments (formal-informal, extrinsic-intrinsic), the ideal values are, to a greater or lesser extent, sustained. The present study focuses on the sustainment of values rather than on the means whereby they are inculcated.

Through successive levels of the Army school system, officers of varying sources of commission and then of differing branches of service are intermingled. Missions and atmosphere are largely academic. For the most part, collective opinions from the Army school system do not represent the vested interests of any particular functional group other than that represented by the school. Students, in the absence of specific organizational responsibilities and allegiances, can speak more freely than those in the Army mainstream. With this fact in mind, the data for the present study were drawn largely from the Army school system.

Qualitative data, expressed in conversation or in writing, provide for varied, unstructured, and perhaps original responses of sentiments

and ideas. On the other hand, by structuring responses and forcing them to a common numerical base, quantitative data are produced which make possible the comparison and manipulation of variables within large amounts of information. The present study used both quantitative and qualitative data to take advantage of the positive features of each. The relationship between the two types of data was held relatively constant. Qualitative assessments and quantitative measurements were derived separately from each of the five basic questions of the study.

DATA BASE SOURCES.

Data base for this study was provided by a survey of appropriate literature, administration of a questionnaire, and a series of interviews and group discussions.

LITERATURE SURVEY. As an initial step, and throughout the duration of this study, applicable reference material was collected, reviewed, and extracted. This search, while not exhaustive, was sufficient for the purposes of the study. The following topics are indicative of the search leads used in this review of the literature: values, ethics, morality, code of behavior, code of ethics, professionalism, professional standards, attitudes, attitude change. Collectively, these topics define the subject area surveyed. References believed to be most applicable are listed in the bibliography (Annex C).

As noted in the preface, this study of professionalism is interdisciplinary in nature. Academic references were drawn largely from

the areas of social psychology, sociology, and personnel management. Prime authors were Krech and Crutchfield, Cartwright and Zander, England, Jahoda, Janowitz, Stouffer, Coates and Pellegrini, Likert, and Dunnette.

The central academic reference employed was a recent graduate-level thesis by Major James W. Tyler, A Study of the Personal Value Systems of US Army Officers and a Comparison with American Managers.

Visits to the Office of the Chief of Research and Development, the Behavioral Science Research Laboratory, and the Officer Personnel Directorate revealed no on-going or programmed research in the area of professional value systems. At these sources, and in the DCSPER Inventory Report of Studies with Personnel Implications, there was no evidence that any studies designed to "assess the state of professionalism" had been made previously at Department of the Army level.

The Office of Research, United States Military Academy has conducted value system research. This research, however relates primarily to basic cultural values rather than to the values of military professionalism.

Two Army studies, although not specifically directed to value systems, were found to be highly relevant and applicable to the present study. A 1969 DCSPER study, The Officer Efficiency Reporting System, outlined many of the shortcomings of the current officer appraisal system as well as possible means of solution. The Franklin Institute's Career Motivation of Army Personnel--Junior Officers'

Duties provided a means whereby many of the professional values of junior officers could be at least inferred.

QUESTIONNAIRE.

Purpose. As shown in the data base model of this study (Figure II-1), the use of a questionnaire was one of the primary means for collecting information considered essential. The main purpose of the questionnaire was to provide a quantitative assessment of the existing climate of professionalism by furnishing numerical data which could be displayed, compared, and manipulated analytically.

Design. The questionnaire employed is attached at Appendix 1. It was derived from the five basic questions of this study and was designed to explore the breadth and depth of opinion and ideas relating to these questions.

Part I requested biographical data. This part included eight variables which were intuitively felt to have bearing on perception of professional values.

Part II provided a step-by-step approach to the measurement of the differential or variance between ideal and actual standards. Item 9 asked for a gross overall estimate of the difference. Succeeding questions asked the respondent to discriminate or differentiate from his gross overall estimate to more specific evaluations. This particular means of questioning, based upon the "funnel sequence" concept of professional interviewers (Kahn and Gannell, 1957), was designed

to lead logically to discriminatory estimates of variance within each of the many tasks or functions common to the typical officer's job.

Part III extended the general definition of value system into two components, professional competence and ethical behavior, then required the respondent to move from the more general "grade level" perspective of Items 10-13 to the specific senior, peer, and subordinate levels of his last duty assignment.

Part IV measured the behavioral correlates of variance between ideal and actual standards. The functional areas listed in Items 20-54 were derived from the 54 job essentials or task behaviors developed by Flanagan in his "Critical Incident Method" study of the job behavior of officers (Dunnette, 1966). Flanagan's job essentials define the behavior or functions common to most officer jobs. The functions selected from his definitive listing were those considered to be most susceptible to the influence of an officer's value system.

In addition to asking the degree of variance between ideal and actual standards as they applied to each of the selected functions, Part IV also asked that the respondent indicate the degree to which this variance was important to the Army. This "importance measure" has been used previously in attitudinal research (England, 1967 a; Tyler, 1969) and performs the highly useful purpose of distinguishing, for example, between large differences of little significance and differences which, although moderate, are of great importance.

Part IV further provided for an optional discriminatory response in permitting the respondent to specify a particular grade level if he

felt that the variance for any function was significantly greater at that level. It was believed that if a sufficient number of respondents (perhaps 25 percent) elected to specify a particular grade level for ideal-actual variance within a single function, this would indicate that grade level was an important factor in the perceived variance for that function.

Part V asked for a more specific, more refined significance or importance measure by requiring the respondent to select the 3 or 4 functions where he considered that variance was most important, and then to indicate the one function where variance would merit a maximum solution effort.

Part V also probed into the questions of cause and solution. A qualitative, narrative response mode was selected for this portion of the questionnaire so as not to restrict the respondent's consideration of possible alternatives.

Part VI, the final portion of the questionnaire, permitted the respondent, at his option, to expand on any portion of the questionnaire, or to add any comment believed to be of value to the study.

Analytical Plan. Parts I-IV of the questionnaire were designed for computer-assisted analysis which would produce the descriptive statistics needed for quantitative assessment of the climate of professionalism. Accordingly, a basic analytical task was the computation of the frequency, mean, standard deviation, and response choice percentage for each item in Parts I-IV.

In Part I, it was believed that a correlational analysis would reveal relationships existing between biographical variables and variables of grade level, chain of command position, and behavioral functions. An overall matrix of correlation was programmed so as to check for possible relationships between any two measures in Parts I-IV.

A multiple regression analysis was used, testing Items 20-54 against Item 9. By studying the resulting F values and multiple correlation coefficients, it would then be possible to determine the relationships between the behavioral functions and the perceived overall variance between ideal and actual standards. This would determine the appropriateness of using behavioral functions as a means of studying variance between ideal and actual values. Further, through the resulting regression coefficients and T values, it was hoped that an assessment could be made of the relative strength of each of the behavioral functions in predicting the overall variance as measured by Item 9. While this operation would not establish a causal relationship, it could prove to be of considerable diagnostic value in establishing solution priorities. This portion of the regression analysis was planned also to augment the importance measures discussed previously.

In an effort to reduce the 34 functions listed in Part IV to those wherein variance was considered most important to the Army, a variation of the "joint modal frequency" procedure employed by England (Tyler, 1969) was planned. This technique, employing the difference scales and the importance scales of Part IV, would isolate

those functions wherein variation between ideal and actual standards was considered to be of considerable magnitude as well as of considerable importance. (This procedure is illustrated schematically in Figure A-1 on the following page.)

A final step in the plan for quantitative analysis of the questionnaire data called for a simple tally of the frequency with which each of the behavioral functions was listed as "most important," as required by Part V. It was believed that these data, coupled with the measures of the importance scales, the regression analysis, and the joint modal frequency analysis, would provide an acceptable answer to an otherwise highly subjective area; i.e., the basic question of which variances are of greatest importance to the Army.

Part V of the questionnaire also required a plan for qualitative analysis to isolate the cause and solution alternatives expressed in the narrative responses. To accomplish this purpose, it was decided to employ a rather common content analysis or theme analysis procedure, whereby a group of selected judges would first review the narratives, then agree on recurring themes, then finally record the frequency with which these themes appeared throughout the entire accumulation of narrative comments.

Subjects. Prior to administration, the questionnaire was pretested twice with representative subject groups. These tests brought to light several weaknesses in design and wording which were corrected through revisions in content, sequence, and response mechanics.




FIGURE A-1. TEST OF MEAN VALUES TO DETERMINE WHICH VARIATIONS BETWEEN IDEAL AND ACTUAL ARE "MOST SIGNIFICANT."

The final version of the questionnaire was completed by approximately 420 officers. No attempt was made to select a stratified random sample of the larger Officer Corps population. The size of the respondent group and its characteristics were determined more by the exploratory research concept previously discussed than by the need for experimental or statistical controls.

The officer respondents, for the most part, were students at various Army schools, including the Artillery School, the Transportation School, the Infantry School, the Armor School, the Chaplains School, the Command and General Staff College, and the Army War College. The testing was mostly done in May 1970, and was conducted in a manner which ensured the subjects' anonymity.

The sample was heavily weighted with higher ranking officers. Lieutenant colonels and colonels collectively made up 69 percent of the total. This would, of course, make the overall indexes unrepresentative of the Army as a whole.

The sample is fairly well divided between USMA, ROTC, and OCS graduates when considered in terms of source of commission. The percentage of USMA graduates, 25 percent, is unusually high when compared with USMA percentages for the Officer Corps as a whole.

The sample was well-educated. Of the total, 93 percent had three or more years of college. Half (50 percent) also had more than 30 months of command experience.

Detailed biographical data are at Appendix 3.

INTERVIEWS AND GROUP DISCUSSIONS.

Purpose. Early in the problem definition phase, it became evident that written responses to a questionnaire, irrespective of both quantitative and qualitative expression, would alone be insufficient for the purposes of the present study. Values and value systems defy verbalization, not only because they represent ideological feelings, but because they are general and not linked to specific objects. For example, it is exceedingly difficult to translate accurately a value such as "Duty" into operative guidelines for behavior. To assess the feelings and sentiments which are inextricable parts of value systems, personal contact with a sizeable group of representative officers was considered an essential means of communication. Interviews or, more properly, group discussions were therefore decided upon as one of several necessary methods for collection of data base input. It should be recognized that the data thus obtained, while qualitative, subjective, and judgmental, also comprise a vital part of the analysis and conclusion.

Design. Group discussions employed in this study were designed and structured to support the stated concept of research. The discussion methods used paralleled those of the "focused interview" (Merton, Fiske & Kendall, 1957) in that a standardized agenda was used in all groups. The agenda items consisted of the five basic questions of this study. This procedure provided sufficient standardization of discussion

group effort, and additionally served to maintain a common basis for comparison of information obtained by questionnaire and group discussion.

In interaction with respondents, discussion leaders made maximum use of "non-directive" discussion techniques (Kahn and Cannell, 1957). It was believed that this procedure, with its emphasis on probes and careful listening, would elicit unstructured and perhaps original opinions and ideas, particularly in the areas of cause and solution alternatives.

Discussion Leaders. Discussion leaders were selected individually from among the faculty and students of the US Army War College. Four two-man teams were organized, each consisting of a student and a faculty member, with each team visiting a different service school to conduct discussions.

Teams were provided with a common discussion agenda and several worksheets to be completed immediately following each discussion period. The agenda and worksheets are attached at Appendix 2. The worksheets were designed to aid in the following post-discussion tasks: Analyzing group composition; summarizing discussion content; estimating group attitude toward the study of professionalism; and estimating respondent concern with several prevalent conditions initially hypothesized to be indicative of considerable variance between ideal and actual values.

Analytical Plan. Inasmuch as the vast majority of the information to be collected through group discussion was qualitative,

Judgmental, and based upon the perceptions of the discussion leaders, the plan for analysis of these data was by no means as precise or structured as that for questionnaire data.

Some specific measures were available from the discussion worksheets; but for the most part, analysis called for summary opinions, collectively formulated and agreed upon by all discussion leaders, which would accurately represent the views of the respondent groups in answering the five basic questions of the study.

Upon return from the discussions, each team was debriefed and the results recorded for later review and analysis. Team members then participated in a week-long consolidation phase of discussion and preparation of the summary opinions noted above.

Subjects. As was the case with the questionnaire, the group discussion agenda, procedures, and worksheets were pretested in a representative discussion group prior to actual employment for the procurement of data for this study. This pretest served to standardize discussion procedures, to give the discussion leaders a preview of the content and problems of actual group discussion, and to ensure agreed-upon interpretation of the requirements of the discussion worksheets.

During the period 10 May through 14 May 1970, the teams visited six Army posts and conducted 25 group discussion sessions of approximately two hours per session. The sample participating in these group discussions consisted of approximately 250 officers representing

the grade levels called for in the study's basic conceptual model. These officers, for the most part, were students at various Army schools, including the Artillery School, the Transportation School, the Infantry School, the Chaplains School, and the Command and General Staff College.

The grade level of these discussion groups was much lower than the questionnaire sample. Colonels and lieutenant colonels comprised 28 percent of the discussion group participants as compared to 69 percent for the questionnaire. Grade breakout for the discussion groups was as follows:

<u>Captain</u>	<u>Major</u>	<u>Lieutenant Colonel</u>	<u>Colonel</u>
90	82	41	26

Special Purpose Discussion Groups. During late May and early June several groups of about ten officers from the student body and faculty of the US Army War College were formed to discuss various aspects of the study. (These participants are not included in the statistics listed above.) Two groups were used to ascertain reactions to a draft Officers Creed and to solicit any recommendations for its modification. Four groups discussed conclusions and recommendations, with emphasis on cause-effect relationships and detailed recommendations for corrective measures. Attitudes, reactions, and ideas from these discussions were considered along with other information in developing valid conclusions and feasible recommendations.

APPENDIX

1

QUESTIONNAIRE

ANNEX A
APPENDIX 1
STUDY OF PROFESSIONALISM
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS
FOR
QUESTIONNAIRE

1. As you fill out this questionnaire, please bear in mind that we need your personal opinion on the questionnaire items. We ask that you give particular attention to the short narrative responses required by Part V (Page 7).
2. The content of this questionnaire and the fact that a study of professionalism is being conducted is an internal Army matter and should not be discussed outside of official military circles.
3. Because of scheduled computer processing time, we request that you return the questionnaires as soon as completed, but please no later than 0830, Friday, 15 May. Please fold and staple closed so the return address is on the outside; then return through Message Center
4. Point of Contact:

Colonel LeRoy Strong
US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONNAIRE

This questionnaire is one of several methods being used to gather information for an analysis of professionalism within the Officer Corps. The specific purpose of the questionnaire is to look at the standards or values that guide an officer's behavior (thought and action).

Standards and values are largely a matter of feelings that an individual senses. They are difficult to express in precise terms that would have the same meaning for all. If you are not sure of the meaning of a word or phrase, assume your own definition and answer on the basis of what it means to you.

Your responses to this questionnaire should indicate how you, personally, feel about the questionnaire items. The questionnaire contains an optional response section (Page 9) which you may use to further express your feelings and ideas on any topic related to the questionnaire items.

You will not be asked to sign the questionnaire, but you may if you wish. No effort will be made to link responses to individuals. The biographical data and questionnaire code numbers are solely for statistical control.

PART I. BIOGRAPHICAL DATA [ENTER (✓)]

1. GRADE:	01 ()	02 ()	03 ()	04 ()	05 ()	06 ()	07 Above ()
2. SOURCE:	USMA ()	ROTC ()	OCS ()	DIRECT ()	OTHER ()		
3. BRANCH:	ARMS [Armor, CE, FA, () Inf, ML, SigC]			SERVICES ()	[AGC, MC, MSC, CH, CmlC, FC, JAGC, MPC, ORD, QMC, TC]		
4. EDUC. LEVEL:	12 or less ()	13-14 ()	15-16 ()	17 or more ()			
5. MIL. EDUC.	BASIC ()	ADV ()	AFSC CGSC ()	WAR COLLEGE ()			
6. HIGHEST EQUIV. LEVEL OF CMD.	NONE ()	PLT ()	CO ()	BN ()	BDE ()	DIV ()	

- | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|---|---------------------|-----------|------------|------------|--------------|-------------|-------------------------|-----------|-----------|----------------------|
| 7. | HIGHEST EQUIV.
LEVEL, STAFF
DUTY | NONE
() | BN
() | BDE
() | DIV
() | CORPS
() | ARMY
() | DA
JCS
DOB
() | | | |
| 8. | TOTAL
MONTHS
OF COMD.
(APPROX) | 6 or
less
() | 12
() | 18
() | 24
() | 30
() | 36
() | 42
() | 48
() | 54
() | 60 or
more
() |

PART II. IDEAL AND ACTUAL STANDARDS

Previous discussion and interviews have suggested that, at least theoretically, there is an "ideal" officers' code or set of standards, and another set which might be labeled "actual" or "real world."

The phrase, "Duty--Honor--Country" implies a set of standards that represent what should be. What you have actually observed represents the existing standards.

Now, for a moment compare your own personal concept of the ideal standards (implied by Duty--Honor--Country) with what you have actually observed among all the officers you have known. Do you feel that, within the Officers' Corps as a whole, there is a discernible difference between the ideal standards and those that actually exist?

DIFFERENCE

- | | | | | | |
|----|-------------|---------------|-----------------|--------------------------|--------------|
| 9. | NONE
() | SLIGHT
() | MODERATE
() | CONSIDER-
ABLE
() | GREAT
() |
|----|-------------|---------------|-----------------|--------------------------|--------------|

If you think that a discernible difference exists, do you feel that it might vary by grade and experience?

DIFFERENCE

- | | | | | | | | |
|-----|------------------|-------------|---------------|-----------------|--------------------------|--------------|------------|
| 10. | JUNIOR
GRADE: | NONE
() | SLIGHT
() | MODERATE
() | CONSIDER-
ABLE
() | GREAT
() | [LT, CPT] |
| 11. | MIDDLE
GRADE: | () | () | () | () | () | [MAJ, LTC] |
| 12. | UPPER
GRADE: | () | () | () | () | () | [COL] |
| 13. | SENIOR
GRADE: | () | () | () | () | () | [GEN] |

PART III. SENIOR AND SUBORDINATE LEVELS

Think of all the Army superiors, peers, and subordinates with whom you served during your last duty assignment and the manner in which they adhered to the "ideal" set of standards. To what degree do you feel that they adhered to the ideal with respect to that category of standards which we might call professional military competence?

	<u>Close Adherence</u>	<u>Minor Difference</u>	<u>Moderate Difference</u>	<u>Major Difference</u>
14. Immediate Superior (Rater)	()	()	()	()
15. Typical Peer (Contemporary)	()	()	()	()
16. Immediate Subordinates (Typical)	()	()	()	()

(If you checked "moderate" or "major" difference for any of the levels above, please indicate (on Page 9) the main reason for your response.)

