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OFFICER-ENLISTED MAN RELATIONSHIPS

REPORT
OF THE
SECRETARY OF WAR'S BOARD
ON
OFFICER-ENLISTED MAN RELATIONSHIPS
TO
HON. ROBERT P. PATTERSON
The Secretary of War
MAY 27, 1946



PRESENTED BY MR. THOMAS OF UTAH
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ROBERT P. PATTERSON, THE SECRETARY OF WAR,
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I. PURPOSE

A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The Board was directed in a memorandum dated March 18, 1946, to study officer-enlisted man relationships and to make recommendations to the Secretary of War as to changes in existing practices, laws, regulations, etc., which are considered necessary or desirable in order to improve relations between commissioned and enlisted personnel.

B. PLAN OF INVESTIGATION

The Board has concerned itself with an examination of the following:

1. Complaints and comments on lack of democracy in the Army, instances of incompetent leadership, and the abuse of privileges. Such criticism and comment were obtained from:

(a) Prepared statements and recorded testimony of witnesses. Views of soldiers and civilians were obtained. The civilians included many former commissioned and enlisted personnel. The witnesses were selected in such a way as to procure a truly representative cross section of thinking on the subject of officer-enlisted man relationships. It is felt by the members that the testimony of witnesses who personally appeared before the Board was particularly valuable due to the opportunity for discussion which the hearings afforded.

(b) Comments contained in over 1,000 letters received by the Board as of April 30, 1946.

(c) Newspaper articles, editorial comment, and "Letters to the editor."

(d) Magazine and journal articles.

(e) Radio commentary.

2. Pertinent War Department materials which enabled the Board to know in detail the differential treatment accorded commissioned and enlisted personnel (a) based on statute, (b) manifest in regulations, and (c) of times expressed through custom and tradition. Such materials included:

(a) Findings contained in research studies.

(b) Report from the Inspector General.

(c) Policies as promulgated by the Personnel Division.

(d) Reports from the Judge Advocate General, The Adjutant General, and other staff agencies.

Essentially the problem resolved into the following questions:

1. What were the factors that precipitated the criticism leveled against the Army after this war, particularly in reference to the subject under consideration?
2. To what extent did irregularities, injustices, abuses, etc., which allegedly occurred during the prosecution of the war, actually exist?
3. Upon analysis of reasons for complaints and grievances, are the difficulties the fault of (a) the Army system? (b) the personalities of those in responsible positions? or (c) a combination of system and persons, plus a world-wide change in thinking?
4. Keeping in mind the mission of the Army and the elements essential to accomplish such a mission, what portion of the criticism is justified and what changes in the military organization and its customs, rules, and regulations may be made which will assure more intelligent manpower utilization and improve relations between commissioned and enlisted personnel?

II. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

A. HISTORICAL

The American military system was originally derived from the European, specifically from the Prussian and British organizations. Therefore, it is true that much of the present structure of our Army harks back to this old military order. In the early European system only those who were of the landed gentry were permitted into the officer corps. Commissioned station in the armed forces was thus hereditary. This practice did result in a caste system. However, in the strict sense, the phrase, "caste system," is inappropriately applied to our Army at the present time since the selection of individuals for commissioned rank is based on democratic principles.

It is recorded that, during the trying times of the Revolutionary War, one of the difficulties expressed by General Washington in maintaining a fighting army, pertained to strained relations between officers and men. Even in the days of the Civil War, some men in the ranks of both the North and the South voiced resentment against those "aristocratic" officers, who, being more interested in rank and privilege, failed on occasion to concern themselves with the welfare of their men. A report to the Secretary of War during World War I, submitted by one of his assistants after a survey of conditions in the Army in 1919, called attention to the—

bitterness engendered among the enlisted men by special privileges accorded the officer personnel (privileges that have no military significance nor value) who are in many instances mental and moral inferiors of half of their subordinates.

He anticipated that, following the war, criticism would be leveled against the Army by soldiers returning to civilian status, and that much of such criticism would relate to the inequities in treatment of enlisted men as compared to officers.

In the wake of a second world war, of global proportions, similar reaction to the Military Establishment is appearing. Concurrently with widespread discussions of demobilization, enlistment and reenlistment in the armed services, the extension of the Draft Act, universal military training, unification of the military services, and a host of other problems involving both the Army and Navy and their

relation to national and international issues, much is being written and spoken on the subject of officer-enlisted man relationships. Soldiers who are conscripted into service, often against their will, are not inclined to look kindly on the life that resulted from this conscription. From the beginning, there was a manifest dislike for regimentation and for the feeling of loss of individual identity in the military machine. By reason of their historical dislike of the military system, Americans have a deep-seated feeling against and strongly resist any growth of an old-world type of military caste because such would be out of keeping with our democratic government. Therefore, as soon as soldiers returned to civilian status, many became articulate; some vociferous; and a few outright abusive. The peak of editorial attack on the Army was reached in the spring of 1946.

Most of this writing is a discussion of the social distinction and resultant social privileges created by the official breach, effected by tradition and custom of the service, between commissioned and enlisted personnel.

B. DEMOCRACY AND THE ARMY

Many who were most outspoken wrote of the need for some changes in officer-enlisted man relationships in an army whose members are citizens of a democracy. Those writers and critics who understood the mission or objective of an army, whether in peacetime or in an emergency, did not argue for an abolition of rank or privileges in the military service. They understood that discipline and obedience can only be accomplished by creating rank and by giving necessary privileges to accompany increased responsibilities.

A review of the Russian experiment with their own military system, during and after the revolution in the winter of 1917-18, when the Red Army abolished rank and privileges, brings to light the fact that sufficient recognition was not given by the Russians at that time to the essentials referred to in the preceding paragraph. In subsequent revamping of their military system in terms of these basic principles, the pendulum swung in the other direction and the Russian officer corps now has greater prestige and privilege than before the reorganization was attempted and far more than accorded officers in our Army. There were, however, other governmental changes which accompanied the changes in the Army during this period. It must be pointed out that the system of political commissars, which undoubtedly had an effect upon the military establishment, was in operation at the same time.

C. PHASES OF THE ARMY

An evaluation of real and alleged injustices, irregularities, and abuses during this war, requires that some attention be directed to the phases of contemporary military history.

