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# **LEADERSHIP FOR PROFESSIONALS**

**REPORT OF  
THE CONARC  
LEADERSHIP BOARD  
30 JULY 1971**

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CONARC LEADERSHIP BOARD  
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307

26 July 1971

LEADERSHIP FOR PROFESSIONALS

PREFACE

The CONARC Leadership Board developed a seminar program for senior commanders and prepared an outline plan for an improved leadership development program at the direction of the Chief of Staff, Army. The Board was convened on 26 April 1971 and the report was submitted to the Commanding General, CONARC on 30 July 1971.

Preparation of the seminar program entailed analysis of the present leadership climate, development of a seminar program concept, determination of content, development of materials for the seminars, design and implementation of a training program, selection of teams and installation representatives to present the program world-wide, and scheduling installation and major commands to receive the program. The outline plan for an improved leadership development program required extensive review of existing instructional programs at service schools, ROTC and NCO Academies, analysis of ongoing leadership related studies and projects, review of the current literature, coordination with both military and civilian research agencies, conduct of a conference of service school, NCO Academies and ROTC representatives, a survey of recent service school graduates and a consideration of future leadership requirements. Fortunately, parallel and associated actions at the Army War College, the US Military Academy, The Infantry School and Department of the Army staff agencies provided considerable assistance and saved extensive research time.


The Army historically has supported the concept of getting the job done while taking care of its soldiers and preserving their dignity. Our research validated this concept as well as the Army's leadership principles. Neither recent changes in the Army nor fundamental changes in society at large have made them obsolete.

What societal changes have done is require that we change the way in which the leadership concepts and principles are applied. No longer can we emphasize short range organizational goals at the expense of long range human objectives and expect to have highly motivated, well-disciplined organizations. Strongly dependent on youth, the Army is changing from a draft sustained force to one sustained primarily by volunteers. To compete successfully with civilian enterprises for these young men, we must understand them and their emphasis on human values. We must teach our leaders to be flexible and personal in their application of leadership principles. Moreover, we must earn the young soldier's commitment to the unit mission by properly motivating and satisfying him.

Contrary to some of the more publicized events of recent years, changes in social values should not, and must not, erode discipline. Giving proper attention to long range human objectives neither implies a move toward permissiveness nor a lessening of discipline. Instead, it makes the soldier more responsible for self-discipline than ever before. It also helps relate individual goals to unit goals and emphasizes proper motivation, respect for individual dignity, effective communication and understanding. Emphasizing long range human goals while accomplishing the mission requires a new look at leadership. We need to know how to best motivate and engender self-discipline in the new soldier who wants more individuality.

This reeducation will require considerable effort. It involves providing for immediate improvement while also taking steps to insure acceptance of improved leadership over the long term. The Leadership Board's short range effort exposes leaders now to the concept of improved leadership. Through seminars and participative research, it re-emphasizes leadership principles and calls for the thoroughly professional approach. It stresses the need for discipline, motivation, and job satisfaction. The long range effort is a progressive leadership development program that covers a leader's entire career.

Together, the short and long range efforts form a program of "Leadership for Professionals". This program judiciously applied should provide the knowledge to analyze the leadership environment and the skills to take appropriate action. Indeed, the program should help improve leadership today and throughout the 1970's.

  
HENRY E. EMERSON  
Brigadier General, USA  
President

Inclosure 2 to Appendix A (BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF CONARC LEADERSHIP  
BOARD MEMBERS)

HENRY E. EMERSON, Brigadier General, USA, 457-38-2896; (Commanding General, US Army JFK Center for Military Assistance); US Military Academy (BS 1947); Naval Command and Staff College, 1959; Armed Forces Staff College, 1961; US Army War College, 1965; President.

WALLACE F. VEAUDRY, Colonel, Infantry, 008-14-8104; (US Army War College Faculty); US Military Academy (BS 1947); US Army Command and General Staff College, 1959; Tulane University, MS, 1962; US Army War College, 1967; Deputy.

WILLIAM B. STEELE, Colonel, Infantry, 285-30-9612; (Director, Leadership Department, US Army Infantry School); University of Georgia (BBA 1950); Naval Command and Staff College, 1963; George Washington University, MA, 1963; US Army War College, 1967; Secretary.