To what degree do you feel that they adhered to the ideal with respect to another major category of standards which we might term ethical behavior?

	<u>Close Adherence</u>	<u>Minor Difference</u>	<u>Moderate Difference</u>	<u>Major Difference</u>
17. Immediate Superior (Rater)	()	()	()	()
18. Typical Peer (Contemporary)	()	()	()	()
19. Immediate Subordinates (Typical)	()	()	()	()

(If you checked "moderate" or "major" difference for any of the levels above, please indicate (on Page 9) the main reason for your response.)

PART IV. SPECIFIC VARIATIONS AND THEIR IMPORTANCE

We would now like to go into a bit more detail about the specific nature of the differences between ideal and actual if they exist in the Army today. Listed below are many of the major functions common to the officer's job. The way an officer performs these functions is influenced significantly by his standards and values.

For each function, please indicate (✓) your opinion of the degree of difference between ideal and actual standards as they apply to each function. (For example, what is the degree of difference when the officer is performing

the function of rendering efficiency reports?) If you feel the difference varies by grade and experience, add the letter J, M, U, or S (Junior, Middle, Upper, Senior) to indicate the level where you feel the variance is greatest.

Next, under the importance column, indicate (✓) the importance of this difference to the Army (Officer Corps).

ADMINISTRATION	NONE	DIFFERENCE				IMPORTANCE		
		SLIGHT	MOD.	MUCH	GREAT	LITTLE	MOD.	GREAT
20. Preparing and Presenting Reports	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()
21. Completing Efficiency Reports	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()
22. Keeping Accurate Unit Records	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()
23. Keeping Superiors and Subordinates Fully Informed	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()
SUPERVISING PERSONNEL								
24. Giving and Relaying Sound Orders and Instructions	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()
25. Delegating Authority	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()
26. Looking out for Welfare of Subordinates	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()
27. Setting a Good Example	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()
28. Encouraging Ideas	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()
29. Giving Reasons and Explanations	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()
30. Assisting Subordinates in Work	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()

<u>SUPERVISING PERSONNEL</u> (CONTINUED)	<u>DIFFERENCE</u>					<u>IMPORTANCE</u>		
	NONE	SLIGHT	MOD.	MUCH	GREAT	LITTLE	MOD.	GREAT
31. Evaluating Subordinates' Work	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()
32. Being Loyal to Subordinates	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()
<u>PLANNING AND DIRECTION</u>	NONE	SLIGHT	MOD.	MUCH	GREAT	LITTLE	MOD.	GREAT
33. Taking Responsibility for own Plans and Actions	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()
34. Applying Non-biased Judgment	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()
35. Taking Prompt Action	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()
36. Giving All-out Effort to Assigned Tasks	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()
<u>ACCEPTANCE OF ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY</u>	NONE	SLIGHT	MOD.	MUCH	GREAT	LITTLE	MOD.	GREAT
37. Complying with Orders & Directives	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()
38. Accepting Organizational Procedures	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()
39. Subordinating Personal Interests	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()
40. Being Loyal to Superiors	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()
41. Cooperating with Associates	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()
42. Showing Loyalty to Organization	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()

ACCEPTANCE OF ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(CONTINUED)

DIFFERENCE

IMPORTANCE

NONE SLIGHT MOD. MUCH GREAT LITTLE MOD. GREAT

43. Taking Responsibility for What the Organization Does	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()
44. Assuming Official Fiscal Responsibility	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()
45. Assuming Official Property and Material Responsibility	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()

ACCEPTANCE OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY

NONE SLIGHT MOD. MUCH GREAT LITTLE MOD. GREAT

46. Attending to Duties	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()
47. Meeting Commitments	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()
48. Maintaining Military Appearance	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()
49. Adapting to Associates	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()
50. Adapting to Job	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()
51. Being Financially Responsible as an Individual	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()
52. Setting Standards of Personal Moral Behavior	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()

MILITARY PROFICIENCY

NONE SLIGHT MOD. MUCH GREAT LITTLE MOD. GREAT

53. Developing the Skills Required for Present Assignment	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()
54. Keeping Abreast of Major Developments in Army, Branch, and Specialty Area	()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()

PART V. CAUSES AND CORRECTIONS--NARRATIVE RESPONSE

Next, review your evaluations in Part IV and select the three or four differences that you feel are most significant. As a guide, consider that significance includes the degree of difference and the importance of the difference.

For each of these significant differences, please provide a short narrative paragraph indicating: (1) What the cause might be, (2) Whether the Army should attempt to reduce the difference, and (3) If the difference should be reduced, what solutions or corrective actions could be employed. Please use the blank pages provided and key the narrative to the number of the functions; e.g., "No. 35. Difference caused by . . ."

As a final step, when you have completed these short narratives, look them over briefly then place an asterisk beside the one to which you would devote maximum effort if you had a choice.

NARRATIVE RESPONSES:

NARRATIVE RESPONSES (continued)

PART VI. OPTIONAL RESPONSE

Use this space, at your option, for any opinions, feelings, facts, or experience which you feel will have relevance for this study or which will amplify your responses.

APPENDIX

2

DISCUSSION AGENDA AND WORKSHEETS

ANNEX A

APPENDIX 2

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE STUDY OF MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

DISCUSSION AGENDA

The questions below represent broad areas of interest for this study, and should serve as points of departure for development of more detailed questions and answers.

1. Any profession has a set of standards or code which serves to guide the decisions, establish the competence levels, and direct the behavior of the members of the profession. These standards define what should be done, how one should act, and so on.

WHAT ARE THE PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS WHICH TRADITIONALLY HAVE BEEN SET FORTH FOR THE ARMY OFFICER?

2. For a variety of reasons, what should be done and what is done do not always correspond. One must ask if there is, realistically, a second set of actual standards which differ somewhat from the traditional or ideal. If this second set of standards exists, then picture two parallel lists of standards, one traditional or ideal and the other actual or realistic. For each ideal standard, there is a parallel actual standard.

WHAT ARE THESE ACTUAL STANDARDS--AND, IF DIFFERENCES EXIST BETWEEN THE IDEAL AND THE ACTUAL, WHAT ARE THEY?

3. Some differences between ideal and actual standards may be relatively insignificant, reflecting tolerable or temporary variations. Other differences, however, may have major implications for the Army, both today and in the future.

OF THE EXISTING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN IDEAL AND ACTUAL STANDARDS, WHICH HAVE MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE ARMY?

4. Many factors, both internal and external to the Army, cause differences between ideal and actual. Some of these factors might impact on just a few officers as individuals; others, on the Officer Corps as a whole. It is difficult to identify and categorize these factors; nevertheless, they must be isolated and studied if one is to understand the "standards" aspect of professionalism.

WHAT FACTORS, CONDITIONS, AND SITUATIONS (BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL) UNDERLIE THE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN IDEAL AND ACTUAL STANDARDS?

5. The Army should be able to influence many of the factors which cause the significant differences between ideal and actual standards. Consider, for example, the manner in which the standards are first instilled in the individual officer; or the means whereby these standards are sustained over time; or the present system of rewards and punishments which contributes to the formation of actual standards; or the factors which are instrumental in changing an individual's concept of the relative importance of his personal goals and standards. Some of the specific possibilities might be: revised service school curricula; changes in officer education, promotion, or assignment policies; revised management and reporting techniques; promulgation of a written code of officer professional ethics; modification of the UCMJ; redefining the rules of superior-subordinate relations; and so forth.

BY WHAT MEANS (REGARDLESS OF THE SCOPE OF THE EFFORT REQUIRED) CAN THE ARMY AND THE OFFICER CORPS MAKE THE IDEAL AND THE ACTUAL STANDARDS MORE NEARLY IDENTICAL?

TRIP REPORT WORKSHEET

7 May 1970

INTERVIEW/SEMINAR SESSION REPORT

1. ADMIN, TIME AND PLACE DATA:

Date of seminar: _____ Time: _____ Location: _____
 Contact Officer: _____ Phone: _____
 Seminar ended at _____ hours.

Composition of the group: (or individual interview)

TOTAL	B R A N C H						OTHER: _____	(A,C, other) CATEGORY *
	IN	AR	FA	ADA	TC	CH		
0-2/3	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
0-4	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
0-5	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
0-6	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
0-7+	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

* If Advance Course member: A If CGSC student: C

2. BASIC GROUP ATTITUDE

A. Toward the idea of the professionalism study and their opportunity to participate

<u>INTEREST</u>		<u>RECEPTIVITY</u>	
Keen	_____	Enthusiastic	_____
Mixed-medium	_____	Non-committal	_____
Low	_____	Cynical-hostile	_____

B. Toward the importance of the subject of professional ethics of the officer corps

<u>INTEREST</u>		<u>MOOD</u>		<u>OUTLOOK</u>	
Keen	_____	Serious	_____	Optimistic	_____
Mixed-medium	_____	Mixed	_____	Mixed	_____
Low	_____	Cynical	_____	Pessimistic	_____

3. YOUR ANALYSIS OF THE MOST IMPORTANT POINTS THAT AROSE DURING THE SEMINAR AND A LISTING OF THE MOST INNOVATIVE IDEAS FOR CORRECTIVE ACTIONS.

MOST IMPORTANT POINTS IN TERMS OF THE TOTAL STUDY: _____

MOST INNOVATIVE IDEAS FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION: _____

7. YOUR ESTIMATE OF THE RELATIVE SENSE OF CONCERN OR URGENCY REGARDING TEN SPECIFIC POINTS:

LOW OR
NON-EXISTENT

PRESENT BUT
NOT SIGNIFICANT

EXTREMELY
HIGH

- A. Pressure to get the job done regardless of the methods; mission first regardless of the importance of the mission; and justifies means.

0 _____ 1 _____ 2 _____ 3 _____ 4 _____ 5 _____ 6 _____ 7 _____ 8

- B. Drive for personal success and career "tickets" takes precedence over the longer range goals of the unit or the welfare of the troops.

0 _____ 1 _____ 2 _____ 3 _____ 4 _____ 5 _____ 6 _____ 7 _____ 8

- C. Oversupervision stemming from an attempt for no mistakes at any time.

0 _____ 1 _____ 2 _____ 3 _____ 4 _____ 5 _____ 6 _____ 7 _____ 8

- D. Impact of the "permissive" trends of our society on discipline and professional ethics; dilution of traditional standards within the officer corps resulting from the pressures from outside.

0 _____ 1 _____ 2 _____ 3 _____ 4 _____ 5 _____ 6 _____ 7 _____ 8

- E. Statistical indicators--AWOL, body count, weapons lost, re-enlistment rate, GMMI scores, expert marksmen, etc.--have assumed inordinate importance; they tempt officers to cheat.

0 _____ 1 _____ 2 _____ 3 _____ 4 _____ 5 _____ 6 _____ 7 _____ 8

- F. Officers are not highly competent in their duties; this is one cause for unrealistic standards, poor supervision, over supervision, use of statistical indicators in place of "professional judgment," etc.

0 _____ 1 _____ 2 _____ 3 _____ 4 _____ 5 _____ 6 _____ 7 _____ 8

- G. Disenchantment with the leadership or integrity of (JUNIOR) (SENIOR) officers.

0 _____ 1 _____ 2 _____ 3 _____ 4 _____ 5 _____ 6 _____ 7 _____ 8

- H. "Politics" or favoritism in selection, promotion, prestige assignments, etc.

0 _____ 1 _____ 2 _____ 3 _____ 4 _____ 5 _____ 6 _____ 7 _____ 8

- I. Difficulty in communicating with senior officers: "nobody listens or understands."

0 _____ 1 _____ 2 _____ 3 _____ 4 _____ 5 _____ 6 _____ 7 _____ 8

- J. Loyalty seems a "one-way street." It goes mostly up, rarely down.

0 _____ 1 _____ 2 _____ 3 _____ 4 _____ 5 _____ 6 _____ 7 _____ 8

Inclosure: Summary of observations (2 pp) with _____ additional pages attached.

DATE:

SOURCE:

SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS

BASELINE
STANDARD

OBSERVED
VARIANCE

A-2-5

SIGNIF. OF
OBSERVED
VARIANCE

CAUSES OF
VARIANCE

WHEN COMPLETED:



PROPOSED
CORRECTIVE
ACTIONS

VARIATIONS IN
OBSERVATIONS
RETURN: JR/SK,
RES/RA,
OCS/MOTC/USMA

7-2-6

COMMENTS
OF SEMINAR
LEADER OR
INTERVIEWER

WHEN COMPLETED:



APPENDIX

3

STATISTICAL TABLES

APPENDIX 3

TABLE 1

DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE

DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

1. Number of questionnaires analyzed: 415.

2. By grade:

O1	2	0%
O2	3	1%
O3	60	14%
O4	76	18%
O5	153	37%
O6	120	29%
O7 & Above	1	0%

3. By source of commission:

USMA	105	25%
ROTC	151	36%
OCS	97	23%
Direct	47	11%
Other	15	4%

4. By Branch:

Arms	322	78%
Services	93	22%

5. By educational level:

12 Years of school or less	5	1%
13-14 Years of school	25	6%
15-16 Years of school	178	43%
17 or more years of school	207	50%

6. Total months of Command:

6 or less	54	13%
12	68	16%
18	48	12%
24	36	9%
30	40	10%
36	35	8%
42	18	4%
48	28	7%
54	50	12%
60 or more	38	9%

ANNEX

B

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

ANNEX B - FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

PERSPECTIVE.

The three tasks inherent in the objective of this study are to: assess the climate of professionalism; determine the cause of existing discrepancies; and develop solution alternatives. The first task is largely one of fact and objective measurement. The remaining two are more subjective, requiring reasoned judgment based on consideration of information available. This discussion of perspective explains how the quantitative and qualitative results obtained through analysis of the data base are to be used in accomplishing the stated tasks.

Quantitative results come primarily from Parts I-IV of the questionnaire and, to some extent, from the worksheets used by discussion leaders. These results are the scores, measures, and scale values which appear throughout this annex. Qualitative results were derived in large part from the information obtained through group discussion. Additionally, qualitative results were obtained through analysis of the narrative responses requested in Parts V and VI of the questionnaire. Representative narrative responses from questionnaires and group discussions, indicative of the perceptions and expectations of the officer sample, are at Appendix 1, Anecdotal Input. In short, quantitative results represent measurement, while qualitative results represent controlled and reasoned judgment applied to a synthesis of group opinion.

A non-standard format is employed in this discussion of results. This format is believed to be appropriate to a study intended to "explore." The format involves, essentially, a dialogue of question and response, addressed under the major headings of Ideal Values, Actual Values, The Existing Professional Climate, Causes of Variance, and Solutions. The questions represent the exploratory logic employed. They are derivations and extensions of the five basic questions of the conceptual model (Figure II-2). The answers represent the quantitative and qualitative results of analysis of the data base. Where applicable, detailed analysis and statistical tables are provided.

IDEAL VALUES.

"WHAT ARE THE "IDEAL VALUES OF THE OFFICER CORPS?"

Without exception, in group discussion or interviews, respondents, irrespective of grade level or experience, avoided coming to grips with the problem of definition. This finding coincides with the empirical research and theoretical studies of values. Values and value systems defy verbalization (La Piere, 1954) because they are abstract feelings and sentiments, and because they remain largely a personal matter.

However nebulously defined, ideal values for the Officer Corps do exist. Officers share a common view of the professional prescriptions and proscriptions which define how an officer is supposed to think, evaluate, decide and act.

* HOW CAN THESE IDEAL VALUES BE EXPRESSED?

"Duty-Honor-Country" and, to a lesser extent, the Oath of Commission, are agreed upon as general expressions of the ideal value system of the Officer Corps. These expressions, however, are not easily translatable into operable, specific guidelines for behavior. The junior officers expressed a need for this specificity.

* ARE THERE MORE SPECIFIC, OPERATIVE EXPRESSIONS OF THE IDEAL VALUES?

A leadership text used at the US Military Academy, Taking Command, contains several chapters on professional ethics, values, and standards. The Armed Forces Officer likewise gives the subject a degree of specific meaning and at the same time provides some concrete practical guidance. Both of these sources are narrative expressions, however, and one must extract the specific guidelines from the narrative.

Some years ago, in a special text used by the US Army Engineer School, there appeared an appendix entitled, "A Guide to Introspection." This guide provided a means whereby the officer could evaluate himself using a variable grade on a number of introspective questions. Several of these questions are illustrated below:

- Do I possess determination to carry out my mission?
- Do I diligently teach and train my subordinates to assume responsibility?
- Do I accept the blame when blame is mine?

The "Guide to Introspection" contained 134 items similar to those above. Collectively, these items express the professional value system in terms

of specific, operable guidelines. They represent the "Duty-Honor-Country" concept extended to nearly maximum specificity.

* IS IT POSSIBLE TO EXPRESS IDEAL VALUES AT A LEVEL SOMEWHERE BETWEEN THE GENERAL LEVEL OF THE "DUTY-HONOR-COUNTRY" CONCEPT AND THE OVERLY DETAILED "GUIDE TO INTROSPECTION"?

There is a need for a statement of professional values which will be at the same time both dignified and operable. Junior officers, particularly, express this need, as evidenced in the statement of one young captain, "The only place I learned about these things was from a copy of the Officer's Guide that I happened to buy one day in the bookstore." Senior officers, seldom prone to return to the specifics of their initial indoctrination, would probably welcome mechanisms designed to sustain the ideal value system of the profession.

A research-derived prototype of an Officer's Creed is shown in Figure B-1 on the following page. Such a creed might be given widespread dissemination as a statement of the enduring standards of an Army officer. It could be appropriate as part of both educational and ceremonial processes.

ACTUAL VALUES.

If there are ideal values which are difficult to achieve, and if these values are highly subject to individual interpretation as well as the pressures of practical reality, it would appear that within the Officer Corps, at least conceptually, there exists a system of actual values which channel decisions and behavior.

AN OFFICER'S CREED

I will give to the selfless performance of my duty and my mission the best that effort, thought, and dedication can provide.

To this end, I will not only seek continually to improve my knowledge and practice of my profession, but also I will exercise the authority entrusted to me by the President and the Congress with fairness, justice, patience, and restraint, respecting the dignity and human rights of others and devoting myself to the welfare of those placed under my command.

In justifying and fulfilling the trust placed in me, I will conduct my private life as well as my public service so as to be free both from impropriety and the appearance of impropriety, acting with candor and integrity to earn the unquestioning trust of my fellow soldiers—juniors, seniors, and associates--and employing my rank and position not to serve myself but to serve my country and my unit.

By practicing physical and moral courage I will endeavor to inspire these qualities in others by my example.

In all my actions I will put loyalty to the highest moral principles and the United States of America above loyalty to organizations, persons, and my personal interest.