1. The peacetime prewar military establishment

In September 1939, the military force totaled approximately 198,000, of which about 15,000 were officers. This force was composed of individuals who chose the military service as a career; it therefore did not contain conscripts nor draftees. In this peacetime prewar Army there was, in addition to the official gap between commissioned and enlisted personnel, a breach based upon the general caliber of the

men. The official gap, established by law, regulations, custom, and tradition was accepted without question by the vast majority of those men then in the Army. The differential, due to caliber of most of the enlisted as compared to that of the commissioned personnel, permitted the development of habits of dealing with men in the ranks which later were to cause difficulties.

2. *Mobilization for war*

The period of mobilization preceded, in its initial stages, the actual declaration of war. It was in this period that rapid expansion of the military body began. Selective service was put into operation; Reserve officers were called to duty; National Guard units were ordered into the service—civilians were entering the armed forces. It is now easy to forget that the Army was being multiplied in size more than 40 times, and with such expansion, irregularities and abuses were inevitable in any system whatsoever. Training and organization were speeded up, and demands were created which resulted in the assignment of untrained or partially trained and, in many cases, unqualified individuals to jobs of great responsibility. Some methods of prompt selection of potential leaders had to be put in operation. Indoctrination had to be abbreviated. The exigencies of time did not allow the Army to develop fully among its officers a more liberal understanding of responsibilities to troops. Drawing of manpower from civilian sources wiped out the peacetime gap based on the difference in caliber between commissioned and enlisted personnel, for the Army was now receiving into its enlisted ranks men who were often far superior by training, education, and work experience, to men in the commissioned ranks. As one officer put it:

I would recognize the high average intelligence level of our enlisted personnel as a combination asset and liability. It enables us to accomplish miracles but it also increases the problem of leadership tremendously.

In addition, many men were commissioned because of their technical skill, and it was soon learned that high technical skill did not necessarily imply concomitant leadership ability.

3. *Actual war*

In this period geographical and functional variation in duties must be considered, i. e., the combat zone, rear areas in foreign theaters, isolated installations, and home front.

The complaints, grievances, and criticisms received by the Board indicated that the problem of officer-enlisted man relationships was insignificant among combat troops while at the front. It was in the rear areas and isolated outposts, such as the Aleutians, and on the home front, where most of the abuses of privileges, irregularities, and poor personnel management took place. In the rear areas, much of the criticism might be ascribed to the following: Freedom from fear of death and more time for consideration of lesser important things; more opportunity for abuses, consequently more abuses; often, poorer officers, without command experience and ability with less knowledge of human relations and how to deal with people and less experience with troops. In the isolated installations throughout the world, where there was little chance for contact with the enemy, inadequate facilities for recreation, a general feeling of futility and frustration, surplus energy, and excessive free time, there was inevitably greater oppor-

tunity for the development of strained relations between commissioned and enlisted personnel. Abuses of privilege and authority, in some of these areas, were frequent. The home front, although similar in its conditions to the rear areas overseas, did not show as much evidence of complaint and criticism. Many of these troops were new; they had not had time to formulate ideas about the Army and therefore develop dissatisfaction. Home ties were not broken, as in the case of overseas troops, and soldiers were near enough to have frequent home contacts. Furthermore, there is evidence to believe that many of the men on the home front were satisfied with their lot "over here."

4. *Postwar*

The postwar phase may be considered as a division into (a) demobilization and (b) the interim Army period. In the immediate postwar period, men, now out of combat, wanted out of the service and most of them wanted to come home. There was the clamor of those who wanted to get out and the criticism of those who already had been separated. The criticism which began in this period of demobilization carried over into the period of the interim Army. It is a well-known fact that, among military personnel, the scattered fears and deep resentments which have been engendered by war experience often find best expression in outbursts against their authorities, and it must be remembered that the mass of manpower consisted of conscripts. Some of the complaints, voiced by those who had been separated, were the result of deep-seated personal reactions and individual antagonism to the military in general. Some of the more serious minded wanted to make known what they considered bad features of the Army in order that our Nation could avoid any repetition of them in the future. Such individuals offered constructive ideas with the hope of improving future conditions. There was also some criticism from a minority who saw a chance to "get on the bandwagon" and to use this moment for advancing some selfish or ulterior motives.

During this postwar phase, note must be taken of changing concepts, social unrest, a transitional period in which thinking is directed toward the perfection of democratic processes, with greater emphasis on human relations, security, the dignity of the individual—all the result of the war years and many other factors, i. e., greater education of the masses, greater world wide dissemination of information, increased speed of transportation, geographical dislocation of peoples, etc.

The difficulties now encountered by the Military Establishment, in recruiting (enlistment and recruitment) a force to meet international commitments for policing defeated territories, and to care for equipment worth billions of dollars, are indicative of strong public resentment against certain features of the Army. Having experienced the regimentation, the distinctions and privileges which were the basis for abuse, and never quite understanding the military, thousands of men who served admirably in a victorious army are now uttering their protests against the existing military system.

D. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COMMISSIONED AND ENLISTED PERSONNEL—STATUS AND BENEFITS

The following facts indicate to some degree the differential between commissioned and enlisted personnel as based upon existing statutes, regulations, customs, and tradition:

1. Some of the differences based on existing statutes:

Base pay:

Foreign-service or sea-duty pay:

Commissioned personnel: 10-percent increase.

Enlisted personnel: 20-percent increase.

Allowance for quarters and subsistence:

Commissioned personnel: Subsistence allowance fixed at 70 cents per day—number of allowances depend upon pay period and dependents, allowance for rental of quarters ranging from \$45 to \$120 per month.

Enlisted personnel: Value of allowance for quarters and rations, where not furnished in kind, depends on duty performed, not to exceed \$5 per day, based on Presidential regulations. First three grades entitled to receive monthly allowance for quarters where public quarters not available for dependents.

Family allowances for dependents:

Commissioned personnel: No provision.

Enlisted personnel: Dependents receive monthly allowance consisting of Government contribution and charge to pay of men, amounts varying with number and class of dependents.

Reenlistment allowance: Enlisted personnel only.

Furlough travel allowance on reenlistment: Enlisted personnel only.