ROBERT H. FORMAN, Lieutenant Colonel (P), Field Artillery, 527-26-8742; (Staff and Faculty, US Army Command and General Staff College); Arizona State University (BS 1951); US Army Command and General Staff College, 1965; US Army War College, 1970; Chief, Short Range Committee.

WILLIAM H. TYLER, Lieutenant Colonel (P), Infantry, 240-38-7294; (Commanding Officer, 3d Bn, 11th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division); The Citadel (BA 1951); US Army Command and General Staff College, 1965; US Army War College, 1970; Short Range Committee.

CHARLES D. BUSSEY, Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry, 597-38-4703; (Commanding Officer, 2d Bn (Abn), 504th Infantry, 82d Airborne Division); A & T College of NC (BS 1955); Armed Forces Staff College, 1969; Indiana University, AM, 1970; Budget and Board Report.

RUDY P. SCHUVER, Lieutenant Colonel, Field Artillery, 481-38-8120; (Commanding Officer, 2d Bn, 26th Field Artillery, XVIII Airborne Corps); Iowa State College (BS 1953); US Army Command and General Staff College, 1965; Syracuse University, MBA, 1966; Long Range Committee.

THOMAS M. VASSY, Lieutenant Colonel, Ordnance, 248-38-4413; (Commanding Officer, 189th Maintenance Battalion, 12th Support Brigade); Clemson University (BS 1954); University of Miami, MBA, 1966; Armed Forces Staff College, 1971; Short Range Committee.

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

#### Background

The 1960's was a decade of substantial technological and social change. It was a period during which instant communications became the rule rather than the exception. It was a decade of space spectacles, of Neil Armstrong making "a giant step for mankind". It was ten years of exciting growth in the computer sciences. History may one day record it as the most significant period since the Industrial Revolution.

Sociological developments during the decade were perhaps even more significant. Hundreds of thousands answered a young President's challenge to "ask what you can do for your country". Wealthy businessmen and penniless, but idealistic, young people carried the Peace Corps banner into remote villages and primitive farm areas. Bright young college and university graduates spurned lucrative job offers to work in the ghettos. Americans encountered "revolutions of rising expectations". Sparks from such "revolutions" singed America's conscience and fired its heart. These promoted substantial progress in social justice and triggered unprecedented violence.

Much of the cost of this decade of social turbulence can best be paid in meaningful change. Having accepted this hard truth, many of the Nation's institutions already have moved in this direction. Churches have opened their doors to rock groups, and now are "carrying their ministries to the people". Colleges and universities offer new courses and are becoming more interested in community action and social progress. Big business has demonstrated considerable social responsibility. Much of the Nation has become more aware of the people factor.

Historically, the relationship between Army leadership and the soldier has been relatively favorable. Our success in past wars is proof enough. Until recently, however, the Army remained essentially mission-oriented. Although we often talked about such people matters as putting "personal" into personnel, more often than not, we have concentrated on short-term goals. We mechanized pay systems, popularized systems analysis, and emphasized training in automatic data processing. We talked about new generations of vehicles, aircraft, weapons, and about "automated battlefields". We became converts to statistics-based efficiency. In short, we embraced a doctrine of getting the job done, without regard to its impact on troop morale.

Today, such a doctrine clearly conflicts with trends in society. The young, particularly, push hard for recognition of human values. Their substantial support from the clergy, from educators, and from increasing numbers of parents and public officials suggests that longer term human objectives have top priority in contemporary society.

Fresh from that society--and still tied to it--young soldiers tend to reflect its social values. They cry for more participation, understanding and individuality. They criticize the concepts and procedures that historically have enabled the Army to get the job done. Indeed, they warn that our leadership situation is not what it should be, that it is out of step with the march of time.