Figure B-1, Prototype Officer's Creed

* WHAT APPEAR TO BE THE ACTUAL VALUES WHICH SHAPE THE COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR OF OFFICERS TODAY, AND HOW ARE THESE RELATED TO IDEAL VALUES?

To begin with, it can safely be assumed, by definition, that these actual values are less positive, less good, less inspirational than the ideal values. As noted earlier in the discussion of reference sources, seldom if ever has the Army looked inward to the value system of its Officer Corps through the medium of organized study or empirical research.

There is some evidence, derived from respectable scientific research, which describes the personal value system of the Army officer today. Tyler (1969), following the research methodology of England (1967), probed the value system of the US Army officer in a sample comprised of: 34 general officers, 82 USAWC lieutenant colonels, 73 Advanced Course captains, and 46 ROTC cadets. Tyler found the value system of Army officers to be significantly more "pragmatic" than "humanistic," giving greater importance to practical values than to ethical/moral values.

Listed below are illustrative examples of the "operative" Army officer values identified by Tyler. These are first-order, dominant values which channel actual decision and behavior.

HIGH PRODUCTIVITY	ABILITY
ORGANIZATIONAL EFFICIENCY	ACHIEVEMENT
MY BOSS	SUCCESS
AMBITION	

Second-order, less dominant, "intended" values which serve more to influence perception than to channel behavior include the following:

OBEDIENCE

HONOR

MY SUBORDINATES

DIGNITY

TRUST

EQUALITY

LOYALTY

From Tyler's research, it appears that the ideal values implied by "Duty-Honor-Country" have taken a subordinate role to values that are more practical, more pragmatic. Tyler comments as follows regarding the subordination of values previously considered ideal:

These are values that have been considered highly important throughout most of the lifetime of the officer. His contacts with society and the cultural setting of his background have always stressed the importance of these values; however, the officer's organizational experience has not always demonstrated the importance of these values in achieving success. . . . There is a conflict between what he has been taught to believe is important and what he sees to be important in his accepted environment. (Tyler, 1969, p. 12)

THE EXISTING PROFESSIONAL CLIMATE.

Variance: Ideal vs. Actual.

" CAN WE SAY CONCLUSIVELY THAT THERE IS A MEASURABLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THOSE VALUES HELD TO BE IDEAL AND THOSE WHICH ACTUALLY GOVERN OFFICER BEHAVIOR?

General. This query appears to belabor the logically obvious; nevertheless, at this point in the analysis it is essential to establish conclusively the fact that a difference exists. As indicated by the conceptual model which guided the study, this difference or gap or variance between ideal and actual becomes for a time the focal area for analysis.

The prime quantitative measure for establishing the existence of variance was questionnaire Item 9. The response to this question is illustrated below.




Figure B-2 - Gross Measure of Ideal-Actual Variance

Detailed Analysis. The overall evaluation, based on the limited sample of the Officer Corps, is that there is a "moderate" difference between ideal and actual standards in the Corps. (Appendix 2, Table 1.) The "moderate" evaluation was midway (3.02) between "None" (1), indicating no difference between ideal and actual standards, and "Great" (5), indicating a great difference, on the intensity scale with five graduations. More than half (53 percent) made the evaluation of "moderate" on this scale.* Only a very small number (3 percent) made the extreme evaluations of "None" or "Great." The

*The fact that the word "moderate" was used in the questionnaire as the term to describe the mid-point of the scale was a possible source of some of the clustering about that point. It is believed that "moderate" may have been interpreted within a broad range of connotations, and thus was a particularly attractive choice of response.

standard deviation of .7714 indicates relative agreement on this question as compared with other questions in the questionnaire.

* IS THE EXISTING OVERALL VARIANCE BETWEEN IDEAL AND ACTUAL VALUES PERCEIVED DIFFERENTLY, ACCORDING TO THE OFFICER'S GRADE LEVEL?

General. "Professional climate" is, to a considerable degree, climate as perceived by the members of the profession. It is important, therefore, to include in this assessment the perspectives of the principal grade levels. Analysis of the quantitative data permits the establishment of the following general rule regarding perception of the difference between ideal and actual values: The greater the rank, the less the perceived difference.

Responses to questionnaire Item 9, analyzed by grade level, are depicted below.




Figure B-3 - Gross Measure of Ideal-Actual Variance, by Grade Level

Detailed Analysis. There is a slightly greater tendency for lower ranking officers than for senior officers to say that, in the Officer Corps as a whole, there is a difference between ideal and actual standards (Appendix 2, Table 2). This tendency, though modest, has

significance statistically. This finding is the result of an analysis by grade of the answers to Item 9 on the "Individual Questionnaire." The correlation between officer rank and the perception of the difference between ideal and actual standards is $r = -.21$ at a $p = .05$ level of statistical significance (Appendix 2, Table 3).

There also is an apparent grouping of officers of lieutenant through major in one group, and lieutenant colonel and colonel in another. The answers of the former are skewed to the right while those of the latter are skewed to the left. The resulting groupings could be considered a military "generation gap" since, due to accelerated promotions, the majors may be closer in age and outlook to the company grade officers than to their fellow field grade officers.

The Impact of the Variables.

The preceding section established the existence of a difference or variance between ideal and actual values. In this study, an "assessment of professional climate" includes describing the nature or characteristics of the difference. In the following sections, through the use primarily of quantitative data from questionnaires, the difference will be examined on the basis of: biographical variables; grade level; senior-subordinate relations; and the specific officer behavior which illustrates variance.

- 3 WHAT EFFECT DO SOME OF THE MORE COMMON BIOGRAPHICAL VARIABLES (e.g., BRANCH, EDUCATION) HAVE ON THE PERCEPTION OF VARIANCE BETWEEN IDEAL AND ACTUAL STANDARDS?

General. Data to answer this question come primarily from correlational analysis. Part I of the questionnaire contained eight biographical variables intuitively felt to have some influence on value systems: grade, source of commission, branch, civilian education, military education, level of command, level of staff, and total command time. A study of the relationships existing between these biographical variables and the perceived difference between ideal and actual standards permits the establishment of the following three statistically significant propositions:

- The greater the rank, the less the perceived variance.
- The higher the level of military education, the less the perceived variance.
- The higher the level of staff experience, the less the perceived variance.

Detailed Analysis. The effect which a variation in grade has upon perceptions of differences between actual and ideal standards, as expressed in Item 9 of the "Individual Questionnaire," has been indicated in a preceding comment. In looking at the effects which other biographical variables appear to have, the most obvious conclusion is that while they do not greatly affect perceptions, there are, nonetheless, some weak but statistically significant trends (Appendix 2, Table 3). In general, these trends are in consonance with the previously reported tendency of perceptions to vary slightly with rank in an inverse manner; that is to say, as rank increases the

perceived difference between actual and ideal standards tends to show a small decrease.

There is a slight tendency for officers with less command experience to perceive more difference between the ideal and actual standards than officers with more command experience. The negative correlation of $r = -.11$ tends to provide weak support for this observation. The same tendency holds true for officers who have commanded at lower levels as opposed to those who have commanded at higher levels--the correlation in this case being $r = -.13$.

There is no meaningful difference between attitudes of officers when grouped by source of commission.

There is a slight, but not statistically significant, difference in attitudes of officers when grouped by branch. The officers of the services perceive a slightly greater difference between actual and ideal standards than do the officers of the combat arms.

There is a slight, but not statistically significant, difference in attitudes of officers when grouped by educational level. The officers with the lower educational levels perceive a greater difference between actual and ideal standards than do those with higher educational levels in this sample.

Correlations of the key variables, as indicated in Appendix 2, Table 3, are weak and must be used with great caution. The fact that the correlations which are over $r = .20$ are all negative indicates that as the independent variables (grade, military education, and

level of staff) increase, the dependent variable (difference in ideal and actual standards) tends to decrease.

* HOW DO THE DIFFERENT GRADE LEVELS VIEW EACH OTHER WITH RESPECT TO VARIANCE BETWEEN IDEAL AND ACTUAL STANDARDS?

General. This question uncovers the viewpoints or perspectives held by the various grades. In defining the nature of the differences between ideal and actual values, an assessment of how each grade level views the other is an essential step in eventually determining the "climate" and the causative factors at various grade levels. If this can be determined, understanding of the overall variance is increased; but, more importantly, in this assessment one can see the beginnings of some initial guidelines for development of solution concepts.

The results of analysis of Items 10-13 on the basis of "variance by level" are illustrated by Figures B-4 on the following page.

Junior officers (lieutenant and captain) perceive a greater difference between the ideal and the actual standards of the Officer Corps as a whole than do the senior officers, which tends to confirm the findings on the analysis of answers to Item 9.

Middle (major and lieutenant colonel) and upper (colonel) ranking officers agree with the relative standings of the various ranks as evaluated by the junior officers. All groups agree that divergence in terms of specific activities listed is the greatest in the junior ranks and progressively decreases as rank increases.

The middle and upper ranks view divergence at their grade level as being about the same; that is, on a 1-5 numerical basis, between

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ACTUAL AND IDEAL STANDARDS ON THE BASIS OF
DUTY, HONOR, COUNTRY AS SEEN BY VARIOUS GRADE LEVELS

SUMMARY OF SCORES FROM QUESTIONS 10-13 OF
"INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONNAIRE"

S = 414

QUESTIONS 10-13: "DO YOU FEEL THAT WITHIN THE OFFICER CORPS AS A WHOLE
THERE IS A DISCERNIBLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE IDEAL STANDARDS AND THOSE
THAT ACTUALLY EXIST?"

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ACTUAL AND IDEAL STANDARDS BY GRADE LEVEL:

		<u>JUNIOR</u>	<u>MIDDLE</u>	<u>UPPER</u>	<u>SENIOR</u>	<u>AVERAGE</u>
AS SEEN BY:	<u>JUNIOR</u> S=65	3.5	3.3	2.7	2.3	2.9
	<u>MIDDLE</u> S=228	3.0	2.8	2.8	2.3	2.7
	<u>UPPER</u> S=121	2.8	2.7	2.8	2.4	2.7
	<u>AVERAGE</u>	3.1	2.9	2.8	2.3	2.8

<u>LEGEND:</u>	<u>RANKS:</u>	<u>NUMERICAL SCORES</u>
	JUNIOR - LT, CPT	1 - None 4 - Considerable
	MIDDLE - MAJ, LTC	2 - Slight 5 - Great
	UPPER - COL	3 - Moderate
	SENIOR - GENERAL	

Figure B-4. Variance by Grade Level as Seen by
Junior, Middle, and Upper Grades.

2.7 and 2.8. They, and the juniors as well, view the composite divergence, in terms of the 54 specific functional areas, as being markedly less at the senior officer level. The image of the typical general officer in terms of specific behavioral functions reported in the quantitative data is much better than that of the colonels and lieutenant colonels.

Detailed Analysis. Junior officers also consider that the greatest difference between the ideal and the actual performance occurs at their own grade level. This finding is derived from Items 10 through 13 of the "Individual Questionnaire."

The higher ranking officers, and particularly the senior grades, are seen in this context as conforming more closely to the ideal (Appendix 2, Table 4). There is a seeming paradox here. Elsewhere in this study we find that these same junior officers have indicated that the failure of the higher ranking officers to provide a good example is a major cause for junior officers' failing to meet the ideal standards. The resolution of this paradox is amply supported by close scrutiny of data, particularly the qualitative segments which follow. (Note particularly the variance themes on pp. B-28, 29, 30, and the causal themes on pp. B-36, 37, 38.)

The explanation is extremely important and forms one basis for major conclusions of this study. (See Part IV: Conclusions and Concepts for Solution.)

Shortcomings of junior officers, while serious when the Army as a whole is considered, generally have less effect when considered on an

individual basis. Furthermore, and particularly important in searching for potential corrective measures, many of the systemic "pressures" which tempt the junior to resort to unethical practices to "get the job done" are seen as the result of techniques or policies initiated or condoned by senior officers. The seniors, with their greater leverage of power and visibility, and their natural role as behavioral models, may find the results of their shortcomings multiplied throughout their commands.

" IF WE NARROW GRADE LEVEL ANALYSIS DOWN SPECIFICALLY TO SENIOR-SUBORDINATE RELATIONSHIPS, HOW DO SENIORS AND SUBORDINATES (AND PEERS) VIEW EACH OTHERS' ADHERENCE TO IDEAL VALUES?

General. It is quite possible that perceived variance by grade level is, in part, a function of chain of command, of peer relationships, and of the organizational environment rather than of rank alone. In order to keep the length of the questionnaire acceptable to the respondents, the quantitative responses were not designed for direct comparison of the effects (on perception) of rank versus chain of command position. It is possible, however, in a "by chain of command" analysis, to personalize the assessment of perceived variance in terms of specific superiors and subordinates. This would reduce some of the individual tendency to generalize.

In addition to assessing variance from the point of view of recent specific senior-subordinate relationships, questionnaire items 14-19 begin to give definition to ideal-actual variance in terms of the type of behavior involved. These items, then, assess variance not only with respect to senior-subordinate relationships, but also with respect to

each of two primary behavioral dimensions: professional competence, and ethical behavior. Considering the combined effects of rank and senior-subordinate relations upon how an officer views adherence to the competence and ethical aspects of an ideal value system, the quantitative data depict the following:

- Officers with whom an individual has recently served are perceived as adhering more closely to ideals of competence and ethical behavior than those within the Officer Corps as a whole.
- Officers at all levels perceive greater divergence from ideal values in the area of professional competence than in the area of ethical behavior.
- Officers at all levels perceive greater divergence in their subordinates than in their peers and superiors--with respect to both professional competence and ethical behavior.
- The greatest divergence from ideal values is perceived to exist in the professional competence of junior grade officers (O1-O3).
- The least divergence from ideal values is perceived to exist in the ethical behavior of the superiors of upper grade (O6+) officers.

Detailed Analysis. In Items 14-19 of the "Individual Questionnaire," subjects were asked to evaluate the superiors, peers, and subordinates with whom they had served on their last duty assignment. The result of this personalization of the questions was that the attitudes expressed were more favorable than the attitudes noted when the questions were impersonal and referred to the Officer Corps as a whole (Appendix 2, Table 5). In referring to the Officer Corps as a whole in Item 9, as indicated previously, the respondents said that there was a "moderate" difference between ideal and actual standards;

in Items 14-19, when officers were asked about actual persons with whom they had recently been in contact, they reported what were generally "minor" deviations from ideal standards. A strict comparison of the results of Item 9 versus those of Items 14-19 is not possible, however, for two reasons--the first being that the scales used in Items 14-19 measured only four levels of intensity, while the other scales measured five; and the second being that Items 14-19 measured attitudes toward both professional competence and ethical behavior, while Item 9 was broader and asked only for an evaluation of deviations from the ideal standard of "Duty, Honor, and Country."

Another result of this series of questions was that officers at all levels considered that there was more divergence from the ideal in terms of professional competence than ethical behavior. This was true whether these officers were rating their superiors, their peers, or their subordinates. The differences were not large, but they were consistent, and were all in the same direction. The lesson from this would seem to be that while more publicity has attended the area of ethical behavior, the problem of divergence from ideal standards of professional competence is of equal, if not greater, interest.

Two other important results of this series of questions were as follows:

(1) The lower the grade, the more critical the evaluations, as a general tendency. The same tendency has been noted on other questions, and it again holds true with this series. Junior officers were the most critical of both professional competence and ethical behavior.

The junior officers were even more critical of each other in the area of professional competence (2.46) than were their superiors critical of these same officers (2.26, 2.06, and 1.95). This seems to indicate a healthy potential for their accepting corrective measures.

(2) The tendency of officers at all grades was to be more critical of their subordinates than their superiors or peers in evaluating the difference between the actual and the ideal in both professional competence and ethical behavior. For example, the juniors evaluated their superiors 1.90 and 1.82 on professional competence and ethical behavior respectively, their peers 2.46 and 2.09, and their subordinates 2.53 and 2.19. The most unfavorable evaluation of any group was the 2.53 rating given to the subordinates of the junior officers by the junior officers in the area of professional competence. The relatively most favorable rating was the 1.58 evaluation given by the upper grade officers of their seniors (general officers) in the area of ethical behavior.

* IF IT IS POSSIBLE TO ASSESS DIVERGENCE (BY RANK AND POSITION) FROM IDEAL VALUES IN TERMS OF THE GENERAL AREAS OF PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE AND ETHICAL BEHAVIOR, CAN WE ALSO ASSESS DIVERGENCE WITHIN THE SPECIFIC BEHAVIORS OR FUNCTIONS THAT ARE COMMON TO MOST OFFICER JOBS?

General. Because of the great variety within and between the many jobs found in today's Officer Corps, it is difficult to derive a manageable yet comprehensive list of "common functions" which represent specific behavior. For this analysis, the initial effort was to

refine "common" functions down to a list which defines those officer functions that are not only common but also critical.

In the mid-50s, US Air Force personnel researchers developed a listing of the more important aspects or functions common to most officer jobs. Within the behavioral sciences, this list is still regarded as one of the best devices for focusing on managerial or officer behavior (Dunnette, 1966). The list consists of 54 functions, or categories of behavior, ranging from "Understanding Instructions" to "Taking Responsibility."

Some of the functions are not affected to any significant degree by the officers' value system. In the present study, the list was reduced to 35 functions believed to be: common, critical, and subject to the influence of the officers' value system.

In questionnaire Items 20-54, respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which officers diverged from ideal values when performing each of these functions. On these same items, respondents were also asked to specify a particular grade level if they felt that divergence was significantly greater at that level.

The bar graphs which follow, constructed from simple descriptive statistics, show the divergence from ideal values within each of the functions considered common and critical to most officer jobs. (See Appendix 3, Numerical Tabulation.)

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONNAIRE












FUNCTIONAL AREA	DEGREE OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ACTUAL AND IDEAL (\bar{x})					STANDARD DEVIATIONS
	1	2	3	4	5	
<u>ADMINISTRATION</u>						
20. Preparing and Presenting Reports.						.93
21. Completing Efficiency Reports.						1.08
22. Keeping Accurate Unit Records.						.86
23. Keeping Superiors and Subordinates Fully Informed.						.92
<u>SUPERVISING PERSONNEL</u>						
24. Giving and Relaying Sound Orders and Instructions.						.86
25. Delegating Authority.						1.05
26. Looking out for Welfare of Subordinates.						.99
27. Setting a Good Example.						.92
28. Encouraging Ideas.						1.06
29. Giving Reasons and Explanations.						.93
30. Assisting Subordinates in Work.						.94

Figure B-5. Behavioral Correlates of Ideal-Actual Variance.

NOTE: \bar{x} represents the mean arithmetic response, expressing degree of difference between ideal and existing standards, based on a scale from 1 ("no difference") to 5 ("great difference").