Travel allowance:

Commissioned personnel: Mileage of 8 cents per mile or per diem rates in lieu of subsistence when traveling on official business, not to exceed \$7 per day; transportation of dependents authorized on permanent change of station.

Enlisted personnel: Mileage of 3 cents per mile regardless of mode of travel; transportation in kind, or monetary allowance in lieu thereof; transportation of dependents on permanent change of station authorized for those in first three grades only; allowance of 5 cents per mile from place of discharge to point of enlistment or induction.

Arms qualification:

Commissioned personnel: No provision.

Enlisted personnel: \$1 to \$5 per month additional compensation for special qualifications.

Parachutist's pay:

Commissioned personnel: \$100 per month additional pay.

Enlisted personnel: \$50 per month additional pay.

(Similar compensation—glider flight pay.)

Additional pay for decorations:

Commissioned personnel: No provision.

Enlisted personnel: Additional pay of \$2 per month for original award of Medal of Honor, Distinguished Service Cross, or Distinguished Service Medal, and any additions.

Expert or combat infantryman badge:

Commissioned personnel: No additional pay authorized.

Enlisted personnel: Entitled to additional pay per month of \$5 for expert infantryman badge and \$10 for combat infantryman badge.

Mustering-out pay:

Commissioned personnel: Payment authorized to those in first, second, and third pay periods (second lieutenants, first lieutenants, and captains); none authorized for those receiving pay at a higher rate than base pay of third pay period (e. g., base pay of captain).

Enlisted personnel: All enlisted personnel entitled to payment. (NOTE: \$100 for less than 60 days' service; \$200 for over 60 days' service all in Z1; \$300 for over 60 days' service, part of which was overseas.)

Uniform allowance:

Commissioned personnel: \$250 paid officers below the rank of major for uniform and equipment when entering on active duty. (West Point graduates not authorized this allowance since they are provided a uniform allowance while at the Academy.)

Enlisted personnel: No monetary allowance provided; clothing and uniform issued in kind.

Retirement benefits:

Considerable variance exists in payments to military personnel.

Commissioned personnel: For 30 years' service completed and upon request to retire, approved by Secretary of War, commissioned personnel are entitled to benefits of 75 percent. After 15 years' service completed (see AR 35-1740), request may be made for retirement, and, if approved by Secretary of War, benefits vary from 2 to 3 percent of base and longevity pay for each year of service; however, as a matter of policy, Secretary of War will not approve requests of those with less than 25 years' service. Commissioned personnel required to retire on basis of age: 60 years for all officers other than general officers; for latter, 62 and 64 years.

Enlisted personnel: 30 years' service completed entitles an individual to retirement benefits amounting to 75 percent; no provisions for mandatory retirement on basis of age. After 20 years' service completed, provisions for retirement on basis of disability, at full retirement pay.

(NOTE.—Retirement of commissioned personnel for disability is considerably involved and depends upon specific cases. All existing statutory provisions and regulations pertaining to retirement are under scrutiny at the present time, and changes are being considered by Congress.)

Leave or furlough:

Commissioned personnel: Granted 30 days in 1 year; and paid for unused accrued leave on termination of service.

Enlisted personnel: No statutory limitations on length of furlough, no terminal-leave pay.

In September 1939, out of a total of 198,335 men in the Army, there were 14,916 officers, male, female, warrant, and flight. The peak of commissioned strength was reached in July 1945 when the number of approximately 15,000 had grown to 897,777.

Of this latter total, only 2 percent were Regular Army officers—1 percent representing graduates of the United States Military Academy; about 3 percent were National Guard officers; about 15 percent were from the Officers' Reserve Corps—those holding commissions from ROTC units, etc.; about 13 percent represented officers commissioned directly from civilian life, such as doctors, dentists, chaplains, etc.; the total of this group of officers represented 33 percent. The balance, or 67 percent, were (a) officers commissioned through the officer candidate schools, (b) aviation cadets, (c) battle-field commissions, (d) direct commissioning of enlisted personnel, and (e) direct commissioning of warrant and flight officers. Thirty-two percent were graduates of officer candidate schools.

During the period between September 16, 1940, and April 15, 1946, a total of 6,700 officers appeared before reclassification boards. Of this number, 327 were demoted, 4,123 were separated from the service, and 2,250 were reassigned. In addition to this total of 6,700, an additional 1,837 officers were reassigned without reference to a board proceeding. The total figure of 8,537 officers represents approximately 1 percent of the peak commissioned strength referred to above.

B. FINDINGS CONTAINED IN RESEARCH STUDIES CONDUCTED BY INFORMATION AND EDUCATION DIVISION

In a post VJ-day survey of leadership, a wide variation in the proportions of men within any one company with favorable or unfavorable attitude toward their officers ranged from as high as 90 percent favorable to as low as 10 percent favorable. Only one out of four men stated that in general their officers were of poor quality and that much better officers could have been picked. These findings indicate that there is no over-all tendency to criticize all officers indiscriminately on the part of enlisted personnel. Specific comments about officer-enlisted man relationships may be broken down into three categories as follows:

1. Leadership practices

The attitudes of enlisted personnel tend to emphasize the need for better leadership practices, especially in regard to personal relations. In the post VJ-day cross-section survey, 55 percent of the enlisted personnel state that few or none of their officers take a personal interest in their welfare, 52 percent state their officers did not do what they could to help the enlisted personnel, 50 percent felt their officers did not understand the enlisted man's problems or needs, and 70 percent stated their officers rarely ever or never gave recognition or praise to a particularly well-done job. All surveys in the United States and overseas have shown the same sensitivity of enlisted personnel toward the personal leadership relations between themselves and their officers.

competent to
not. Officers
Enlisted person-
Enlisted personnel are prohibited from
of time, punishment, name and residence
for enlisted personnel. Any sentence of an officer,
except in time of war. Enlisted personnel: No comparable
provision.

2. Some of the differences based on regulations:

Retirement: Commissioned personnel may retire on disability after short periods of service; enlisted personnel must have at least 20 years' service before being eligible.

Clothing: Entirely different uniforms prescribed for commissioned personnel when off duty until recent change in regulation.