Is our leadership situation really in need of substantial change? Several factors suggest that it is. Racial incidents, for example, point to increased social awareness and stronger demands for justice. They also might point to a lack of discipline born and nurtured in a climate in which desired standards are unknown, or are nonexistent. The questioning of the "meaningfulness of their service" by soldiers who are not necessarily dissident is an even stronger indicator. Stronger still was the finding in the 1969 Army War College Professionalism Study that the individual perceives the leadership climate as unfair. In essence, a youthful, rebellious, and well-informed generation is pushing for less emphasis on machines and more emphasis on man.

It is easy to understand why much of the Army refuses to accept some of these changes. Tradition resists change. Tradition generously laced with success resists even harder. Thus, some of the Army's most successful officers and noncommissioned officers find it hard to believe they should alter the techniques that have worked so well.

Two other factors bear on this condition. First, too few of us are really skilled in human behavior. We lack the expertise to properly handle a rapid change in orientation from mission accomplishment at any price, to mission accomplishment with maximum concern for human values. Nor have we taken advantage of available empirical data on human behavior. This is the second factor. In our various personnel and organizational studies, we have been too concerned with management, money and machines, and not concerned enough with motivating men to perform with full effectiveness.

That tendency is being reversed. Not only has the Army started to tap the wealth of empirical data that the behavioral sciences have collected; it also has initiated several relevant studies. Among these are the Army War College leadership study; the Research Analysis Corporation's study on dissention in the Army; and leadership studies conducted by the Infantry School and the United States Military Academy.



On a smaller scale, a number of genuinely concerned soldiers have offered constructive criticism to help the Army they love. Some have suggested more emphasis on "creativity, organizational structures, and effective leadership styles". Some have called for "more honesty" and a willingness to "try new solutions". Others have voiced their concern in reminders that our "young people today differ from the young people of 1940 and of 1950 and, probably of 1960".

More recently, the Chief of Staff of the Army stated his concern in a letter to the Commanding General, CONARC, in which he called for short term and long term "leadership improvement efforts". In that letter, General Westmoreland noted "the evident need for immediate attention by the chain of command to improving our leadership techniques to meet the Army's current challenges".

General Westmoreland's letter also provided for the formation of a group of "selected young leaders" to study the subject of leadership and formulate a leadership improvement program. The Commanding General, CONARC, then appointed a board of officers and noncommissioned officers to carry out this task.

The Board of Officers on Leadership for Professionals (CONARC Leadership Board) convened at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, on 26 April 1971. The Board was directly responsible to the Commanding General, CONARC. Inclosure 1, Appendix A depicts the organization of the Board and identifies Board members.

The Board received substantial assistance from many individuals and activities. (See Appendix B, Acknowledgements). Foremost among the military contributors were retired Generals Bruce C. Clarke and Harold K. Johnson. Further, useful suggestions, comments and concerns were obtained from active Army general officers too numerous to mention.

Those Army activities to which the Board is particularly indebted include the Infantry School Leadership Department; the United States Military Academy's Department of Military Psychology and Leadership; the Army War College; and the various Army service schools, NCO Academies, and training centers whose representatives participated in the conference on leadership programs of instruction.

Principal civilian contributors to whom the Board is most grateful include Dr. T. O. Jacobs, Human Resources Research Organization; Drs. James M. Farr, Robert Dorn, and Don Penner, Center for Creative Leadership; and Dr. James B. Partin, Army Logistics Management Center.

## Mission

The mission of the Board appears in detail in the CONARC Terms of Reference (Appendix C). Simply stated, it involves two basic goals: (1) Creation of a short range seminar program that will impact immediately on the leadership situation and, (2) development of a program of improved leadership for the Army through established institutions. This latter goal will impact over the long term as service schools and training centers teach and apply improved leadership techniques to enhance professionalism.

Analysis of the Terms of Reference and related correspondence suggested a need for two things. The Board needed to refine the list of tasks into an easily understood mission, and it needed to develop a concept which would focus its efforts on the mission. This analysis led to acceptance of the following mission statement.

Develop a leadership seminar program for use by installation and major unit commanders in the conduct of their seminars on improved leadership and recommend an outline plan for an improved leadership development program for the US Army.