FUNCTIONAL AREA	DEGREE OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ACTUAL AND IDEAL (X)					STANDARD DEVIATIONS
	1	2	3	4	5	
(CONTINUED)						
31. Evaluating Subordinates' Work.	██████████ 2.6					.90
32. Being Loyal to Subordinates.	██████████ 2.9					1.00
<u>PLANNING AND DIRECTION</u>						
33. Taking Responsibility for Own Plans and Actions.	██████████ 2.7					.99
34. Applying Non-biased Judgment.	██████████ 2.8					.95
35. Taking Prompt action.	██████████ 2.5					.93
36. Giving All-out Effort to Assigned Tasks.	██████████ 2.5					.95
<u>ACCEPTANCE OF ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY</u>						
37. Complying with Orders & Directives.	██████████ 2.3					.83
38. Accepting Organizational Procedures.	██████████ 2.3					.86
39. Subordinating Personal Interests.	██████████ 2.9					.99
40. Being Loyal to Superiors.	██████████ 2.5					.89
41. Cooperating with Associates.	██████████ 2.3					.82
42. Showing Loyalty to Organization.	██████████ 2.4					.90
43. Taking Responsibility for What the Organization Does.	██████████ 2.4					.91
44. Assuming Official Fiscal Responsibility.	██████████ 2.3					.98
45. Assuming Official Property and Material Responsibility.	██████████ 2.5					.99

	DEGREE OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ACTUAL AND IDEAL (X)					STANDARD DEVIATIONS
	1	2	3	4	5	
<u>ACCEPTANCE OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY</u>						
46. Attending to Duties.	██████████ 2.4					.81
47. Meeting Commitments.	██████████ 2.3					.80
48. Maintaining Military Appearance.	██████████ 2.5					.98
49. Adapting to Associates.	██████████ 2.2					.71
50. Adapting to Job.	██████████ 2.2					.74
51. Being Financially Responsible as an Individual.	██████████ 2.1					.84
52. Setting Standards of Personal Moral Behavior.	██████████ 2.6					.96
<u>MILITARY PROFICIENCY</u>						
53. Developing the Skills Required for Present Assignment.	██████████ 2.4					.86
Keeping Abreast of Major Developments in Army, Branch, and Specialty Area.	██████████ 2.6					.95

Detailed Analysis. Detailed analysis in this case was limited to study of the results of a multiple linear regression analysis, with questionnaire Item 9 as the dependent variable, and the difference values of Items 20-54 as the independent variables. The purpose of this analysis was to determine whether the divergences within the list of functions represented by Items 20-54 were valid predictors of (i.e., collectively related to) the gross measure of difference in Item 9.

An obtained multiple correlation coefficient ($r = .6086$) shows the relationship between Items 9 and Items 20-54 to be positive and moderately strong, indicating that, collectively, divergence in Items 20-54 predicts for difference in Item 9.

The coefficient of determination ($CD = .3704$) suggests that the difference scores of Items 20-54 accounted for slightly more than one-third of the variance in the response to Item 9. Considering the thousands of variables that could be studied and the elusive nature of values and value systems, the coefficient of determination is considered adequate.

In the analysis of variance for the multiple linear regression ($df = 35$, due to regression; 360, due to variation about regression) the F-value of 6.3879 indicates that the results of the analysis are statistically significant.

* IF "SIGNIFICANT" IS DEFINED AS DEGREE OF DIVERGENCE FROM IDEAL VALUES PLUS THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DIVERGENCE TO THE FUTURE OF THE OFFICER CORPS, CAN THE LIST OF FUNCTIONS BE FURTHER DISTILLED DOWN TO THOSE CONSIDERED "MOST SIGNIFICANT"?

General. In questionnaire Items 20-54, respondents were also asked to evaluate, for each function, the importance of divergence or variance within that function. Because of the large number of items and a relatively small evaluative scale, this "importance measure" was further refined by questionnaire Part V, which requested respondents to review the entire list of functions and indicate the three or four they felt to be most significant.

Significance is subjective, highly dependent upon perspective. From the collective perspective of the 415 officers responding to the questionnaire (not all of whom completed Part V) and on the basis of four separate procedural tests discussed in the detailed analysis, the 14 functions shown in the figure on the following page represent those perceived as "most significant" to the future of the Officer Corps.

Detailed Analysis. Using available descriptive and analytical statistics, a series of logical and simple tests was applied in the detailed analysis designed to determine which functional divergences could be considered as "most significant."

The correlation analysis (Annex A, Methodology) was reviewed for correlations between the difference measures on Items 20-54 and the gross measure of correlation on Item 9. Items with correlations less than $r = +.25$ were eliminated.

Mean values for Items 20-54 on both the difference scales and the importance scales were reviewed. Items whose mean values were not above the scale mid-point on both scales were eliminated. This dual criteria procedure is illustrated in Annex A, Figure A-1.

SIGNIFICANT FUNCTIONS




Figure B-b.
B-26

Total responses to questionnaire Part V indicating which functional divergences were perceived as most significant were recorded. The frequency with which each item appeared was noted; those appearing less than 30 times were eliminated.

The appearance frequencies derived in the preceding test were arranged in rank order. Items appearing in the lower half of the rank order were eliminated.

Test results for all items were compared. Those items which met successfully the criteria of any three of the above tests were retained as "most significant." (Figure B-6)

Observable Divergence.

Up to this point, this study has assessed the climate of professionalism in terms of quantitative, manipulatable, objective fact. The job functions just discussed categorize behavior; and the data employed serve to pinpoint the location and level of divergence. These quantitative data, however, transmit little of the feeling that is an absolute essential of communication. In short, the assessment thus far defines, rather than describes.

- * WHAT ARE THE EVERYDAY MANIFESTATIONS OF THE "MOST SIGNIFICANT" DIVERGENCES PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED? . . . CAN THEY BE ILLUSTRATED BY SITUATIONS AND CONDITIONS FOUND WITHIN THE ARMY TODAY?

The answer to this question must come from the qualitative data (Annex A), since it is these data that carry the "feeling" component. Primary reliance, therefore, now shifts to that portion of the data

base (Figure II-1) labeled "qualitative"--the collective opinion of group discussion and narrative written response.

The content of interviews, group discussion, and questionnaire narratives was analyzed by the controlled procedures noted previously (Annex A). This content analysis produced a series of 14 divergence or variance themes. These themes, representing the collective perceptions of the entire officer sample, describe the situations and conditions which best reflect the existing variance between ideal and actual values. They represent one important ingredient of the description of the prevailing climate.

- SELFISH AND AMBITIOUS BEHAVIOR; PASSING THE BUCK. This major variance theme defines the Army officer who lacks awareness of human relations; who places self first--at the expense of Duty, Honor, Country, the Army, and his subordinates. He is the officer who wants to "make his mark" and appear to his superiors as general officer material, and yet who is, in fact, somewhat hesitant to lead, to make decisions, and to accept responsibility.

- MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT--REGARDLESS OF MEANS OR IMPORTANCE. This variance encompasses the officer who has the automatic "can do" reply. . . . The commander who attempts to accomplish every mission regardless of its importance or the capacity of his unit. This is the commander with a narrow vision of overall mission and a disarranged priority of objectives.

- POOR ARMY IMAGE. The poor Army image is an internal as well as an external problem. The internal aspect is emphasized by the lack of adequate post facilities including housing medical and dental facilities, the Commissary and Post Exchange. The external portion, of lesser significance, is the synthesis of: the misconduct by some ranking members of the Officer Corps; a general portrayal of the military-industrial complex; misrepresentations by the news media; the My Lai and Green Beret cases; and few at the seat of authority willing to "tell it like it is" and defend the military institutions.

- ACCEPTANCE OF MEDIOCRE AND UNSATISFACTORY OFFICERS. There is some tendency on the part of newly commissioned officers to be complacent. There is at the same time a reluctance on the part of the middle and upper grades to weed out the mediocrity and incompetence in the company

middle ranks. There is a widespread acceptance of mediocre officers in the middle and upper ranks who have "retired on active duty," who provide little incentive for junior officers, and who are of marginal value to the service.

- DISTORTION OF REPORTS--TO INCLUDE THE OER. There is a widespread distortion of fact in reports. The Officer Efficiency Report was the most frequently mentioned example of distortion. AWOL, USARV body count, and MACV pacification reports are additional examples.

- OVERSUPERVISION AND SQUELCHING INITIATIVE; "DON'T ROCK THE BOAT." The layers of bureaucracy stifle innovative ideas and intuitive thinking. Senior officers shy away from new ideas, fear mistake. The supervisory mode of the "squad leaders in the sky" is prevalent.

- VARYING STANDARDS. Many senior officers disregard regulations and directives while demanding strict compliance by the lower grades. Most frequently mentioned was the perception that the higher the officer's grade, the greater the probability he will not receive punishment. The "can do" commander, eager to please the boss rather than do what is required for the unit, begins and sustains the upward spiral of unequal, unrealistic workload and reward.

- ARMY SYSTEM OF REWARDS. There is an apparent fostering of a system which rewards the driving officer who, over the short run, "gets the results," but who over the long run exacts a terrible cost in human values. As a result, commanders reward their units based largely on reports which are prepared to reflect only the favorable side of the unit. This tacit approval of distorted reports by commanders has built a false reward system. There are many instances of the award of valor and meritorious medals to senior officers for questionable deeds in the eyes of their junior officers; e.g., the "meritorious" or "cumulative" award of the Silver Star. Commanders and courts fail to punish offenders for obvious and serious violations of standards.

- TECHNICAL INCOMPETENCE. The many branch immaterial duties cause the middle and upper grades officers to lose their branch proficiency. Little attempt is made to master the details of the job or upgrade one's information until placed in the position of responsibility. This conditioned development of potential incompetence is increased by disproportionate emphasis on such peripheral "tickets" as the graduate degree.

- LYING, CHEATING, STEALING. This variance is illustrated by Army-wide: signing of false certificates; falsification of flight records; condoning of the unit thief or scrounger; acceptance by middle and upper grade officers of obviously distorted reports; falsification of TDY trips for self gain and the attendant travel pay; hiding of costs under various programs; placing AWOLs on leave to satisfy commander's desire for "Zero Defect" statistics.

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- LACK OF ESPRIT AND PRIDE. This variance encompasses the tolerated lack of drive and pride in the Army, the lack of pride in one's self, and the resultant laziness, obesity, and lowered standards of personal appearance. It is fostered by instability in assignments.

- TOLERATED DEVIANCE. There is a hesitance or even failure, at all levels, to eliminate those who tend to lie, cheat or steal. Seniors fail to set and enforce proper standards of ethics and professionalism. Failure to enforce lends credence to any aura of hypocrisy coming from other sources.

- ONE WAY COMMUNICATIONS. There is a serious breakdown in interpersonal communications which is identified by a failure on the part of seniors to listen to their subordinates, and a marked tendency to talk at rather than with the subordinate. The Army talks much about this; does little. The need for junior officer councils has "face validity," but reflects dereliction of a time-honored command responsibility: Know your men and look out for their welfare.

- LOYALTY AND DEDICATION. These basic ingredients of soldiering are seldom projected down, or across.

* IS THERE A RELATIVE ORDER OF PREVALANCE AMONG THESE INDICATORS? . . . ARE SOME MORE WIDELY PERCEIVED THAN OTHERS?

In one phase of content analysis, a group of judges, using a derivation of a qualitative analysis procedure known as the "Q-Sort Technique" (Vroom, 1964), recorded the frequency with which divergence or variance themes appeared in the written narrative responses (Part V) of the questionnaires. The list of divergence themes used in this analysis does not correspond precisely with those previously discussed; nevertheless, the frequency tally made by the judges illustrates quite clearly a relative order of perceived prevalence among the indicators of variance. These data, summarized in the figure on the following page, should be interpreted with an awareness that the numbers shown represent prevalence, and not, necessarily, importance.

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RECURRING NARRATIVE DIVERGENCE OR VARIANCE THEMES (FROM 415 RESPONSES)

<u>THEMES</u>	<u>NUMBER OF RESPONSES</u>
1. Distortion of reports - including OER.	189
2. Selfish/ambitious behavior; passing the buck.	166
3. Oversupervision, "don't rock the boat."	119
4. Technical incompetence.	101
5. Varying standards (grades, units).	86
6. Lying, cheating, stealing.	70
7. Acceptance of substandard officer.	52
8. Army system of rewards.	48
9. Lack of esprit and pride.	43
10. Poor Army image.	34
11. Mission accomplishment regardless of means or importance.	31

Figure B-7. Divergence or Variance Themes

° TO WHAT DEGREE CAN THESE INDICATORS (AND THEIR PREVALANCE) BE CONSIDERED AS REPRESENTATIVE OF CONDITIONS EXISTING THROUGHOUT THE OFFICER CORPS IN ITS ENTIRETY?

The first data analyzed were those brought back by the discussion group leaders. Each team was debriefed separately. The recorded debriefing sessions show that, irrespective of the post visited or the grade level of the discussion groups, the same divergence themes appeared.

The written narrative responses to the questionnaire were studied later in the analysis phase. Again, the same themes appeared--and with much the same intensity. This supports the representativeness of the themes, but it also suggests that the views of divergence held by an officer at the "public" level (group discussion) did not differ greatly from those held at the individual and anonymous "private" level (questionnaire).

Further, there is a marked similarity in the divergence uncovered by this assessment and that noted in a series of informal seminars held at Department of the Army level prior to initiation of this more rigorous study of professionalism.

A final support of the representativeness of the indicators discussed lies in one of the worksheets used by the discussion leaders. At the beginning of the study, during problem definition, ten conditions or situations were informally hypothesized as illustrative of existing variance between ideal and actual values. Discussion leaders were asked to evaluate, on the basis of their interaction with discussion groups, the degree to which officers were concerned

about these ten conditions. The results of this analysis are depicted in Figure B-8 on the following pages and are compatible with those obtained through the more precise analyses discussed.

In sum, it is difficult to disavow the perceived existence of the problems identified by this quantitative and qualitative assessment of professionalism.

CAUSES OF VARIANCE.

The officer behavior illustrative of a difference between ideal and actual values has been operationally defined and subjectively described in considerable detail. Additionally, since individual perception is so intricately involved in interpretation of adherence or divergence, the difference or variance has been examined from the points of view of different grade levels within the Officer Corps. Assessment, per se, is essentially completed. The thrust of this study now shifts from assessment to diagnosis.

° WHICH APPEAR TO BE THE CAUSES WHICH UNDERLIE THE DIVERGENCE PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED?

In attempting to diagnose cause, it is evident immediately that cause and effect cannot be separated with precision into mutually exclusive categories. They are interwoven. The distortion of an OER, listed earlier as an indicator, is an effect. However, it causes (in part) the acceptance of mediocre and unsatisfactory officers. The interrelationships are extremely complex, as illustrated by the model

COMPOSITE PROFILE OF DISCUSSION GROUP LEADERS'
RESPONSES TO:

"Your estimate of the relative sense of concern or urgency regarding ten specific points."

Low or
Non-Existent

Present But
Not Significant

Extremely
High

0 — 1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 — 6 — 7 — 8




Figure B-8

SPECIFIC POINTS

ORDER OF CONCERN


F. Officers are not highly competent in their duties; this is one cause for unrealistic standards, poor supervision, over supervision, use of statistical indicators in place of "professional judgment," etc.

G. Disenchantment with the leadership or integrity of (JUNIOR) (SENIOR) officers.

H. "Politics" or favoritism in selection, promotion, prestige assignments, etc.

I. Difficulty in communicating with senior officers: "nobody listens or understands."

J. Loyalty seems a "one-way street." It goes mostly up, rarely down.



shown in Figure III-1; nevertheless, an understanding of cause must be established as a precondition for solution.

In the present study, the diagnosis of cause was not included in the collection of quantitative data, since to have done so would have restricted the consideration of causes to those listed on a questionnaire. Instead, the search for cause was approached directly, and through qualitative means. Perceived cause was a central item in the discussion of divergence; "causation" themes were identified and described. There is understandably a degree of overlap with the earlier noted divergence themes. In terms of the methodology employed in this study, themes listed below represent the causes underlying the divergent behavior previously discussed. Many of them logically overlap. They are derived from both reported perceptions and analysis by the study group.

- NO TIME OR EXCUSE FOR FAILURE. There are no allowances for failure. Mistakes are seldom condoned. Both quest for and receipt of accelerated promotions provide little time to acquire a wide variety of experience. The press of the 6 or 12 month command tour leaves little room for counseling and delegation of authority. There is a prevalent feeling that "one mistake will ruin a career. There is little freedom to fail."

- TICKET-PUNCHING. To succeed, one must command (preferably in combat), serve on high level staff, etc. Officers go to unbelievable lengths to get the "right" assignments needed for promotions and schools.

- STATISTICAL PRESSURES. Upper and senior commanders set unrealistic goals. At lower levels, professional principles are sacrificed to the production of "results." There are myriad requirements for certificates, reports, statistics. Many feel that statistics are used primarily as an officer appraisal tool rather than as an adjunct to resource management.

- IMPROPER GOALS, DEMANDS, AND QUOTAS. Units are given too many missions, too many inspections with unclear or insignificant purposes.

There is an abundance of "busy work" and wasted effort generated by middle and upper grades. Resources are often obviously inadequate to accomplish the mission; e.g., a unit at 60 percent strength attempting to maintain 100 percent of its equipment in a "zero defects" mode.

- LACK OF STABILITY IN LENGTH OF ASSIGNMENT; SOMETIMES INADEQUATE TIME IN GRADE. The 6-month command tour fosters a lack of personal knowledge of subordinates' capabilities, leaving little time for the development of professionalism. Fast promotions mean limited experience and superficial understanding of assigned duties. Rapid promotion to captain is a particular case in point.

- PRESSURE TO REMAIN COMPETITIVE. There is unhealthy competition for command and for certain staff positions, particularly within middle and upper grades. Further, officers hesitate to admit weaknesses and frequently cover up mistakes with little consideration of the consequences.

- COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY. The helicopter and the radio have weakened the chain of command. With almost "real time" reporting systems, there is little opportunity to explain or discuss problems, or to give guidance. Statistics are transmitted rapidly; but essential background information often does not come through.

- REQUIRING EXPERTISE IN TOO MANY AREAS. Given the emphasis on "generalists" rather than "specialists," the spectrum of normal duty assignments is so varied that it is difficult to be well prepared.

- PERMISSIVE SOCIETY. The interpretation of "Duty-Honor-Country" is influenced to some degree by contact with the more pragmatic values of contemporary society. Younger officers will often accept the prevailing values of the "real world," although they recognize the disparity between the ideal and the actual situation.

- REQUIREMENT FOR MORE OFFICERS. The rapid activation of new units without mobilization leads to dilution of experience and, in turn, to more frequently mediocre and unsatisfactory job performance. Standards of commissioning are lowered to some degree.