Travel: Commissioned personnel: Authorized transportation for dependents and movement of household goods upon permanent change of station relief from active duty or retirement. Enlisted personnel: Only those of the first three grades authorized transportation of dependents and only those of the first four grades authorized movement of household goods upon permanent change of station or retirement and in certain cases, upon discharge.

Passes:

Commissioned personnel: Need only identification cards. Enlisted personnel: Required to have passes while away from post of duty.

Segregation in post theaters:

Commissioned personnel: Special seats.

Enlisted personnel and families: Segregated from officers. Messing: Officers dine separately, either in own mess hall or officers' club, receive individual service usually by enlisted personnel; usually only one facility for enlisted men's mess; differences in messing facilities aboard ship.

Prohibitions for enlisted personnel: Enlisted personnel not permitted association with commissioned women personnel, not permitted to enter officers' clubs, attend officers' parties, use officers' facilities no matter what they may be; while commissioned personnel frequently may use facilities provided enlisted personnel.

Saluting: Enlisted personnel required to salute all commissioned personnel first.

3. Some of the differences based on tradition:

Social distinctions on and off post, especially manifest among wives.

Use of enlisted personnel for menial tasks and subservient duties. Considered demeaning for commissioned to associate with enlisted personnel off duty or off military reservation.

Special privileges for commissioned personnel (RHIP).

All expressed a widespread condemnation on the part of enlisted personnel of the abuse of rank and privilege by the commissioned class. In the survey referred to above, 46 percent of the enlisted personnel stated that their officers usually or always used their rank in ways that seemed unnecessary. A separate tabulation made by the Research Branch of the Information and Education Division has been made for those enlisted personnel who have received military awards or decorations. The agreement of this group with the general cross section would indicate that these attitudes of enlisted personnel toward rank and privilege are not due simply to a "browned off" attitude on the part of chronic grippers. The sources of enlisted men's gripes overseas were the privileges, real or otherwise, of officers in regard to use of Army vehicles for social purposes, unfair advantage in getting liquor, more opportunities to have dates, good hotels, restaurants and recreation, and particularly signs "off limits to enlisted men."

3. Informal officer-enlisted man relations¹

In the post-VJ-day study referred to above, 82 percent of the enlisted personnel agreed with the statement that "The Army would be a lot better if officers and enlisted personnel were more friendly with each other," and 78 percent agreed with the statement that "An officer will not lose the respect of his men if he pals around with them off duty."

Only a minority of officers agree with enlisted personnel on the advisability of closer relationship between officers and enlisted personnel, but the minority is surprisingly large—30 percent.

Numerous studies conducted by the Research Branch indicate how closely leadership is related to morale. The feeling of bitterness in the attitude of enlisted personnel toward their officers is most pronounced in rear and garrison areas outside the continental United States. The major factors contributing to the situation are: The number of commissioned personnel who are lacking in basic qualities of leadership; undemocratic attitude among many commissioned personnel who fail to respect enlisted personnel as individuals; growing differentiation in privileges between commissioned and enlisted personnel, specific privileges which have no relation to military necessity or effectiveness.

G. SUMMARY OF REPORT OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

No comprehensive over-all survey of officer-enlisted man relationships has been made by the Office of the Inspector General. Privileges enjoyed by commissioned and not by enlisted personnel have come up incidental to investigations, inquiries, or surveys on other suggestions. Certain trends or patterns have become more or less established regarding the attitude of enlisted personnel in their relations to commissioned personnel. These trends appear to fall into

¹In a recent poll of the American Institute of Public Opinion, 72 percent of a cross section of the Nation said "good idea" in answer to the question, "Do you think it would be a good idea if Army officers and enlisted men had the same food, clubs, and social privileges?" and 76 percent of both officer and enlisted personnel of World War II veterans stated it was a "good idea"; officers are found divided about equally on the question. Eighty-six percent of the former enlisted personnel favor eliminating special privileges for officers. (George Gallup, director of American Institute of Public Opinion, May 3, 1946, Princeton, N. J.)

two general categories, namely, those regarding the established relation itself on the grounds that it is not democratic, and those arising from the abuse of established precedent and privileges.

Complaints alleging discrimination with respect to privileges granted commissioned as compared to those afforded enlisted personnel are, in general:

Better quarters.

Better and more abundant food.

Better and more varied recreational facilities for "officers only."

Liquor available to commissioned but not to enlisted personnel.

More and better automotive transportation available to commissioned personnel for recreational use.

A distinction in the uniform of officer and enlisted personnel.

Ready access by commissioned personnel to a greater number and better female society.

Enlisted personnel required to assist and be a part in securing and providing many of the foregoing special privileges for commissioned personnel.

H. SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY OBTAINED FROM WITNESSES

Observations of witnesses.—The testimony of witnesses, the great proportion of which contained criticism of present officer-enlisted man relationships, included some few statements supporting the present Army system. In the main the complaints and grievances were against officer personnel. They included general condemnation of commissioned personnel, complaints of poor leadership, citations of irregularities and injustices, and complaints of abuse of privilege. The causes for the failure of a small percentage of the Officer Corps were held to be the result of poor and faulty selection, inadequate orientation or indoctrination, insufficient training, and in some cases poor-caliber men. Witnesses testified that the military system is, in itself, in some cases responsible for deficiencies and the inefficient operation of members of the commissioned group. It was claimed that there is no adequate method for prompt elimination (or demotion) of incompetents and undesirables, that commissioned personnel are not subject to the same rigorous procedures in military justice as are enlisted personnel, that, by tradition, they are not as morally responsible for their acts, and that there are other weaknesses in the system of administration and control of commissioned personnel.

It is in the realm of social behavior that the feeling of superiority on the part of commissioned personnel most rankled the enlisted personnel. Social distinction, both on and off duty, directed attention to the unnecessary indignities suffered by soldiers—indignities which had no positive effect upon discipline and military efficiency. It was in this category that abuses were most rampant, violations occurred most frequently, irregularities were most apparent. Fundamentally these manifestations of social distinction are rooted in the old traditional officer concept; and the sharp line of demarcation between officer and enlisted personnel officially, which established differentials, makes possible such abuses. In addition, the results of faulty selection, insufficient orientation and indoctrination, and inadequate training in responsibility, increased the number of instances of abuse and arrogance displayed by officers.

of such personnel. Specific recommendations were made concerning requirements, methods of selection, materials for orientation and indoctrination, steps in the training program with particular emphasis on personnel management, more rigorous methods for elimination of incompetents and undesirables, placing in regulations controls which could be utilized to thwart the overindulgence in privileges, a system of demotion, more intelligent assignment, eliminating technicians from command positions, and a host of other intelligent suggestions.