## Concept

Development of a workable concept of improved leadership required considerable effort. The Board had to answer several hard questions. It had to decide, for example, if the principles of leadership outlined in FM 22-100 still are valid. The Board also had to separate fact from emotional rhetoric about the current leadership situation. Has the Army callously ignored the people factor, as some critics charge? Or, is the real problem more a question of priorities, of being tied too rigidly to tradition?

Not only did the questions enable the Board to focus on improvements needed to change the current leadership situation, they also surfaced several additional considerations. They indicated, for instance, that the US Army concept for leadership always has emphasized getting the job done while taking care of the individual and preserving his dignity. They also indicated, however, that in the past few years, we have tended to neglect long term human goals by placing too much emphasis on short term organizational goals.

This last consideration screams for change. It cautions that the Army, an organization largely dependent on youth, is profoundly affected by changes in societal values. It reminds us that we are changing from



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an Army sustained by the draft to one sustained predominately by volunteers. We have to compete directly with civilian enterprises to obtain the caliber of young men we need. Those we get will bring to the Army sets of values moulded from their experiences and from comparison of their environment and opportunities with those of their civilian friends and peers. These values include the belief that there should be an equitable relationship between what a soldier is expected to give the Army and what he receives from it. Obviously, such values dictate that the leader understand this informal contract; that he learn to motivate and satisfy the legitimate needs of his subordinates in exchange for their commitment to accomplish the unit mission.

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This really means we must adjust our leadership behavior. It means the Army must recognize the earnest desire of today's youth for individuality and, where possible, participation. It also means that leadership today must be both flexible and personal. It does not mean we must change our leadership principles. Time honored and tested, they are as valid and relevant today as ever. What we must do is change the way in which the leadership principles and concepts are applied.

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No concept for leadership would be complete if it failed to address discipline. This concept gives discipline major consideration. It charges leaders to improve discipline not through fear-inspired control, but by setting, announcing and accepting nothing less than high standards of performance and behavior. It suggests that individual goals be linked to unit goals; that leaders build pride and confidence in their units; that we respect individual dignity; that leaders "communicate" up and down the chain of command; that we learn to better motivate our men; that we emphasize to our men their responsibility for self-discipline; and that we apply to ourselves the same expectations for self-control and respect for others that we apply to our subordinates. In short, the leadership concept in this study projects the belief that improved leadership will breed good discipline. It also makes the point that "ensuring the soldier's welfare" means more than providing him with hot food, swimming pools, current movies and other recreational facilities. It means making him dig in during field exercises, working him an extra 30 minutes to correct training deficiencies, and running him an extra mile to keep him physically fit. It means conditioning him to stay alive when the chips are down. The concept follows:

The concept of improved leadership for the US Army is based on accomplishment of the organizational mission while preserving the dignity of the individual and ensuring his welfare. The expected leadership behavior must be flexible in technique and personal in application in order to motivate the individual, promote and maintain a high state of discipline, and foster esprit de corps.

## Scope

This study effort necessarily reaches into many areas. It examines current leadership studies and projects. It considers leadership programs of instruction in various service schools. It reviews literature related to leadership, motivation and management activities. And it addresses the use of behavioral science offerings to improve leadership in the Army. The following areas receive particular attention:

- a. Discipline
- b. Motivation and job satisfaction
- c. Scope, objectives, findings and recommendations of ongoing leadership studies and projects
- d. Consideration of leadership programs of instruction presented in Army service schools
- e. Consideration of current policies applicable to leadership instruction in Army Schools
- f. Identification of practices and conditions which hamper or prevent the exercise of effective leadership
- g. Development of seminar programs to help senior commanders teach improved leadership
- h. Selection of background materials, films, and visual aids to support leadership seminars
- i. Training of instructor teams to help installation and major unit commanders present improved leadership instruction
- j. Formulation of long range training and educational programs to improve the leadership climate throughout the Army.

## Organization of the Report

This report emphasizes simplicity and usefulness. Chapter II outlines the current projects, studies and literature reviewed by the Board and their applicability to the Board's mission. The study and operational designs employed are discussed in Chapter III, followed by the findings and recommendations in Chapter IV. Finally, some additional considerations are discussed. Some of the more detailed backup or amplifying items such as recommended programs of instruction have been appended to the report.