- INADEQUATE ELIMINATION OF OFFICERS. It often appears that quality is not a criterion for promotion. There is little effort to identify and remove the "dead wood" at upper levels and the inept at lower levels. Officers obviously lacking in integrity are retained.

- INSUFFICIENT COUNSELING AND SETTING OF STANDARDS. These factors both relate to the development of younger officers. There is a widespread lack of time and technique for counseling and

coaching subordinates in their duties. Certain examples of middle and upper officers have strong negative effects: lack of respect for other people, low moral standards, drunkenness, failure to correct, failure to support subordinates, preoccupation with retirement.

- LEGALISM. Commanders often hesitate to take action for fear of not having legal sufficiency for their actions, or of becoming entangled in a legalistic administrative morass. They want to be "covered."

- LOYALTY UP--NOT DOWN. Subordinates perceive a gross lack of real interest in their welfare. Despite gimmicks and programs, this lends an air of hypocrisy to other policies and programs promulgated by "they." Loyalty downward is often seen as dependent upon the subordinate's contributions and achievements. Subordinates in trouble are not "backed up" when they should be.

- FAILURE TO ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR OWN ACTION. Failure and error are projected to subordinates. Superiors discourage unfavorable "feedback" from subordinates. "Higher headquarters" also gets the blame frequently.

- LACK OF MORAL COURAGE AND SELF DISCIPLINE. There is a marked reluctance to ask superiors, particularly general officers, for clarification and additional guidance. Junior officers avoid giving unpleasant orders. Some officers show little regard for moral and ethical "right."

° CAN SOME ORDER OF PERCEIVED PREVALENCE BE ESTABLISHED AMONG THESE CAUSES?

As was the case in the analysis of divergence themes, the causation themes appearing in group discussion and in the written responses to the questionnaire were quite similar. There were few variations by grade. The frequency tally of the judges, which established a rank order of occurrence among the causation themes, is the basis for the illustration shown on the following page, and suggests an order of prevalence.

RECURRING NARRATIVE THEMES USED TO EXPLAIN CAUSE OF VARIANCE
(FROM 415 RESPONSES)

<u>THEME</u>	<u>NUMBER OF RESPONSES</u>
1. Inadequate counseling/setting standards by seniors.	170
2. Unrealistic goals/quotas.	126
3. No time/excuse for failure.	113
4. Loyalty up - not down.	108
5. Pressure to remain competitive (survival).	107
6. Lack of self discipline/moral courage.	98
7. Failure to accept responsibility for action.	91
8. Communication technology.	91
9. Inadequate elimination of officers (automatic promotions/retention).	90
10. "Statistical" pressures.	84
11. Ticket Punching.	73
12. Instability in assignments; also in promotion, retention policies.	63
13. Permissive society.	55
14. Requiring expertise in too many areas.	25
15. Legalism: "be covered."	22
16. Requirement for increased number of officers.	21

Figure B-9. Causation Themes

° DO THE OBVIOUS INTERRELATIONS AMONG THESE CAUSATION THEMES
PROVIDE A MEANS FOR REFINING THE LIST OF CAUSES DOWN TO A
FEW THAT SEEM BASIC?

If a few basic root causes can be isolated, solution is obviously simplified. This principle was recognized by the study and a concerted effort (collective judgment in group seminar) was made to distill the list to a more basic level.

An initial attempt was made to combine within themes; i.e., to determine if two or more themes were sufficiently similar to permit the selection of one which would encompass the others. This effort was unsuccessful; however, as these causation themes were manipulated and tested through study, redefinition, and debate, it gradually became apparent, although imprecisely so, that two broad areas of personnel management might together incorporate the longer list of more detailed causation themes. This listing represents but one of many possible categorizations of these themes. Several of the themes obviously might fit in either category.

The majority of the causal factors seemed to have at least partial origins in what might be termed the Army's appraisal system, defined as formal and informal procedures whereby an officer is evaluated; then rewarded, not rewarded, or punished. Causation themes felt to be related to this appraisal system are the following:

- NO TIME OR EXCUSE FOR FAILURE
- STATISTICAL PRESSURES
- PRESSURE TO REMAIN COMPETITIVE
- PERMISSIVE SOCIETY

- INADEQUATE ELIMINATION OF OFFICERS
- LOYALTY UP--NOT DOWN
- FAILURE TO ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY
- LEGALISM
- LACK OF MORAL COURAGE AND SELF DISCIPLINE

The remainder of the causal factors appeared to be related to a second gross category, termed the Army's assignment system, defined as formal and informal procedures and requirements existing in the long-term process of officer development. The causation themes listed below appeared to have partial origins in this assignment system:

- EXPERTISE REQUIRED IN TOO MANY AREAS
- TICKET PUNCHING
- REQUIREMENT FOR INCREASED NUMBERS OF OFFICERS
- INSUFFICIENT COUNSELING AND SETTING OF STANDARDS
- UNREALISTIC GOALS, DEMANDS, QUOTAS
- COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY
- LACK OF STABILITY IN LENGTH OF ASSIGNMENT AND TIME IN GRADE

In summary, the list of causation themes can be further refined but, in the process, the relationships become less clear. Second-order causes do not "fit" their base cause category with acceptable precision. It is doubtful, therefore, that the resultant basic causes, discussed above, are sufficiently inclusive or definitive to warrant their being labeled as finite "basic" or "root" causes.

They can, however, be viewed as initial and tentative start points for solution.

SOLUTION.

The objective of solution, in terms of the conceptual model of this study, is to reduce the difference or variance between ideal and actual values. In the sections that follow, the means whereby this can be accomplished are developed, beginning first at a general level of solution.

• WHAT CAN BE CONSIDERED AS SOME INITIAL GUIDELINES FOR SOLUTION?

The Spectrum of Solution.

Early in the problem definition phase, it was evident that not all problems and causes would be subject to corrective action. Due to the nature of values and value systems, a "spectrum of solution," as illustrated in Figure B-10 on the following page, appears to be an appropriate guideline. The spectrum expresses a range of alternative approaches. These are derived from the need to recognize the essentially unchanging character of human nature; the changing value systems of portions of society; the susceptibility of some problems only to long term, incremental solutions; and the certain impotence of piecemeal solutions.

The diagnosis of cause, previously discussed, points undeniably to traditional and contemporary aspects of the Army's personnel system as an initial guideline or starting point for solution. It becomes clear almost immediately, however, that other systems of the




Figure B-10. A Spectrum of Solution

Army's structure are also involved. Consider, for example, the readiness reporting system. While the personnel system can be looked to as an initial start point, all facets of Army operations and policies must be addressed in formulating solution alternatives.

Consistency of the Data. Any concepts for solution must view the data base in totality. The total inputs, as well as the analysis and search for underlying causes, then form an integrated and consistent pattern. Thus the quantitative result that showed senior officers as a group deviating less numerically from ideal standards than did junior officers became, in overall perspective, somewhat less reassuring than one might have assumed in viewing that finding in isolation. Similarly, the role of the "permissive society" or the intrusion of the "commercial ethic" became less relevant as immediate causes of variance from ideal standards. These societal pressures seemed, upon closer scrutiny, to be exacerbating agents rather than direct causative forces. It was, for example, the uncontrolled ambition of the commander and his often thoughtless quest for a personal image of perfection that apparently created the situation in which the junior officer submitted incorrect reports. While societal conditioning might have softened the junior officer's defenses against compromise of ethical standards, such conditioning was not the prime impetus for any compromise. Taken as a whole, particularly in light of the qualitative inputs which described the constraints within which the junior officer is placed and the pressures

imposed upon him by his seniors, the responsibility for systemic defects shifted consistently toward the senior officers--the lieutenant colonels and above.

This shift, reinforced by attempts to isolate "root causes" and consolidate themes of causality, a supported by independent findings of allied studies and observations (USMA, Franklin Institute, OPD), forced a search for corrective measures in the Army's policies and procedures as well as in the obviously less fertile ground of basic human behavior. It is in fact an optimistic finding that seemingly correctable flaws in various self-designed Army systems might be prime causes of variances from ideal standards. This situation portends greater possible success for corrective measures than if the system design and management were perfect but human nature and societal pressures were relentlessly subverting the system.

* ARE THERE SOME GENERAL SOLUTION CONCEPTS WHICH CAN SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR MORE SPECIFIC SOLUTION MEASURES?

This study has shown that in the highly subjective area of values and value systems, it is difficult to move in direct, precise, lock-step fashion from indicator, to cause, to basic cause, to solution. Two problems relate to a third, and then collectively produce another. There are, however, certain solid solution concepts which result from analysis of the data.

Questionnaire Part V, without restricting the options, requested the respondents to propose corrective measures which might be employed--regardless of the effort required. This freedom from restraints was

established so as to widen the range of alternatives that might be developed.

[At this point, it is important to note parenthetically the large proportion of War College students among the questionnaire respondents (Annex A, Methodology). These individuals, representing a future generation of Army leadership, expressed deep concern with cause and effect--and their proposed solutions were not greatly influenced by organizational bias. The need, in this solution-oriented exploratory study, for the application of their collective experience, wisdom, and quality, accounts in great part for the non-representative nature of the study sample.]

Narrative responses to questionnaire Part V were processed by the Q-Sort analytical procedure previously mentioned on page B-30. From this process, the group of judges developed a list of five "solution themes" which can be considered as basic solution concepts in the development of more specific corrective measure. These concepts, and the frequency with which they were proposed by respondents, are illustrated in Figure B-11 on the following page.

° WHAT SPECIFIC CORRECTIVE MEASURES, READILY TRANSLATABLE INTO MISSION STATEMENTS, CAN BE DEVELOPED FROM THE LIST OF SOLUTION CONCEPTS?

The solutions proposed in the qualitative data, conceived under conditions of limited restraint, can be labeled "naive" and "idealistic"; they are, nevertheless, representative of the expectations of the respondents. To the degree that expectations point to ideal conditions, the corrective actions proposed point to the objective

RECURRING NARRATIVE SOLUTION THEMES
(FROM 415 RESPONSES)

<u>THEME</u>	<u>NUMBER OF RESPONSES</u>
1. Emphasis/attention on part of senior officers	222
2. Reward system: OER - promotion, assignments, schools, and retention, awards & decorations.	200
3. Communication (inter-personal).	96
4. Stabilize personnel policies & assignments.	49
5. Utilize varying degrees of talent - allow for specialization and retention of solid non-promotable officers.	47

Figure B-11. Solution Themes

established for solution: reduce the difference between actual and ideal conditions.

The final list of solution measures rests upon no specific procedure or analysis. The foundation of these measures is a synthesis of the findings concerning: the existence of variance, the perspectives of grade levels, the behavioral correlates of variance, and their everyday manifestations, the perceived causal factors, and finally, the straightforward expectations of all who participated in this study. These findings, carefully and collectively considered, indicate that the following are necessary:

- (1) Disseminate to the Officer Corps the pertinent findings of this study.
- (2) Promote an atmosphere conducive to honest communication between junior and senior officers.
- (3) Outline standards for counseling of subordinates.
- (4) Motivate the competent and facilitate the elimination of the marginal performer.
- (5) Enforce adherence to standards, with senior officers setting the example.
- (6) Focus on the development of measurable expertise.
- (7) Revise certain officer assignment priorities and policies, including policy regarding the duration and essentiality of command tours.
- (8) Revise the officer evaluation systems.
- (9) Revise the concept of officer career patterns.
- (10) Revise promotion policies.

APPENDIX

1

ANECDOTAL INPUT

ANNEX B

APPENDIX 1

ANECDOTAL INPUT

PART I - Selected Representative Narrative Comments from Questionnaires.

1. Questionnaires were distributed to approximately 420 officers ranging in grade from second lieutenant to major general. Listed below are selected narrative comments obtained from these questionnaires.

2. The comments are grouped under broad descriptive headings. Since many of the comments could be placed under more than one heading, the groupings are somewhat arbitrary; however, the comments are direct lifts from the questionnaires and are representative.

Standards

- CPT: The young men in the Army today need and expect their leaders to set standards of moral behavior.
- CPT: Senior officers seem to live under the standard of "do as I say, not as I do." In my last assignment I witnessed senior officers doing things that if done by an enlisted man would result in courts-martial charges.
- MAJ: Pride in profession promotes professionalism. Renewed effort on the part of commanders to emphasize Army tradition and formality would, in my opinion, aid in developing and maintaining the needed esprit de corps.
- MAJ: The biggest failing is setting the example in the 10-20 year service majors and lieutenant colonels who simply are waiting out the retirement requirements. . . . The inflated OER's hide these people at DA, but field action could put the burden of adequate performance or "out" on these individuals.
- COL: The military must take action to overcome its willingness to accept mediocrity. With few exceptions what I feel to be the most serious problems stem from this prevalent attitude.
- COL: The Army encourages "free-loaders" particularly in the middle grades . . . by preparing himself for retirement at the expense of his military duty and general competence.

- CPT: There are too many nonprofessional, incompetent, hangers-on in the Army. . . . Unqualified officers should be gotten out of the Army . . . as it is now, all promotions up to O5 are pretty automatic.
- MAJ: The only current decorations I admire are the DSC and Medal of Honor, all others are tainted by too often being awarded to people who do not deserve them. . . . Duty, Honor and Country is becoming--me, my rater, my endorser, make do, to hell with it.
- COL: Discipline is the foundation of the Army . . . but somehow it is deteriorating. This state of affairs is [due to] the pressures and requirements which erode discipline and force a false set of leadership principles upon commanders.
- MAJ: My experience has been that line units operate better at cadre strength of high caliber than full strength of a mix of high and mediocre caliber officers. Our Officer Corps will only be as good as our determination to cull it to insure high standards.
- COL: Senior officers fail to set the example by adhering to standards of Duty-Honor-Country. Many a subordinate has been sacrificed to advance the career of a senior. A policy of strict and ruthless elimination of officers who do not adhere to the standards . . . would do much to alleviate the situation.
- MAJ: There is ample evidence of high level (including generals) moral laxness which in no way is reflected in promotions or assignment limitations or sanctions. Ratings are solely on results, no matter how obtained. . . .
- MAJ: My superior was a competent, professional, knowledgeable military officer that led by fear, would doublecross anyone to obtain a star, drank too much and lived openly by no moral code. He is now a BG!
- COL: Too much attention is being given by the Army, through its undue emphasis and policies as well as by individuals, on personal advancement or "ticket punching." Our professionalism as soldiers has thereby been degraded.
- COL: . . . Zero defects complex which says that nothing short of perfect is acceptable. So long as an officer is held personally responsible for seeing that no mistakes are made by his subordinates he will have difficulty passing authority to them.

Integrity

- COL: Lack of courage to admit error/failing leads subordinates to hide information that superiors should know because the subordinate fears for his career. This is as much a condemnation of superiors who will not tolerate mistakes as it is subordinates who lack fortitude to admit them.
- CPT: Far too many majors and lieutenant colonels turn out to be yes men for the purposes of receiving a good report. . . . One example is availability of aircraft in RVN . . . is not only exaggerated but almost inhuman working hours are often required.
- MAJ: Staff officers and Bn Cos distort reports to either justify their existence or perpetuate their own careers. . . .
- LTC: Dishonesty has been forced upon a great portion of the Officer Corps in rendering efficiency reports, and the junior grade officers can see this and don't like or understand the reason.
- LTC: There is a lack of moral courage among raters to give low efficiency reports to those officers that deserve them. Officers relieved in combat and other assignments continue to appear on promotion and school selection lists.
- MAJ: . . . The system forces unethical reporting and practices, and punishes variation.
- LTC: As a Captain I was ordered to falsify a Unit Readiness Report by changing my company's REDCON after the cut-off date of the report. I refused to falsify the report. My OER contained a comment that "this officer is dogmatic and fails to recognize the necessity to cease discussion when the decision is made."
- LTC: Juniors are just more idealistic. Seniors, except for some generals, tend to lie (on 2715s, AWOL, CMMI), steal (leave status, club bills, checks) and cheat (avoid unpleasant duties, unfair advantage, etc.), and no one makes this an issue.

Self-Interest

- COL: Perhaps the one trait I have observed in fellow officers most distracting to me is selfish interest, particularly at the expense of others and the military service in general.
- CPT: . . . all responses pertain to grade O3 through O5. I feel that officers in these grades are more concerned with protecting themselves than in doing a good job.

MAJ: It is disturbing to me to observe officers in the middle grades lie, cheat, distort facts, and take other measures to aggrandize their own personal careers. . . . Their conduct fools no one. Sufficient regulatory authority exists to eliminate those who fail to live up to the code, but it must be consistently enforced.

MAJ: . . . Commanders more oriented upon "ticket punching" and not taking any chances as long as they are in command . . . inhibits what a truly good unit can accomplish.

COL: Too many officers still worry about accumulating the "right tickets" rather than performing at their best in any assignment.

CPT: . . . Pressures of the system to excel personally. It is thinking of yourself more than how your actions will affect others below you.

Career Progression

CPT: The efficiency report is the most disturbing administrative farce in the Army. It is a measure of "following" and not leading. Its weight in "tickets of success" allows officers of incompetence in leadership to advance.

COL: The Army has made it clear that an individual has to have "certain tickets"--without these he is in trouble as far as promotions and assignments are concerned. This is shortsighted and does not make use of the talents of the individual.

LTC: Even OPO make assignments on the basis of "this ticket must be punched." Command of a battalion is sought not to make a contribution to the Army, not to lead troops and improve their performance, but to fulfill a requirement for the advancement of one's career. Failure of even minor tasks result in elimination from competition for colonel, war college etc. Hence loyalty to subordinates is given only in furtherance of personal goals, responsibility for failure is avoided and judgment is biased toward "what effect will this have on me?"

MAJ: With all efficiency reports being high, the tendency in the Officers Corps today is to get "the ticket punched" regardless of the cost . . . the methods used. The attitude of putting forth extra effort to better the organization is sneered at today.

CPT: No one will take a chance lest his OER be lowered and his opportunity for advancement threatened. Innovation is stifled and conformity promoted. Initiative is stifled because a

commander . . . assumes greater control. Command time "takes on a hollow ring" the commander is there to swing in case . . . something should go wrong. Indicators such as CMMI become ends in themselves

- MAJ: The short periods of command enhance passing the buck, by a commander, for failures of the unit.
- MAJ: The Army should redefine officer career patterns in an attempt to allow an officer to attain and maintain high expertise in fewer fields.
- LTC: The Army has contributed to its own problem by overloading Washington with talent at the expense of all other activities--except command positions. Unfortunately these assignments are filled from the Washington pool by officers who are not . . . grounded for command but must get their ticket punched.