The majority of recommendations, which pertained to the inequities or disparities in treatment of commissioned and enlisted personnel resulting from the system, were general in nature. Recommendations were made to "wipe out all inequities and establish a system of pay, rank, promotion, and demotion on the basis of merit"; make it impossible for social distinctions and discriminations off duty; review the machinery for administering military justice and the courts-martial procedure with the view of making all military personnel subject to the same types of punishment as based upon infractions of rules and misdemeanors; make available to all military personnel the same food items, the same messing facilities, etc.; permit accumulation of leave and provide for terminal-leave pay to enlisted personnel; change the ruling on passes, bed check, physical examinations, etc., which pertain only to enlisted personnel; provide for a common uniform; equalize the housing facilities on posts, camps, and stations, in terms of family size and rank; abolish saluting, except on ceremonial occasions, on duty, and in occupied territories. A number of good specific suggestions were made available to the Board for rectifying many of the inequities in the military system.

There were recommendations which related to the improvement of the status of enlisted personnel, all of which, as mentioned, might indirectly affect an improvement of officer-enlisted relationships.

Recommendations concerning the Office of the Inspector General included the following: Staff with more highly qualified personnel, fitted for the particular task; increase the allotment of personnel; make the inspectors general in field installations responsible directly to the Office of the Chief of Staff, or the Secretary of War, or the President; use civilians instead of military personnel; give certain authorities in order that actions may be taken immediately upon discovery of inefficiencies.

There is one more category in which criticism has been received. In this category are problems which are not directly pertinent to officer-enlisted man relationships but which directly bear upon the status of the enlisted personnel. Such items as, inadequate pay for enlisted personnel, inadequate use of talents and skills, insufficient training or possibilities for training along lines other than military subjects, are included in the well of complaints.

No witness maintained that there should not be discipline and strict obedience to orders. Each agreed that there should be levels of authority up the scale of responsibilities, and some methods and means up the scale should be provided for those in responsible positions to more effectively carry out their duties. For example, everyone agreed that with greater responsibility and authority should go greater remuneration. Some of the witnesses felt as though any major changes in the military organization might result in an ineffective military machine. This feeling was based on a fear that perhaps the mission of an army might be overlooked when criticisms were considered without reference to objective.

Recommendations of witnesses.—By and large the recommendations followed closely the complaints and grievances. Since the major portion of the criticism was leveled against commissioned personnel, the largest number of recommendations pertained to the improvement

of such personnel. Specific recommendations were made concerning requirements, methods of selection, materials for orientation and indoctrination, steps in the training program with particular emphasis on personnel management, more rigorous methods for elimination of incompetents and undesirables, placing in regulations controls which could be utilized to thwart the overindulgence in privileges, a system of demotion, more intelligent assignment, eliminating technicians from command positions, and a host of other intelligent suggestions.

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I. SUMMARY OF COMMENTS RECEIVED THROUGH THE MAIL

Observations of those who wrote to the Board.—The letters contained many more abusive statements than were obtained from witnesses who appeared in person; there were many more citations of specific grievances; relatively few had an over-all comprehensive view of the problem of officer-enlisted man relationships. However, upon analysis it was found that the majority of unsolicited opinions did cite about the same categories of problems as revealed in the testimony of witnesses. There was an overwhelming reaction against commissioned personnel, criticism even being leveled against specific groups, e. g., West Point graduates, Officer Candidate School graduates, National Guard officers, Reserve officers. There were many critics of the selection, indoctrination, and training of commissioned personnel; there was as much, if not more, critical comment which pertained to abuse

of privilege, social distinctions, social barriers, and the unnecessary indignities suffered by enlisted personnel.

As stated, the criticism of the many who volunteered to write to the Board followed somewhat the same pattern as the testimony received from witnesses. After the criticism of officers, the most frequently occurring complaint was against the inequities made possible by a system in which law, regulations, and tradition favored the commissioned and not the enlisted personnel. It is apparent that citation of the inequities, resulting from the system which affords rank certain privileges, represents another approach in the attack on the Army because of allegedly undue suffering at the hands of commissioned personnel. In other words, had all commissioned personnel been screened more carefully, had been orientated and indoctrinated more thoroughly, and had the incompetents been relieved or dismissed "on the spot" when alleged justifiable complaints were rendered, there might not have been nearly so many criticisms against the system. The more glaring disparities cited, as resulting from the system, were: The administration of military justice, courts martial, terminal-leave pay, travel allowance for dependents, etc.

More comment was received through the mail referring to the censorship of enlisted men's newspapers than was received from the witnesses. Considerably more comment was made concerning enlistment and the military educational system. A small minority submitted statements of defense of the system as it now exists, some of these claiming that many of the gripes of enlisted personnel were due to certain elements that are purposely attempting to undermine the efficiency of the military.

A high percentage of those who wrote in admitted that, in order to have an effective fighting force and army, there must be discipline and strict obedience to orders. Many spoke of democratizing the Army, but only a few went to the extreme of stating that discipline, rank, authority, and privileges were totally unnecessary.

Recommendations of those who wrote to the Board.—As was found in the testimony of witnesses, the recommendations of those who wrote letters to the Board followed closely the complaints and grievances listed. There were many recommendations offered to improve the Officer Corps: Everything from methods of selection to a very effective internal policing system which would result in elimination of the incompetents more readily.

Recommendations in the field of inequities due to the system were in the main directed toward the administration of military justice. All such material received was submitted to the War Department Advisory Committee on Military Justice which is now studying this problem. There were the usual recommendations concerning subsistence, housing, uniform, saluting, decorations and awards, recreational facilities, medical treatment, retirement, leaves and furloughs, etc.

As was found in the testimony of witnesses, the mail contained a great deal in the way of constructive comment as to the improvement of the Office of the Inspector General.