Statistics

- COL: The military requires success in everything. So success is reported. Training records, supply records are two cases in point. These lies then easily lead to others.
- CPT: The majority of my associates were interested in keeping higher headquarters happy--false reports were the result. The fact that my leadership ability is judged by how many people in my company sign up for bonds or give to the United Fund or Red Cross disturbs me.
- MAJ: . . . excessive emphasis on statistical data . . . when a commander is required to report on himself. . . . Under such a system, the honest commander who reports his AWOLs, etc., gets into trouble while the dishonest commander gets promoted.
- CPT: Through exposure the junior officer becomes aware of the disproportionate emphasis placed on statistics. . . . The young officer is quick to recognize this situation and complies for his own safety.
- MAJ: Today efforts are made to quantify every facet of a unit's activities, leaving the commander little latitude to allocate resources and forcing him to at least create the appearance of achieving a plethora of numerical goals.

Communication

- CPT: A problem does exist, it is basically one of communications in informing officers of both the standards to be aspired to and minimum acceptable standards. . . .
- MAJ: Only when a commander establishes an atmosphere of freedom of expression will he get accurate information and be believed when he gives his reasons. Training in really listening should be given to all commanders at every echelon. They have to hear what is being said and also what is not being said--which may be more important in the long run.
- MAJ: I feel the problem arises from lack of communication between more senior officers and the junior.
- COL: Failure to pass on to junior officers results of their suggestions or outright ignoring them . . . in some cases the upper levels of command actually are unaware that they are unapproachable.
- LTC: There is a general reluctance to face troops and present a cogent rationale for what has to be done. . . . Commanders at each echelon should encourage and insist upon subordinate leaders talking more often and directly to the troops, listening to their ideas and questions. . . .
- MAJ: More emphasis must be placed on pressing ranking officers to listen as well as speak.
- LTC: There is a crying need for majors through generals to do a better job of communicating with their subordinates on a very personal basis.
- LTC: Keeping the commander and subordinates informed is essential in any military organization. Junior officers are reluctant to discuss problems with senior officers. Thus the problem lies with the commander and senior officer to improve lines of communication.

Loyalty

- MAJ: Loyalty to subordinates gets largely lip service in the Army today. Too many colonels and generals appear to want all junior officers to suffer like they did. . . . It seems the more senior officers become, the more hardware or systems oriented they become.
- CPT: Loyalty seems to be a one-way street to some senior officers.

- COL: Patience with and responsibility toward subordinates needs to be stressed at the highest levels. We still treat our junior officers and enlisted men as things rather than as people.
- MAJ: Many senior officers feel that it isn't in their job description to help their juniors when needed. All too often the senior takes the gutless way out and relieves the unfortunate junior and shifts him off on someone else. . . . Quality officers can be made, given the proper guidance and support.
- MAJ: It has been my experience that the young officer of today has very little loyalty to his organization and to a degree to the entire Army.
- CPT: The apparent subservience of senior commanders to public relations and the obvious fear of congressional rebuke results in countless instances of either senseless directives or failure to support subordinates. Two general trends in the Officer Corps are significant . . . the slavery of the Corps to the efficiency report combined with the inequality of the report itself. The biggest problem is not the disgraceful behavior of the battalion and brigade level commanders, but the resulting effect on my contemporaries who seem unable to avoid outdoing their superiors in demonstrating fear, obsequiousness and irresponsibility to subordinates or self. There is a serious inability to distinguish between servility and loyalty.
- LTC: Little loyalty flows down. Compare proportionately the number of lieutenants through lieutenant colonels relieved doing operations in RVN to the number of colonels or BGS . . . errors in military judgment existed at all levels. . . .
- MAJ: Many officers possess a two-fold standard of loyalty. One to the commander's face, the other behind his back.
- CPT: The subordinate who even suspects that his superior "gives a damn" for him will give, without demand, more "followship" than a leader ever dared hope for.
- CPT: The Army fails to allow a man the opportunity to learn through his mistakes. Too many commanders are the junior officer who makes one mistake.
- MAJ: Superior officers should take a more personal interest in the professional development of all junior officers. A commission as a 2LI does not mean the end of learning.

PART II - Selected Comments from Field Seminars.

1. Four separate teams, consisting of one faculty member and one student at the USAWC, were sent to six different locations (Forts Leavenworth, Sill, Knox, Benning, Eustis, and Hamilton) to conduct seminars and obtain the views of representative officers of all grades on the state of professionalism in the Officer Corps today.

2. The teams were debriefed separately, and did not discuss their specific comments with members of other teams until after all debriefing sessions were completed.

3. Extracts of selected comments from the debrief of the four teams, under descriptive headings, follow. (To maintain the promised anonymity, the teams are not identified as to location visited.)

TEAM A

Desired Standards

oo In trying to get expressions of what these officers thought the ideals were, perhaps Duty-Honor-Country came through the loudest, in terms of trying to identify what the ideal should be . . . high integrity, high moral standards, high state of discipline were expressed and in every instance there was some variance from these high standards.

oo The younger officers appeared to have higher ideals than the senior officers. The senior officers seemed to be more pragmatic . . . the junior officers were more idealistic about the Army's standards.

oo Duty consists of 24 hours a day performing at the best of your ability at all times. This was their expression that was repeated over and over again among the younger officers.

Actual Standards (General)

oo One point made by these young officers was that money won't buy them out of the Army. But the standards and values that they hold to be true within the service are not being supported, and when they lose identity or pride in service--they're getting out.

oo In ethics . . . they all could identify, somewhere in their classes, students who were cheating in their examinations. Individuals who have been caught doing this, . . . were eliminated from the class but in one specific case returned two classes later . . . in another case sent on to flight school. It appears that the

Army has lowered its standards below what they expect an officer to be. They feel that because of the requirements of the Army today we have lowered our standards to accept people as officers that never should be officers, and they violently oppose this. Younger men say they would rather have shortages of officers than accept people who are below the standards of what an officer should be.

oo . . . we're sending officers to school, to the advance course specifically, that have no business being there and would not be there if there were DA promotion boards to captain. Other officers are graduating who should not be graduated--they're inept, to put it quite frankly. . . .

oo They believe that there needs to be a better screening system. This covers two areas . . . the standards of commissioning are too low--they are talking about the basic course officer, new officers from ROTC, from OCS. There has been a drive for numbers. "We need X number of guys wearing gold bars, hence we'll commission this many people, without regard to--are they really capable of being officers." This was expressed by every group we talked to. . . . Some of them identified people who did everything that they could to not be commissioned and yet were talked into accepting commissions.

oo The lack of uniform standards throughout the Army . . . standards of appearance and standards of performance and standards in court-martials, and this sort of thing. Problems that every commander is faced with today . . . the haircut; on every single post and on each post, within units, there is a different standard for haircuts and commanders are fighting a constant battle with this. What they would like is a Department of Army standard that is enforced by all commanders and all commanders have to live with it. . . . You get into the problem of the Afro hairdo, one unit lets them bush it out a mile and the next unit makes them crop it down and then they get some real problems. The black power salute--what is the DA policy on the black power salute? Some unit commanders are letting . . . men use the black power salute and others are clobbering the ones that use it . . . and these types of things are prevalent throughout the Army.

oo They feel that there should be a directed DA standard or policy that every commander must comply with and this would make their problems as commander, particularly junior commanders, where the brunt is taken, easier.

oo The company grade officers observed a significant difference in professional and ethical standards, from the ideal. They cited specific examples of dishonesty, selfish behavior, and incompetence.

oo They believe that the finest officers we have . . . now, this is not only professionally, but in appearance . . . should be

at all the entry points of the service . . . ROTC, recruiting, basic training and service schools, and they believe this without exception. The reason for this is that one of the things that they feel is most important is a proper example being set at the beginning.

Integrity

oo One of the most violent reactions we got was from the body count, particularly from the young combat arms officers recently back from Vietnam . . . basically being given quotas, or if not given quotas, being told that their count wasn't adequate--go back and do it again. . . . Regimental (Brigade) Commanders directing that the count be reverified and upped, that it was inadequate for the day . . . being told that they had a quota for the day. . . . In fact they expressed concern that the President of the United States was making decisions on totally invalid information. The captains were extremely concerned about this situation. They had no faith in the body count, in the number of the enemy that had been killed. Also the MACV pacification report . . . they cited examples of being told to survey about 96 units in something like two weeks. . . .

oo Nobody out there believes the body count. They couldn't possibly believe it. This is probably the most damning thing the Army has used recently . . . we had one lad even tell us of an experience where he almost had to get in a fist fight with an ARVN adviser over an arm, to see who would get the credit for the body, because they were sorting out pieces . . . it just made him sick to the stomach that he was put in such a position that a body was so important to the next higher headquarters or to the division, that he had to go down and argue over pieces of a body to get credit for it.

oo Dishonesty is across-the-board. For example, being told by one Major General that there will be no AWOLs . . . impossible demands and therefore being required to put people on leave rather than indicate that they are AWOL from the unit.--Being told that AWOLs were a reflection on their ability to lead and therefore adjusting the records to be sure that there were a minimum number . . . being given a quota, in effect, by CONARC stating that eight AWOLs per 1,000 was the acceptable standard, or looking at it the other way, any AWOLs over eight per 1,000 was unacceptable, therefore don't report more than this ratio.

oo A number of these young officers indicated that they were forced to change their OERs because--this unit has outstanding officers. Everybody in this outfit is a winner. Therefore we don't have anybody that's less than 98 on a scale of 100 . . . officers bringing up specific instances where they were directed to change an OER. And also on the other side of the same coin . . . when they had someone

totally incompetent and felt that they should eliminate him and therefore they rated him at the bottom of the scale, being told by the next higher headquarters, let's not rock the boat. . . . Maybe he will tell some things that are wrong with the outfit and we're all moving along now and we don't want to have these things come out and we don't want to have a bunch of problems here so let's up it to where you don't have to support it in writing.

Career Progression

oo A number of officers commented on the staff officer, or the officer from the Pentagon, who has spent years away from troops, getting his ticket punched by getting a command assignment for six months, and on his young staff officer trying to keep him out of trouble and to educate him. By the time they have accomplished it either they were moving on or a new commander was coming in and then they had to go over the same routine again. They felt that this was again due to the unrealistic requirements we have in the Army today--that every officer be a commander--and this came out loud and clear in every single session. They said we've got to recognize the fact that some people are better qualified to do other things than others, that not everyone is a commander, not everyone is an excellent staff officer, but the people that are good at what they are doing ought to be able to stay there and do the job and worry about the performance rather than about the ticket.

oo It came through loud and clear and strikes right at the heart of the problem . . . that they firmly believe there is a route you take to the top. If you are going to be a good officer you must compete to be Chief of Staff. If you don't compete to be Chief of Staff you really aren't running with the flock. You have got to get to school at the right time, you have got to get your master's degree, you've got to get your tour in the Army staff, you've got to get your pertinent overseas tours, you've got to get that command, at the right time. If you got to get that many things, and this is what they think; there just isn't that much time under the accelerated promotion system today.

oo It's reaching the point in the Army today that a competent officer, or one who is viewed by his peers as competent, who doesn't make a secondary zone for promotion is a second class citizen. This is the problem of the pressures that they feel in the field today.

oo They thought that all the way up the chain of command it was assumed that every officer in the Army is perfect in everything that he does. . . . Immediately upon taking over a responsibility every officer must know everything he has to do. If anyone admits that he doesn't know his job he will get clobbered. So it is this

can-do attitude--whether they can or cannot--that is a real problem. They need some counseling and some help and guidance--and recognition that they need help . . . and they need it from senior officers. Accept the fact that every young man that is given a job to do isn't automatically qualified, just because he's been a platoon leader, to be the S-1 or the S-4. When he takes the job over he needs some help and guidance, and they don't feel they are getting it. They are afraid to ask for help, as they are afraid it's an indication of the lack of ability.

oo From the comments that I have heard I would say one overriding problem is this 'let's don't rock the boat' attitude . . . 'let's get through the job, let's get through the tour with everything coming up roses, not have anybody find out that there is something down here that isn't going right.'

oo . . . other factors on the OER that were significant to me. A number of these young officers have been told by their career branches, as they stop through to check their records, that "back here when you were a 2LT you didn't do so well . . . that's going to impact on your career for the rest of your life," and therefore they feel again you never can make a mistake, don't ever tell anyone anything is going wrong because if it ever gets in your record on an OER you have had it, and you are never going to progress up the career ladder.

oo We need to come up with a system whereby everybody doesn't go to the advanced course and I think the students who are in the advanced course at both of the schools felt there should be some positive and identifiable means to eliminate inept students and that their contemporaries should know it.

Statistics

oo Across-the-board, all officers complained about the Army being run by statistics. Anytime that statistics become involved, senior officers are going to judge you by them; OER, ANOL, bonds, readiness reports, you name it--anything that deals with numbers. They are going to grade you by numbers, grade your unit by numbers, anytime they try to measure you it will be numerically.

oo They felt that their careers and their performance were being determined by statistics rather than by actual performance. There was a lot of concern about readiness reports, for example, and status reports of units, status reports of equipment . . . and here they felt that they were being forced to be dishonest because no one would accept the truth. A higher command would not accept an actual report. . . . Either by direction or by implication anything other

than outstanding or everything is going grand wasn't accepted. . . . to specific quotas being given in terms of bond drive, the numbers of AWOLs that were acceptable, number of vehicles that you can have down at anyone time. Pilots were disturbed about down-time for aircraft . . . you just didn't have anything that was less than the acceptable standards and you were forced, by any means, to never report anything other than 'everything was roses.'

oo The expression that they used was that the senior officers appear to be deluding themselves and actually talking themselves into believing these false statistics, all the way up the line.

oo I don't think these youngsters believe a single report that is published today. I think they feel that strongly about it . . . they don't believe that the man who actually makes out the report believes it but it makes the unit look good. They don't trust the senior officers when it comes to reports.

Communication

oo This brings up the subject of communication and without exception company grade officers indicated that there was no communication up the chain . . . nobody would listen to them. This was exemplified in the session we had with majors, lieutenant colonels, and captains, where the lieutenant colonels talked to lieutenant colonels, majors talked to majors, and the two captains talked to each other, but none of them talked to the others.

oo In every instance the company grade officers made the point that they didn't think that they could talk to the senior officers. First of all they said they don't dare to bring any problems to the next senior officer because if you bring him a problem you might get your head cut off because he doesn't want to hear problems--he just wants to hear success stories. The commanders are around for a short period of time, they are just in and out, punching their tickets, and they don't want to know about problems. You couldn't go to them for guidance--or with problems and they very seldom, if ever, came to you and asked you what your opinion was or how things were really going in the unit.

oo Junior officers expressed the view that they need counseling . . . they want it, they would like to be able to talk to their senior officers but they find in their view a lack of interest. And they didn't identify the reason for it as to whether the senior was over-worked or not but they felt a real need for some counseling, . . . and a real need to be allowed to make mistakes and to be counseled on their mistakes rather than have them reflected on their efficiency reports.

oo At the end of almost every seminar the officers would come up to us and say "thank you for letting us talk to a senior officer on such a subject. This is the first time it has ever happened. And thanks for listening."

Justice/Discipline

oo The other side of it was the legal question--the frustration that most of these young officers are facing and the things that they cannot do legally . . . they feel that the JAGs in the Army are working against them rather than for them as young commanders. They don't know when they can search and when they can't. They take cases to court-martial and get them thrown out because it was an illegal search, because they didn't do some procedure properly . . . They feel a strong need for some education and some assistance in what it is that a commander can do today and what he cannot do. But even beyond this they think the Judge Advocate ought to start supporting the Army and support the commanders rather than leaning overboard to let soldiers who get into trouble get away with it. They felt that the commanders above them were not cooperating with them (these are all company officers talking now) by reducing sentences and by failing to put people in the stockade that they recommended and this sort of thing.

oo They feel very strongly that military justice has slipped and with it, military discipline is slipping. And I think they blame that as much as anything else for the problems that they have today.

Army Image/Press

oo A very interesting thing came out of this in the same general area. This exposure to My Lai . . . it has driven some of the units to carry AK47s around with them so that if they did kill someone they've got a weapon to produce with the body. In other words, instead of turning in all the weapons they pick up on action A, they save some for action B in case some of the bodies appear on the battlefield unarmed, so they can arm them. They don't want some newsmen to come around and say they shot an innocent civilian, so they carry a rifle and they make sure they get a rifle to go with the body.

oo They're referring not only to our failure to defend ourselves in public, what they're looking for is someone with stature speaking out publicly in our defense . . . they feel that there is nobody at the helm, and furthermore they feel that when we do speak out it's about as ineptly done as anything could possibly be done.

oo I think we were impressed by the enthusiasm that these young officers had for a military career and they were optimistic about the future. They felt that every one of these problems could be resolved and they are still optimistic that something will be done to resolve them. But going back to the point made earlier . . . the one thing that will drive them out of the service is if they lose pride in being an officer. They all feel very strongly something must be done to help them maintain the pride that they have in being an officer in the United States Army. And by this they are talking about the public image of the Army and also the caliber of officer that is accepted into the Officer Corps or retained. They are concerned that inept people are in our information program and are not taking the proper action. They feel we need better people in the information program.

oo This again is one of the major points that came out in every single session. A frustration--a real feeling of frustration--and this is expressed all the way up to the most senior officers we talked to--the senior officers expressing a strong frustration--just as strong as the young captain, that the media is biased, that it is not giving the clear picture, but worse than this that the Army isn't doing anything about it. That the Chief of Staff and the senior people in Washington aren't doing anything to explain to the public if there was a mistake . . . if the Army did something wrong, stating that it did but explaining why . . . that you can't fight a war without making some kind of mistakes and that people do get killed in wars--many innocent people. . . . permitting newsmen and photographers--right up in the front line where they are harassing commanders--they are violently opposed to this--the junior officers are. . . . well they don't call it a low profile. They call it no reaction at all and the fact that nobody in a senior position is doing anything to refute the things that are being said about the Army and the image of the Army. Some of them express concern that their wives know that they've been to Vietnam one or two times and the wives are beginning to wonder if they were involved in some of these horrible acts over there. Are they killing children and all this sort of stuff? That is what the media is saying all the time and nobody in authority in the Army is saying that it is not so--that it isn't that way and that the Army is doing something right.

oo This comes from all grades . . . you can call it the low profile in the Army . . . the lack of support from the Department of the Army . . . one example was the general who was taken in a civilian car into a garage, in the middle of the downtown, through the back of the garage, up some back stairs to an auditorium where he gave the graduation address and pinned on the bars of the new second lieutenants at a university. And he said had he known in advance that he was going to be put through this exercise he would not have done it. The point was that the Army ought to take some action

to guarantee these young lads that really want a commission and that have worked to earn one--ought to guarantee that they get a decent commissioning and that they stand out in front of the public and accept their bars.

oo Another point that was brought out was, let's accept the fact in the Army that the rights, privileges, and responsibilities of military are not and cannot be the same as the rights, privileges, and responsibilities in civilian life. Hence the standards of discipline, of justice--cannot be equated . . . we cannot become permissive just because society has.

oo They said that we have a democracy in this country but we have an autocracy in the military. And the public ought to be educated along these lines and the military ought to stand up for what it has to have--and that is a disciplined force of people. We are not going to have this by trying to relax our standards to meet the civilian standards.

TEAM B

Desired Standards

oo When it came to standards--ethical, moral and professional--each individual seemed to perceive a different ideal than another man. . . . However, they felt very strongly that the standards should be high. . . . They said there's no need for a further written code. I think that was pretty generally agreed upon, but the one thing that they did say is that the desired standards need further definition, especially today when young people don't have the background trends that we have.

Actual Standards

oo Other things that they see (and this was general consensus among all of the four seminars) include things such as falsifying reports to make the unit look good. One observed variance across-the-board was misuse of the equipment. They brought out many examples, such as misuse of air conditioners and other equipment in Vietnam, Germany, and other places; there was also, of course, the failure of the senior commanders to permit mistakes, to allow a young officer coming in to develop by making honest mistakes, to learn and broaden his background. . . . They thought there was quite a variance between what we perceive as ideal standards and the actual situation or conduct.

oo Another thing that was brought out is that there is really no command emphasis on ethical or moral training, that it is given lip service, and a good point was raised here . . . for example in this area of character guidance. It is a command program, and yet it has again and again reverted to the status of a chaplain's program.

Integrity

oo This was a general opinion of all these groups too They brought out the fact that in their judgment, integrity was a luxury that a junior officer could not afford in today's army and survive. They thought that due to the system, pressure, no mistakes, look good regardless, a junior officer's integrity today could not long survive in this system.

oo Not only does the commander demand that they put the pressure on subordinates to look good, but he even condones falsification of reports on a CMMI, or an annual inspection of whatever sort it might be. Some have even gone so far as to say that the commander really did not want the truth.

Self-Interest

oo Another one was self-interest, people pushing . . . and too much self-interest above the good of the unit, the good of the country, a man scratching to get ahead, bucking for the five percent promotion, for example, and worrying about getting tickets punched.

oo Now regulation says that that's the way you should rate them, but in fact, when they were reviewed and looked at for promotions, schools and everything else, the guy rated average, he's in trouble. . . . He was talking about one of his artillery battalion commanders who was hoping to get promoted to full colonel, and how it was that he just had the attitude 'don't rock the boat. I've had all the rest of my tickets punched, my dogtags, I've got them on a string, I've got to have this record, get this five percent promotion,' and this is what he told me, and therefore, don't do anything that might upset the applecart. . . . He was not very interested in running a good battalion, and he was not very interested in accomplishing his mission. . . . and everybody nodded their heads there in agreement that this is not uncommon.

Career Progression

oo There was a lot of discussion . . . that it wasn't too bad for a guy to be only a commander. Let him be a commander for two or

three years if he wants to command a battalion or a company, and do not penalize him because he hasn't got another hole punched in his ticket. On the other hand, if he's not a real good commander, don't force him into commanding. If he's a good staff officer, let him be a good staff officer. And the overall Army, they felt, would be better if we got off of this business of having the requirement to have certain holes punched in the ticket.

Statistics

oo Too much emphasis was placed on statistical data, such as CMMI, AGI and readiness reports, even efficiency reports. We discussed this quite at length . . . they felt this was one of the root causes of variance from desired standards.

oo A point that they were very much perturbed with . . . we put just as much emphasis on the trivial as we do the important . . . and the individual commander, he's got a lot of pressure on him and he can't get out, and really, be a leader. . . . Namely, get up this report and that report and the other report . . . and no mistakes, zero defects. . . .

Communication

oo And of prime concern was this lack of communications in the chain of command. This was by and large realized as the major fault that we have, this lack of communication. These people would always come back to this thing of lack of communication.

oo This was a new experience for them because several of them came up and thanked us for having an opportunity to talk freely to senior officers, and being able to lay their ideas and thoughts out on the table. . . . and to be listened to.

Loyalty

oo They said there was little concern for the welfare of subordinates. They felt very strong about loyalty. They do not believe that loyalty is a two-way street, although they believe it should be. They feel that loyalty is a one-way street from the bottom up . . . but out of concern for self-interest. I'm loyal to the men above me in order for my own self-interest. So they feel very strongly that loyalty needs to be a two-way street, up and down and laterally.

TEAM C

Desired Standards

oo The junior or company grade officer has high standards all revolving around duty, honor and country. And these loftier ideal standards to which they subscribe are a refreshing thing to behold especially among the nation's youth in the year 1970. They're as high as our own were so many years ago.

Actual Standards

oo I was distraught after the first two sessions because of the leadership that apparently my grade (O-6) is failing to give the young officers in the United States Army. The junior officers are enthusiastic. They have high standards, be they actual standards or ideal. They come in with this, and it's up to us, I think, to foster the growth of these standards. The discussions pointed out to me that we, the upper and senior grades, have failed to foster the growth of these standards.

oo Many of them said, it is better to let a lieutenant make several blunders and be advised of them, than to let things go until he creates a debacle as an O-6. When an O-6 makes them, you sense the standards are not what they should be.

Integrity

oo They come into the Army enthusiastic; they have a desire; there's a certain prestige and they wanted to be officers. And the first thing they're met with is fraud and fallacies and falsification of the records, because the jobs that the second lieutenants get are jobs such as mess officer, maintenance officer, the assistant S-3 of a battalion, and that's where he's introduced to the fraud and the breakdown of the standards that we supposedly gave him.

oo The word that was used by every one of our four seminar groups, I think it's the key word here, survivability. Unless you are willing to compromise your standards, even ever so slightly, you will not survive in the Army system.

oo That's right--survivability--it was that all they had to do was keep their noses clean and they would survive, but in the act of keeping their noses clean, they were forced to compromise on filling out of certain reports and forms, of establishing these indicators, these tools of management, and that's where the compromise first took place.

oo One officer mentioned the fact that he thought that his superiors didn't want to hear the bad problems. Any bad problems that we have in the Army, unless there's something we have to immediately react to, are swept under the rug, hopefully they'll go away if we don't mess with them. . . . the pressure of getting to the apex of our hierarchy that we have set up in the Army causes the man to compromise his standards. Therefore we give him only what he wants or what we feel he wants to hear.

Career Progression

oo They gave us many examples of people who were incompetent; unfortunately, they were talking about the level of O-5 and O-6 who have had jobs perhaps on staff too long or on faculties too often, and then suddenly they needed command time in order to be promoted to the next higher rank. These people were there for six months to a year in various assignments and their staffs and their suborganizations were simply carrying the old man. This reflected throughout the command in almost every case we discussed, and was morale destroying and also led to a lowering of standards. . . . they seemed to feel this incompetence stems from our accelerated buildup for Vietnam. But I think overall that they did have a feeling that they got battalion commanders that they didn't think should even wear the uniform let alone be battalion commanders.

oo Every group pinpointed the fact that the Army would not tolerate a wave-maker or a boat-rocker regardless of how high the officer's personal standards were. . . . Accordingly, good and highly inflated efficiency reports are the rule rather than the exception, and kicking the incompetent upstairs or promoting him out of his disaster area are common occurrences. This is the system which tells us to survive together by not rocking the boat, by not telling it like it is, by not hurting someone's feelings, but by creating a sort of welfare state syndrome which offers cradle to the grave security.

oo All the groups felt they could not make mistakes, honest mistakes. . . . That's right. One mistake was death. . . . So any one mistake is cause to lower you down to an honest efficiency report; i.e., good; performs an adequate job. So the living fear of making that one mistake that will immediately separate them from today's standard which appears to be outstanding across-the-board.

oo One was the need to drive for tickets. Others were indicators which really are the many tools that we have in the Army, the reports that are misused, and the method of misuse. Another is pressure, the competitive pressure of society and of the Army, and other things came up that we have no weeding our system in the United States Army for the junior officer. One captain said, "no matter what I do,

other than kill someone, or some bad act of moral turpitude, I'm going to get promoted almost once a year." They felt that we promote or foster in the Army some degree of incompetence, and that brought up the point of the efficiency report, and the manner in which it's filled out.

oo We must have a weeding out process in the O-1 through O-3 levels. The junior officers insisted on this. They cannot stand another officer making O-3 with them who is obviously a bum. They're almost willing to self-police the system which guarantees weeding out.

Statistics

oo These are some of the statements made . . . if you doubt what we are saying, look at the quality of the five men we reenlisted last month, not at their quantity. Personally fly in each of the 85 percent of the aircraft our report says are available on this day. Count the men who come out of the mess hall and compare the paper total against those that came in. Check our CBR equipment three months after CMMI. We have given you all the statistics. All the indicators, all the news you wanted to hear, but if this has been done at the cost of our personal standards we have paid the price. You then rate us on our efficiency reports, not as leaders, but as followers.

Loyalty

oo Loyalty . . . all four groups, said it was a one-way street. Loyalty only went up. Someone had mentioned that they had been on a junior officer council, and they had discussed the things that were wrong with the units, but they didn't have a channel to take their complaints to. They didn't have a method of being heard. We established the junior officers council for a purpose, but then we built four walls around it so that they can't communicate. . . .

TEAM D

Desired Standards

oo Every group felt that the Army should have and did have very high ideal standards. We heard duty, honor, country as an ultimate goal . . . ideals of service to country appeared to underlie what they were trying to express. Integrity came up in every seminar as highly desirable. Absolute honesty in all dealings and following a standard which you perceive seemed to come up most frequently.

oo The Army needs high standards in order to accomplish what it is charged with doing--duty, honor, country is a good guide . . . perhaps not specific enough.

oo Professionalism for the Army officer, in their words, consisted of three ingredients, technical competence, ethics, and integrity.

Actual Standards

oo The junior officers said among my contemporaries and among my seniors, there is too great a variance (of acceptable standards) allowed. The senior officers said there is too great a variance allowed among our contemporaries, yet we're not allowed to do anything about it. We don't have the authority to enforce the standards . . . what can you do about a lieutenant colonel who's a drunk, or a lieutenant colonel who bounces checks, or a lieutenant colonel who doesn't do his job right? You just can't get rid of him.

oo They complained constantly that--why must I receive standards from Army Times? I want it from my generals. And I want the generals to be very concerned about these standards. I want the generals to enforce these standards. They cited as one of the problems, the 20 year and a day officer. The guy who plans his retirement; and he's in for 20, tells you he's in for 20. He says this is my haven, I'm going to mark time and plan my retirement, it's a good deal and everything else. And they look then at the generals, why do the generals allow this sort of thing?

oo They harped also on improving the quality of the Officer Corps. Now they felt that you could improve quality in your input . . . one example was cited in an OCS class; an officer assigned to an OCS somewhere said they were told everyone that came into OCS will be commissioned. He felt that was terribly wrong. They also feel that we are retaining just anybody. Now this came from senior officers as well as junior officers. . . . tomorrow, and that is the immediate tomorrow with a little more stability, with the cutback, the statement was made, don't be afraid to be short some officers. It's better to have two good officers in a unit than to have four mediocre officers that you can't trust.

oo Every junior officer group that we talked to was looking so strongly at their senior officers for a standard that they could follow that it almost hurt . . . the number of times that they felt they had been let down by looking for higher standards from the senior officers and not finding them.

oo In all the seminars the consensus seemed to be that it doesn't really make much difference what yesterday's standards were, but the

increasing sophistication of the Army coupled with the erosive effects of the society outside of the Army, that is, the attacks on the Army plus the permissive society and all these other things chipping away at the Army, equalled a crying need for high standards today, regardless of what they were yesterday. . . .

oo Brought out practically at every seminar and in every personal interview, and especially brought out by the junior officers, was that the one thing that was most important about the communication of standards was that they must be personified. You can write anything you want, and these young men have usually read the statements, but once they've read them, they start looking at people to exemplify the standards. That's where they really get their perception of standards, from the people they work with and they serve under.

Integrity

oo They recognize that any profession has got to have technical competence and ethics. All the seminars glossed over ethics and jumped right on to integrity which they felt was the ingredient that made the Army profession unique. The senior officers in the seminars dwelt at length on the technical competence, whereas the junior officers tended to deal more at length on integrity. Junior officers felt that the barrier to their integrity was the senior officers' lack of integrity.

oo For instance, we had countless examples cited . . . "My battalion commander stood there in front of me and lied to a general, and demolished me, and while I was standing there. . . ." We had time and again this thing--"If I filled out the report straight and sent it in, it was sent back to me and I was told to make it over, be it a CMMI, a unit readiness report or an OER. But this guy wasn't loyal enough to me to recognize that I had standards and that I wanted to fill it out right."

Career Progression

oo The statement was made that the Army worries too much about the upper five percent, and not enough about the lower 10 percent, which I think summed up the junior officer dilemma. They felt that the Army concentrates on that upper five percent, and the rapid promotions, instead of on the lower 10 percent that needs the attention.

oo They equated ticket punching and turbulence as being two sides of the coin; that you had to punch the ticket, but because of the lack of stability in assignments you had to do it quickly, and that this coin was very significant. In fact they commented that the

guy who's been in the Pentagon for so long and really hadn't commanded very much . . . has to get to Vietnam and get his six months command . . . is a key element creating some of these particular problems.

oo Junior officers especially felt that a lot of incompetent people were being given command positions because this was the good guy approach. In order to get ahead he needs a command, so let's pull him out of some series of assignments where he's been for five or seven years, put him into a battalion where everything is changed, and he's technically not competent . . . it would be harmful to the guy if we didn't give him his chance to command. Then once he gets in there, the bad effect is he's got to punch that ticket in an outstanding manner in order to remain competitive, and as a matter of fact, in one seminar they defined survival in the Army as remaining competitive . . . and the pitch was that survival was staying on that five percent list.

oo The captains cited all the tickets you must punch to get to the War College. These are captains! . . . and they were laughing about how can you possibly do all of these things in the few years you have? And they cited it very lucidly. I must do this then I must do the other, but how can I possibly learn any of these things properly in that short a time, but I must serve time in order to advance properly in that short of time. I must go out and punch those tickets in that short a time in order to survive, which means remain competitive.

oo To show you how sophisticated these young officers were, they all said we've been promoted too fast, and they were being promoted too fast. The example was cited of a first lieutenant who was about to make captain. In his year as a first lieutenant he had spent 1580 hours as a safety officer. Now if you divide that out, that lieutenant hasn't had time to be anything other than a safety officer, and now he's going to be a commander somewhere, and he just hasn't been allowed to learn his job. . . . The young captain's telling us "We're being promoted too fast to be able to hold down the job."

oo Now the problem of weeding out in the junior ranks, they were almost insistent on this. . . . they resented doing a good job and being promoted on the same list with someone who came in the service the same day who had done little or nothing but had just merely kept his nose clean.

Loyalty

oo I would say that roughly 75 percent of the time we had the statement that loyalty appears to be a one-way street, that you've got to be loyal to your boss, that he doesn't necessarily have to

be loyal to you. It was stated in one seminar, we've got to come around somehow to the fact that loyalty to the Army is more important than loyalty to individuals. Rather than a discussion of whether loyalty goes up, down or across, it's got to be loyalty to the Army.

Reward System

oo The OER came in for an across-the-board blast from senior and junior officers, as did other management tools which we have. . . . The use that was being made of the management tools was really criticized. They recognized the inflation of the OER, and they also recognized the tremendous importance to them of the OER. I was surprised to see captains with three years service expressing a tremendous interest and concern about the OER.

oo A new wording of the problem, and I think it's terribly significant, and that is, the reward system in the Army. And this is OER's and other things, but especially OER. The statement is made that the reward system in the Army rewards a short term achievement. By extension the short term achievement is often eroding or corrosive to the long term achievement, which are standards. . . . I'm talking about the assignment, the man goes into his assignment, and nowhere in that assignment, according to the perception of the people we interviewed, does anyone reward his long term achievement. For example, a battalion commander takes over his command. If it's in Vietnam, it's for six months, and this was perceived as a bad thing, or if it's outside Vietnam it's for 18 months. The man is then rewarded and judged on only short term achievement and awarded for short term achievement. He either passes the CMCI or he gets a high body count in Vietnam, and all these things are short term. For instance, somebody said why don't we have a "hearts and minds" count for the battalion commanders in Vietnam--that's a long term achievement, but no, the man's judged by his body count which is a short term. And they cited example after example of the battalion commander or brigade commander in Vietnam who came in and said I'm going to make my mark in six months and I don't care what it does to my unit. I'll leave my unit a shambles if I must in order to make that short term achievement. And then by extension, they said, well, there's no difference between that and the guy who comes into a battalion or brigade in the States, and says I will pass that CMCI. I don't care if I've got to degrade the education of my officers, I don't care if I've got to lie, cheat and steal, I don't care if I've got to ruin the careers of certain people, I'm going to pass that CMCI, and that's what's rewarded--it's passing the CMCI. Nowhere in the OER or in our awards and decorations or in our assignments or in anything else do we gauge the officer on his long term accomplishments.

oo This perception was essentially that at the very hub of the Army there is hypocrisy. . . . The Army says these things are important and then turns right around and completely ignores them in the rewards system of OER's, assignments, schooling, anything you want to mention. . . .

oo When this came up, especially the unit readiness report, we played devil's advocate. We said, well, don't you people see that he was doing it for the good of the unit, to make the unit look good? We played devil's advocate for about one millisecond. We were demolished immediately by their saying, Colonel, don't you realize he just wanted to look good for his OER. That was the purpose of that, that he could say, yeah, I'm C-1.

Army Image/Press

oo But quite on the minds of the people we talked to was the press. We have a bad press and that this acts in two ways. One is that it lowers the image of the Army which makes it more difficult to uphold standards and the other is that the Army often over-reacts to a bad press. They over-react in several ways. One is to try and hide it which lowers your standards and the other is to combat it in the wrong way because they feel we're not allowed to combat it in the proper way.

PART III - Team Leader Notes

Representative general comments, identified by grade only, obtained from the notes of one of the field seminar team leaders.