Several broached the idea that a "book of rules" or "a handbook on the rights of enlisted men" or something akin to this should be written; such a handbook should cover completely all rules and regulations and be used as part of the training of recruits as they enter

the service. It was pointed out also that if anything of this nature was prepared, it would make more apparent the wide differential in so-called rights and privileges of the enlisted personnel as compared to the commissioned group.

A number also suggested that there be a greater exchange of information between the military body and the civilian world; such an exchange would enable the military to understand the citizen's point of view, and also correct many misconceptions which the public now holds concerning the military organization and its administration. In other words, some steps should be taken to educate both the military and the civilian population in each other's problems.

J. AN ADVANCED CONCEPT

Contained in the testimony of witnesses and the comments received in letters to the Board was a recommendation that a new system of personnel organization be established in the Army. The plan, as suggested, would eliminate the official gap, or line of demarcation, between the so-called officer and enlisted groups. It is claimed that this feature of the present Army system is the basis for the majority of criticisms and that a great many of the problems resulting from the system would cease to exist if the new plan were put into operation. Although not presented entirely in detail, the plan calls for a gradual graduation from the lowest to the highest rank in the Army, with each step up the scale involving an increase in duties, responsibilities, and authority. Further, selection of individuals for any position in the scale will be made only on the basis of competitive examination; likewise, promotion up the scale would involve complying with specific requirements and passing of examinations. The new plan, it is stated, will permit more effective placement of technically trained individuals, specialists in many lines, although each such specialist will be required to receive training in military philosophy and organization. No specialist would be given command responsibility unless he qualified.

Under this proposed plan, the pay scale would correspond to that which now prevails in the most advanced personnel-management systems in the field of business and industry, commensurate with duties and responsibilities up the scale. Monetary allowances will be on a graduated basis but factors other than rank will govern the amounts granted at each level in the scale. Such a system will provide incentive for advancement, the elimination of any possibility of incompetents getting into positions of responsibility, and a motivation to follow the military as a career.

Such a plan would involve considerable change in existing statutes, a complete reorganization of Army Regulations, and a breakdown of many customs and traditions.

K. CONCERTED ACTION OF SUBVERSIVE GROUPS

Military Intelligence Division, G-2, War Department General Staff, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation were consulted in an effort to determine whether or not there is evidence of concerted action on the part of subversive elements to precipitate mass criticism against the Army including, specifically, officer-enlisted man relationships. This material is in the hands of Military Intelligence Division.

the most qualified individuals for commissions in the Regular Army. Congressional authorization provided for 25,000 officers in the Regular Army; deducting those already in the Regular Army, there remained around 10,000 vacancies to be filled.

7. *Accumulation of leave and terminal-leave pay for enlisted personnel*—Instructions were contained in recently issued regulations, AR 616-275, April 5, 1948, providing, effective July 1, 1948, a system of granting leave to and recording furlough time of enlisted personnel similar to the procedure for commissioned personnel. Providing terminal-leave pay for enlisted personnel requires congressional action. However, the War Department has reported favorably on a bill now before Congress, S. 721, which will provide that enlisted personnel may accumulate furlough time at the same rate as commissioned personnel and be paid for unused leave upon separation from the service.

The War Department advises that they contemplate further actions in the future based on additional studies now being conducted.

III. CONCLUSIONS

This Board has arrived unanimously at the following conclusions:

1. The rapid expansion of the Army, from an establishment of 198,335 in September 1939 to 8,291,336 in May 1945, created an unprecedented personnel problem. When due consideration is given to all difficulties experienced in preparing for war in a democracy, it becomes obvious that the Army did a truly magnificent job in this Second World War.
2. A comparison of the aftermath of World War II with similar periods following other wars, in which this country was involved, indicates that the present reaction against the military organization is not unique and has occurred in varying degrees despite the fact that we emerged victorious.
3. Because of the distaste of citizens in our democracy for a regimented life in which an individual to some extent loses his identity, and because the majority who served were conscripted or drafted—many against their will, much of the general criticism could be expected.
4. Americans look with disfavor upon any system which grants unearned privileges to a particular class of individuals and find distasteful any tendency to make arbitrary social distinctions between two parts of the Army.
5. There were irregularities, injustices in handling of enlisted personnel, and abuses of privileges in the recent war to such an extent as to cause widespread and deep-seated criticisms.
6. The causes of poor relationships between commissioned and enlisted personnel are traceable, in general, to two main factors:
 - (a) Undeniably poor leadership on the part of a small percentage of those in positions of responsibility.
 - (b) A system that permits and encourages a wide official and social gap between commissioned and enlisted personnel.
7. In most instances poor leadership resulted from the thrusting into position of authority men who were inherently unqualified or were inadequately trained as leaders. This was brought about by the rapid expansion of the Officer Corps called for by the national emergency. There were errors in selection. Orientation and indoctrina-

AN INTEGRATING FORUM

of the problems that grew out of officer-enlisted man relationships during the war and for taking the lead in effecting changes that have significant bearing on the over-all solution of the War Department is offered the congratulations of the Board.

The Board, having apprised itself of the many phases of the question of officer-enlisted man relationships in arriving at its recommendations, looks with favor upon the steps already taken by the War Department in announcing actions, as follows:

1. Review of discharge

In September 1945 a Discharge Review Board was appointed by the Secretary of War in accordance with the provisions of section 301, Public Law 346. The purpose of this Board is to review types of discharge certificate other than discharge or dismissal given by reason of sentences under general courts martial for both commissioned and enlisted personnel. The procedure of the Board is to take action not only upon requests for review made by individuals but also to automatically study all "blue" discharges given to enlisted personnel. In addition, the War Department is at present reviewing the entire system of "blue" discharge procedures with the express purpose of making changes in existing regulations following such study.

2. Recreational facilities for enlisted men

A radiogram was dispatched by the War Department March 1, 1946, to all theaters and major forces, emphasizing that adequate recreational facilities be provided enlisted personnel and that the use of "off limits for enlisted men" signs be completely abolished.

3. Opportunity for enlisted personnel to present grievances

Instructions were issued in Circular No. 74, War Department, March 14, 1946, which provide for and enable enlisted men (and commissioned personnel) to present grievances to the Inspector General not less frequently than once a month. Dependent upon local arrangements, grievances may be presented more often; however, not less frequently than once a month is considered an absolute minimum.

4. Administration of military justice

Establishment of a War Department Advisory Committee on Military Justice was announced in Memorandum No. 25-46, War Department, March 25, 1946. This committee is charged with the responsibility of making a thorough study of the administration of military justice within the Army and the Army's courts-martial system and the making of recommendations to the Secretary of War concerning proposed changes in existing laws, regulations, and practices to improve the system of military justice in the Army.

5. Uniform

Instructions were issued in Circular No. 88, War Department, March 26, 1946, which prescribed that, effective June 30, 1948, there will be similarity in uniform for commissioned and enlisted personnel, except for insignia denoting rank.

6. Integration of officers in Regular Army

The War Department recently adopted a rigorous five-point screening program, designed to sift, from approximately 105,000 applicants,

tion were inadequate. Training was abbreviated. All of this resulted in failure to emphasize the importance of morale, efficient personnel management, and responsibilities. In the training, the Army was limited to emphasizing technical proficiency. The exigencies of time did not allow the Army to develop fully among commissioned personnel a more liberal understanding of responsibility to their troops. In selecting officers the Army was forced to rely upon the character, background, and leadership which they demonstrated while in the processes of training.

8. The peacetime Army did not adequately prepare officers for the wartime job of handling civilian soldiers; it did not offer a code of officer-enlisted man conduct flexible enough for application to an Army where the bulk of the men in all ranks were civilian.

9. The official gap between commissioned and enlisted personnel was widened during the war by untrained and unqualified officers who carried distinctions into the social life. This was to a large extent due to faulty interpretation of the customs and traditions of the regular officer corps in a peacetime Army.

10. It is extremely difficult under existing procedures to get rid of incompetents and undesirables among the officer group.

11. There is need for a new philosophy in the military order, a policy of treatment of men, especially in the "ranks," in terms of advanced concepts in social thinking. The present system does not permit full recognition of the dignities of man. More definite protection from the arbitrary acts of superiors is essential.

12. Under the present system enlisted men are dependent for the satisfaction of many of their needs upon the behavior and attitudes of their officers, but are denied a feeling of security and opportunities for development and self-realization. Despite the procedures established for this purpose, enlisted men and junior officers have actually not enjoyed complete freedom in presenting their grievances. One of the most lacking yet important phases of the military structure is an alert and effective internal policing service and an agency providing a practical means of redress.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

The Board has kept constantly in mind in weighing evidence, coming to conclusions, and in preparing its recommendations, the following:

1. There must be assurance that we, as a nation, have a modern, economical, efficient, and effective military establishment which can, if needed, win battles and a war.
2. Maintenance of control and discipline, which are essential to the success of any military operation.
3. Maintenance of morale which must be of the highest order and under continual scrutiny.
4. That the people returning from combat duty or service in Military Establishment, return in the best possible physical, mental, moral, and spiritual condition.
5. That conditions be such as to create in the mind of the soldier a favorable impression of the military service and the Government.
6. Improvement of the character, the knowledge, and the competency of those who have been and those who are in the service or about to become members of the Army.

7. Assurance of ready availability of all elements of a military establishment in case of an emergency.

8. Assurance of ready expansion of a citizens' army in case of a national emergency.

The Board therefore strongly recommends

1. That steps be taken to improve leadership in the Officer Corps of the Army in order that the corps will merit the respect of soldiers and civilians alike. That this be accomplished by: (1) Better selection, (2) more adequate orientation and indoctrination, (3) effective training, (4) proper assignments, (5) promotion on basis of merit, (6) employment of a rigorous method of screening and selecting out of incompetents and undesirables, (7) a more effective internal policing system to prevent abuses of privileges other than those facilities and means which enable an officer to do a job more effectively. The following specific actions be inaugurated:

(a) *Selection*.—That selection of men for positions of responsibility, up the scale, be based upon the most advanced practices in personnel selection found in industry, business, government, and those developed in the Army. Some of the criteria should be:

(1) Previous military training, preferably 1 year in the enlisted ranks, exceptions to be established in cases of outstanding individuals, especially technicians, who, unless they qualify, should not be placed in command positions.

(2) Character, with emphasis on interest in and potential ability to work with and manage people.

(b) *Orientation and indoctrination*.—That sufficient time be expended in order to inculcate thoroughly:

(1) A sound appreciation of responsibilities, and especially to subordinates.

(2) The intelligent use of authority.

(3) The idea that privileges which accompany rank and responsibility are established to better enable an individual to perform his duties effectively and efficiently and are not for the purpose of improving his own personal interest.

(4) An appreciation of the military service and its mission.

(c) *Training*.—That, in addition to the training in technical subjects, each candidate, whether at West Point, an ROTC unit, or officer candidate school, receive much more comprehensive instruction in command responsibility, personnel management, and human relations.

(d) *Assignment*.—That assignments to positions of responsibility be made on the basis of ability and training of the individual, thus enabling the Army to utilize talents where required.

(e) *Promotion and/or demotion*.—That a complete review be made of the system of promotion, and that a promotion system on a merit basis be established, making it possible to permit especially competent individuals to be advanced ahead of any seniority average; that some system of demotion be established whereby, after a trial period, if an individual does not meet the requirements and demonstrates that he is incapable of assuming

¹ Any system based wholly on seniority stifles initiative and weakens the caliber of the Officer Corps. It is realized that a great deal more supervision on the part of commanders is going to be required under a merit system in order that personnel in and/or demotion may be accomplished intelligently; also it is realized that it will be necessary to assure freedom from individual prejudices, favoritism, and political pressure.

tion be given to family size as well as to rating or rank of individuals; that, if quarters are not to be (or cannot be) provided on military installations, civilian costs as well as family size and rank be considered in granting of monetary allowances in lieu of quarters.

(3) Clothing and uniform: That clothing and uniforms be issued to all military personnel, whether enlisted or commissioned. The Board, however, sees no objection to personal purchase, by any military personnel of clothing and uniform in addition to that issued, provided that whatever is purchased conforms in texture and cut.