- MAJ: The Army talks about integrity . . . an officer's word is his bond or it should be . . . yet a bank or store will accept my checks but I have to show an ID card and fill out a personal history form on the back of a check to cash it at the PX.
- CPT: We have to turn in false reports . . . if we gave a true report of the status of equipment or AWOLs we'd get axed.
- CPT: Nobody wants to make waves. The name of the game is cover-up. Get a 240 on your OBI and move out smartly . . . protect yourself and protect your boss.
- MAJ: Our junior officers and NCOs are more intelligent and capable than ever before but they are afraid to make mistakes . . . hesitate to make decisions because they fear they will lose respect or be clobbered by their seniors.
- CPT: Money can not buy me out of the service, but if I lose pride in service, you couldn't keep me.
- CPT: Junior officers are afraid to use their initiative because they lack support from above.
- CPT: The Army doesn't defend itself against publicity or congressional charges . . . and it doesn't protect its own.
- CPT: Reports are a paper drill . . . the emphasis is on filling the blanks properly, not how well the job is being done. No errors are authorized, everyone has to be perfect . . . zero defects. The system forces a sacrifice of integrity to get good marks to stay in the running for advancement . . . all men in the unit know the reports are false.
- General Officer: There is a lack of personal responsibility among officers today. All errors are due to one's predecessor and each commander leaves before his errors crop up. Despite our catch-phrases-- a commander is responsible for everything--there is really little personal responsibility today.
- CPT: We get impossible directives . . . one general said, "there will be no more AWOLs!!" If a correct report was submitted, it was not acceptable . . . we were told to make a recount. There is too much dishonesty among senior officers . . . they know they are forcing us to make false reports.

- MAJ: Commanders at each level are afraid to let subordinates command. They fear subordinates mistakes will reflect on their short command tour.
- LTC: We used to train our officers . . . now we don't dare let them make mistakes.
- CPT: It's necessary today, to lie, cheat, and steal to meet the impossible demands of higher officers or continue to meet the statistical requirements.

APPENDIX

2

STATISTICAL TABLES

APPENDIX 2

TABLE 1

OVERALL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF
QUESTION 9, "INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONNAIRE"

S - 411

QUESTION 9: "DO YOU FEEL THAT, WITHIN THE OFFICER CORPS AS A WHOLE, THERE IS A DISCERNIBLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE IDEAL STANDARDS AND THOSE THAT ACTUALLY EXIST?"

	<u>INTENSITY</u>				
	<u>NONE</u> (1)	<u>SLIGHT</u> (2)	<u>MODERATE</u> (3)	<u>CONSIDERABLE</u> (4)	<u>GREAT</u> (5)
<u>NUMBER</u>	4	93	217	83	14
<u>PERCENTAGE</u>	1	23	53	20	3

AVERAGE = 3.02

STANDARD DEVIATION = .7714

APPENDIX 2

TABLE 2

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF QUESTION 9,
"INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONNAIRE," BY GRADE

S = 410.

QUESTION 9: "DO YOU FEEL THAT, WITHIN THE OFFICER CORPS AS A WHOLE,
THERE IS A DISCERNIBLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE IDEAL STANDARDS AND THOSE
THAT ACTUALLY EXIST?"

<u>OFFICER</u>		<u>INTENSITY</u>					<u>MEAN</u>
		<u>NONE</u>	<u>SLIGHT</u>	<u>MODERATE</u>	<u>CONSIDERABLE</u>	<u>GREAT</u>	
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
<u>RANK</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>						
O-1, O-2							
O-3	67	0 0%	7 10.0%	33 49.0%	24 36.0%	3 4.0%	3.24
O-4	76	0 0%	9 11.8%	45 59.2%	19 25.0%	3 3.9%	3.21
O-5	150	3 2.0%	42 28.0%	78 52.0%	23 15.3%	4 2.7%	2.85
O6+	117	1 0.9%	35 30.2%	61 51.7%	17 14.7%	3 2.6%	2.88
TOTAL		4 1%	93 23%	217 53%	83 20%	13 3%	

APPENDIX 2

TABLE 3

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF ANSWERS TO QUESTION 9
ON THE BASIS OF VARIOUS BIOGRAPHIC FACTORS

S = 415

QUESTION 9: "DO YOU FEEL THAT, WITHIN THE OFFICERS CORPS AS A WHOLE, THERE IS A DISCERNIBLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE IDEAL STANDARDS AND THOSE THAT ACTUALLY EXIST?"

1. A DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF THIS ATTITUDE BY VARIOUS BIOGRAPHIC FACTORS IS AS FOLLOWS:

TOTAL MONTHS OF COMMAND			TOTAL MONTHS OF COMMAND		
	<u>S</u>	<u>X</u>		<u>S</u>	<u>X</u>
6 or Less	54	3.19	36	35	2.79
12	68	3.27	42	18	2.67
18	48	2.83	48	28	2.96
24	36	3.06	54	50	2.90
30	40	3.05	60 or More	38	3.05

SOURCE			BRANCH			EDUCATIONAL LEVEL		
	<u>S</u>	<u>X</u>		<u>S</u>	<u>X</u>		<u>S</u>	<u>X</u>
USMA	105	3.03	ARMS	122	2.99	12 or Less	5	3.00
ROTC	151	2.97	SERVICES	93	3.10	13-14	25	3.29
OCS	97	3.05				15-16	178	3.05
DIRECT	47	3.09				17 or More	207	2.97
OTHER	15	3.00						

2. CORRELATIONS OF QUESTION 9 vs THE VARIABLES INDICATED IN PART 1.

Variable	<u>r</u>	Variable	<u>r</u>
Grade	-.21	Educational Level	-.09
Total Months of Command	-.11	Military Education	-.29
Source	.01	Level of Staff	-.22
Branch	.06	Level of Command	-.13

NOTE: X represents the mean arithmetic response, expressing degree of difference between ideal and existing standards, based on a scale from 1 ("no difference") to 5 ("great difference").

APPENDIX 2

TABLE 4

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ACTUAL AND IDEAL STANDARDS ON THE BASIS OF
DUTY, HONOR, COUNTRY AS SEEN BY THE VARIOUS GRADE LEVELS

SUMMARY OF SCORES FROM QUESTIONS 10-13 OF
"INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONNAIRE"

S - 414

QUESTIONS 10-13: "DO YOU FEEL THAT WITHIN THE OFFICER CORPS AS A WHOLE
THERE IS A DISCERNIBLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE IDEAL STANDARDS AND THOSE
THAT ACTUALLY EXIST?"

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ACTUAL AND IDEAL STANDARDS BY GRADE LEVEL:

	<u>JUNIOR</u>	<u>MIDDLE</u>	<u>UPPER</u>	<u>SENIOR</u>	<u>AVERAGE</u>
<u>JUNIOR</u> S=65	3.5	3.3	2.7	2.3	2.9
<u>MIDDLE</u> S=228	3.0	2.8	2.8	2.3	2.7
<u>UPPER</u> S=121	2.8	2.7	2.8	2.4	2.7
<u>AVERAGE</u>	3.1	2.9	2.8	2.3	2.8

LEGEND:

RANKS:

JUNIOR - LT, CPT

MIDDLE - MAJ, LTC

UPPER - COL

SENIOR - GENERAL

NUMERICAL SCORES

1 - None 4 - Considerable

2 - Slight 5 - Great

3 - Moderate

NOTE: This table previously shown as Figure B-4, page B-14.

APPENDIX 2
 TABLE 3
 EVALUATION OF DIFFERENCES
 BETWEEN IDEAL AND ACTUAL STANDARDS
 BY SENIOR AND SUBORDINATE LEVELS
 AND ETHICAL BEHAVIOR

S - 413

Evaluation of		SUPERIOR		PEER		SUBORDINATE	
		Profess. Competence (14)	Ethical Behavior (17)	Profess. Competence (15)	Ethical Behavior (18)	Profess. Competence (16)	Ethical Behavior (19)
By Rank	S						
O-1							
O-2							
O-3	65	1.90	1.82	2.46	2.09	2.53	2.19
O-4	76	1.80	1.75	2.17	1.95	2.26	2.03
O-5	152	1.81	1.63	1.93	1.79	2.06	1.85
O-6	120	1.61	1.58	1.86	1.79	1.95	1.75
Average		1.78	1.69	2.10	1.90	2.20	1.95

LEGEND: 1 - Close Adherence 3 - Moderate Difference
 2 - Minor Difference 4 - Major Difference

APPENDIX

3

NUMERICAL TABULATIONS

ANNEX B
INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONNAIRE
 APPENDIX 3

This questionnaire is one of several methods being used to gather information for an analysis of professionalism within the Officer Corps. The specific purpose of the questionnaire is to look at the standards or values that guide an officer's behavior (thought and action).

Standards and values are largely a matter of feelings that an individual senses. They are difficult to express in precise terms that would have the same meaning for all. If you are not sure of the meaning of a word or phrase, assume your own definition and answer on the basis of what it means to you.

Your responses to this questionnaire should indicate how you, personally, feel about the questionnaire items. The questionnaire contains an optional response section (Page 9) which you may use to further express your feelings and ideas on any topic related to the questionnaire items.

You will not be asked to sign the questionnaire, but you may if you wish. No effort will be made to link responses to individuals. The biographical data and questionnaire code numbers are solely for statistical control.

PART I. BIOGRAPHICAL DATA [ENTER (✓)]

1. GRADE:	01 (2)	02 (3)	03 (60)	04 (76)	05 (153)	06 (120)	07 Above (1)
2. SOURCE:	USMA (105)	ROTC (151)	OCS (97)	DIRECT (47)	OTHER (15)		
3. BRANCH:	ARMS [Armor, CE, FA, () Inf, ML, SigC] 322		SERVICES (93)		[AGC, MC, MSC, CH, CmIC, FC, JAGC, MPC, ORD, QMC, TC]		
4. EDUC. LEVEL:	12 or less (5)	13-14 (25)	15-16 (178)	17 or more (207)			
5. MIL. EDUC.	BASIC (21)	ADV (108)	AFSC CGSC (66)	WAR COLLEGE (220)			
6. HIGHEST EQUIV. LEVEL OF COMD.	NONE (33)	PLT (19)	CO (129)	BN (183)	BDE (47)	DIV (2)	

NOTE:
 THIS QUESTIONNAIRE REFLECTS
 THE NUMERICAL RESPONSES OF
 THE TOTAL SAMPLE (415).

7.	HIGHEST EQUIV. LEVEL, STAFF DUTY	NONE () 15	BN () 49	BDE () 51	DIV () 32	CORPS () 25	ARMY () 47	DA JCS DCD () 197			
8.	TOTAL MONTHS OF COMD. (APPROX)	6 or less () 54	12 () 68	18 () 48	24 () 36	30 () 41	36 () 35	42 () 18	48 () 28	54 () 50	60 or more () 38

PART II. IDEAL AND ACTUAL STANDARDS

Previous discussion and interviews have suggested that, at least theoretically, there is an "ideal" officers' code or set of standards, and another set which might be labeled "actual" or "real world."

The phrase, "Duty--Honor--Country" implies a set of standards that represent what should be. What you have actually observed represents the existing standards.

Now, for a moment compare your own personal concept of the ideal standards (implied by Duty--Honor--Country) with what you have actually observed among all the officers you have known. Do you feel that, within the Officers' Corps as a whole, there is a discernible difference between the ideal standards and those that actually exist?

DIFFERENCE

9.	NONE	SLIGHT	MODERATE	CONSIDER- ABLE	GREAT
	() 4	() 93	() 217	() 83	() 14

If you think that a discernible difference exists, do you feel that it might vary by grade and experience?

DIFFERENCE

10.	JUNIOR GRADE:	NONE	SLIGHT	MODERATE	CONSIDER- ABLE	GREAT	[LT, CPT]
		() 9	() 122	() 155	() 100	() 22	
11.	MIDDLE GRADE:	() 5	() 122	() 207	() 61	() 12	[MAJ, LTC]
12.	UPPER GRADE:	() 15	() 153	() 167	() 57	() 15	[COL]
13.	SENIOR GRADE:	() 46	() 223	() 80	() 40	() 12	[GEN]

PART III. SENIOR AND SUBORDINATE LEVELS

Think of all the Army superiors, peers, and subordinates with whom you served during your last duty assignment and the manner in which they adhered to the "ideal" set of standards. To what degree do you feel that they adhered to the ideal with respect to that category of standards which we might call professional military competence?

	<u>Close Adherence</u>	<u>Minor Difference</u>	<u>Moderate Difference</u>	<u>Major Difference</u>
14. Immediate Superior (Rater)	195	138	67	16
15. Typical Peer (Contemporary)	91	225	87	11
16. Immediate Subordinates (Typical)	68	234	88	19

(If you checked "moderate" or "major" difference for any of the levels above, please indicate (on Page 9) the main reason for your response.)

To what degree do you feel that they adhered to the ideal with respect to another major category of standards which we might term ethical behavior?

	<u>Close Adherence</u>	<u>Minor Difference</u>	<u>Moderate Difference</u>	<u>Major Difference</u>
17. Immediate Superior (Rater)	224	123	46	21
18. Typical Peer (Contemporary)	123	231	54	7
19. Immediate Subordinates (Typical)	103	246	53	6

(If you checked "moderate" or "major" difference for any of the levels above, please indicate (on Page 9) the main reason for your response.)

PART IV. SPECIFIC VARIATIONS AND THEIR IMPORTANCE

We would now like to go into a bit more detail about the specific nature of the differences between ideal and actual if they exist in the Army today. Listed below are many of the major functions common to the officer's job. The way an officer performs these functions is influenced significantly by his standards and values.

For each function, please indicate (✓) your opinion of the degree of difference between ideal and actual standards as they apply to each function. (For example, what is the degree of difference when the officer is performing

the function of rendering efficiency reports?) If you feel the difference varies by grade and experience, add the letter J, M, U, or S (Junior, Middle, Upper, Senior) to indicate the level where you feel the variance is greatest.

Next, under the importance column, indicate (✓) the importance of this difference to the Army (Officer Corps).

ADMINISTRATION	NONE	DIFFERENCE				IMPORTANCE		
		SLIGHT	MOD.	MUCH	GREAT	LITTLE	MOD.	GREAT
20. Preparing and Presenting Reports	13	53	40	28	10	()	()	()
21. Completing Efficiency Reports	11	32	58	47	3	()	()	()
22. Keeping Accurate Unit Records	23	58	27	8	1	()	()	()
23. Keeping Superiors and Subordinates Fully Informed	21	34	33	26	9	()	()	()
						106	168	133
						65	111	233
						154	170	83
						93	129	187
SUPERVISING PERSONNEL	NONE	SLIGHT	MOD.	MUCH	GREAT	LITTLE	MOD.	GREAT
24. Giving and Relaying Sound Orders and Instructions	29	51	32	13	9	()	()	()
25. Delegating Authority	18	23	43	43	36	()	()	()
26. Looking out for Welfare of Subordinates	23	39	28	33	18	()	()	()
27. Setting a Good Example	12	50	43	22	13	()	()	()
28. Encouraging Ideas	40	9	29	49	17	()	()	()
29. Giving Reasons and Explanations	24	25	32	22	13	()	()	()
30. Assisting Subordinates in Work	32	28	29	32	1	()	()	()
						104	133	165
						73	159	175
						67	131	210
						68	138	266
						103	174	128
						138	181	90
						165	162	81

SUPERVISING PERSONNEL
(CONTINUED)

	NONE	DIFFERENCE				IMPORTANCE		
		SLIGHT	MOD.	MUCH	GREAT	LITTLE	MOD.	GREAT
31. Evaluating Subordinates' Work	() 19	() 186	() 148	() 42	() 20	() 119	() 158	() 131
32. Being Loyal to Subordinates	() 17	() 143	() 154	() 66	() 34	() 67	() 114	() 228

PLANNING AND DIRECTION

	NONE	SLIGHT	MOD.	MUCH	GREAT	LITTLE	MOD.	GREAT
33. Taking Responsibility for own Plans and Actions	() 29	() 183	() 116	() 68	() 19	() 103	() 111	() 191
34. Applying Non-biased Judgment	() 18	() 162	() 156	() 53	() 25	() 97	() 169	() 141
35. Taking Prompt Action	() 38	() 205	() 115	() 42	() 15	() 126	() 160	() 116
36. Giving All-out Effort to Assigned Tasks	() 43	() 182	() 132	() 38	() 18	() 105	() 146	() 150

ACCEPTANCE OF ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

	NONE	SLIGHT	MOD.	MUCH	GREAT	LITTLE	MOD.	GREAT
37. Complying with Orders & Directives	() 47	() 227	() 110	() 22	() 8	() 146	() 117	() 143
38. Accepting Organizational Procedures	() 40	() 247	() 95	() 18	() 14	() 205	() 156	() 43
39. Subordinating Personal Interests	() 16	() 143	() 163	() 57	() 36	() 104	() 180	() 126
40. Being Loyal to Superiors	() 35	() 213	() 121	() 27	() 17	() 123	() 121	() 159
41. Cooperating with Associates	() 37	() 248	() 92	() 29	() 9	() 158	() 146	() 97
42. Showing Loyalty to Organization	() 44	() 234	() 86	() 35	() 12	() 149	() 128	() 124

ACCEPTANCE OF ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(CONTINUED)

	DIFFERENCE					IMPORTANCE		
	NONE	SLIGHT	MOD.	MUCH	GREAT	LITTLE	MOD.	GREAT
43. Taking Responsibility for What the Organization Does	(40)	(27) 213	(22) 118	(9) 28	(5) 16	(125)	(152)	(127)
44. Assuming Official Fiscal Responsibility	(63)	(22) 211	(17) 95	(10) 21	(9) 22	(153)	(151)	(96)
45. Assuming Official Property and Material Responsibility	(42)	(42) 200	(15) 113	(12) 34	(5) 23	(135)	(152)	(115)

ACCEPTANCE OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY

	NONE	SLIGHT	MOD.	MUCH	GREAT	LITTLE	MOD.	GREAT
46. Attending to Duties	(32)	(44) 242	(17) 107	(13) 25	(3) 9	(133)	(125)	(146)
47. Meeting Commitments	(43)	(36) 243	(14) 102	(8) 17	(3) 9	(143)	(123)	(136)
48. Maintaining Military Appearance	(45)	(52) 207	(4) 109	(14) 31	(5) 23	(169)	(147)	(90)
49. Adapting to Associates	(39)	(23) 287	(14) 69	(11) 14	(3) 6	(212)	(142)	(45)
50. Adapting to Job	(47)	(41) 269	(11) 79	(3) 12	(2) 7	(198)	(136)	(73)
51. Being Financially Responsible as an Individual	(83)	(49) 249	(9) 60	(2) 11	(2) 11	(177)	(98)	(121)
52. Setting Standards of Personal Moral Behavior	(28)	(45) 173	(22) 136	(11) 44	(7) 24	(109)	(108)	(89)

MILITARY PROFICIENCY

	NONE	SLIGHT	MOD.	MUCH	GREAT	LITTLE	MOD.	GREAT
53. Developing the Skills Required for Present Assignment	(34)	(37) 212	(20) 127	(9) 31	(3) 11	(111)	(120)	(123)
54. Keeping Abreast of Major Developments in Army, Branch, and Specialty Area	(28)	(23) 175	(21) 131	(19) 50	(5) 19	(130)	(160)	(113)

LAST ITEM

ANNEX

C

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ANNEX C - BIBLIOGRAPHY

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