(4) Travel: That travel allowances for the individual and for his dependents be apportioned without discrimination in terms of rank, and be made equitable for both enlisted and commissioned personnel.

3. That enlisted personnel be enabled to accumulate leave or furlough time and be granted terminal-leave pay on the same basis as is now provided for commissioned personnel; that the War Department support the legislation required to make this possible, thus eliminating the termination injustices, including mustering-out pay, which now exist.

4. That all military personnel be allowed, when off duty, to pursue normal social patterns comparable to our democratic way of life.

5. That the use of discriminatory references, such as "officers and their ladies; enlisted men and their wives," be eliminated from directives and publications issued in military establishments.

6. That there be definite equality of treatment of both enlisted and commissioned personnel in the administration of military justice, making all equally liable under military law for errors and faults; that the higher the rank the more severe be the punishment; that there be a review of all cases where wartime operations necessitated very strict handling, in order that there be due reconsideration and clemency bestowed where warranted; that enlisted personnel be permitted on courts, but that every member of a court be senior to the accused.

7. That the hand salute be abandoned off Army installations and off duty, except in occupied territories and under conditions where the procedure might be deemed necessary to properly convey military dignity to local populations, but be employed in all official greetings in the line of duty and continue to be manifest at ceremonial occasions and when the national anthem is played or the colors pass by.

8. That steps be taken to establish a system of decorations and awards which will provide for a more equitable distribution on the basis of merit and prohibit distribution to a degree that will tend to cheapen them; that it be made more difficult to obtain an award the higher an individual goes in the scale from the bottom of the enlisted to the top of the commissioned ranks.

9. That the system for registering complaints be improved and that inspections be for the purpose of prevention as well as investigation. This will call for augmentation and possibly reorganization of the Inspector General's section. The following is necessary:

(a) Staff of inspectors general must be composed of carefully selected, highly competent individuals, whose experience particularly qualifies them for such assignment.

to be demoted. Lack of promotion or demotion must not be the basis for any stigmatization.

(f) *Demerit*.—That, in addition to a merit system for promotions, there be established a system whereby greater facility in eliminating the incompetent personnel and the "undesirables" is possible, thus enabling the Army to dismiss an individual when found not suitable for a job, incompetent or unable to manifest the required leadership qualities. Such a procedure will eliminate unnecessary retention in the service, indiscriminate transfers, and other existing methods of dealing with incompetence. Demotion to a level where competence is obtained may be preferable to actual dismissal.

(g) *Retirement*.—That there be established a retirement system whereby, for shorter periods of service, 10, 20, and 30 years, individuals will have the privilege of retiring and be assured some security for having spent a part of their life in the Army; that, in addition, there be a regulation which provides for approval of requests for retirement at any time, thus making it relatively easier to retire; that this system be made applicable to enlisted personnel as well as to the commissioned. This recommendation is made in part because the Army of the future should be one of young men who, in general, are better able to cope with new and scientific concepts, that the retention of older men should be only on the basis of proven capacity to accept new ideas (lack of open-mindedness of some senior officers in the past created difficulties), and with the thought in mind of making it easier for the Army to rid itself of incompetents.

(h) *Disability retirement*.—That an equitable system for commissioned and enlisted personnel be established.

2. That steps be taken to provide all military personnel with a sense of security, substantial compensation for duty and responsibility from bottom to top, equitable distribution of allowances, and assurance of a chance for advancement. It is recommended that the following specific actions be inaugurated:

(a) *Base pay*.—That the present system or schedule of base pay be reviewed from bottom to top and that the War Department establish a rate of pay which will take into consideration the increased rates of pay in industry and business in order that the Army may draw equitably from all levels of the civilian manpower reservoir. This will tend to insure the security and dignity of all Army personnel, eliminating many of the inequities which now exist.

(b) *Allowances*.—That allowances be furnished to all levels, from bottom to top, including all enlisted and commissioned personnel, on a sliding scale basis. The following should be considered in the establishment of a new table of allowances:

(1) *Food*: That food, wherever obtained by Government purchase, be distributed equitably to all grades and ranks, providing identical privileges for augmentation if desired; that efforts be made to assure similarity in preparation and service.

(2) *Quarters*: That, in the peacetime Army if quarters are to be provided on posts, camps, stations, or bases, considera-

(b) Staff of inspectors general must be increased to the extent necessary to permit it to function properly.

(c) Continued study must be made of abuses with the objective of eliminating the causes.

(d) Copies of reports of inspectors general must be transmitted to the War Department outside regular command channels, in addition to normal procedures, in order to eliminate political aspects of control and to insure remedial action.

10. That all regulations and instructions be so written that they not only stipulate the limited "privileges" which are essential to the performance of duties in positions of responsibility but also will be regulatory in that they will prohibit or minimize possible abuses of authority and the prestige that goes with higher rank and responsibility.

11. The abolishment of all statutes, regulations, customs, and traditions which discourage or forbid social association of soldiers of similar likes and tastes, because of military rank.

12. That necessary steps be taken to eliminate the terms and concepts, "enlisted men" and "officer," that suitable substitutes be employed (e. g., members of noncommissioned corps, members of commissioned corps, etc.), and that all military personnel be referred to as "soldiers."

13. That close contact and association with civilians be encouraged and maintained since a citizens' Army is a result of combined interest, effort, and contribution of both military and public. A mutual exchange of information will enhance the military organization. Length of military service seems to automatically divorce military personnel from civilian outlook. A maximum of military personnel living in civilian communities, rather than on Army posts, will assist in accomplishing this.

14. That further study be made of accumulated materials on the subject under consideration by the Board for the purpose of extracting additional ideas which may be worthy of acceptance.

Following are the members of the Secretary of War's Board on Officer-Enlisted Men Relationships:

James H. "Jimmy" Doolittle, lieutenant general (Chairman), who commanded the Eighth Air Force, led the first bomber raid on Tokyo, and is now with the Shell Oil Co. He enlisted as a flying cadet October 6, 1917, and was commissioned a second lieutenant, Signal Reserve, Aviation Section, on March 11, 1918.

Troy H. Middleton, former lieutenant general, who commanded the Forty-fifth Division in north Africa and Sicily, and is now controller of Louisiana State University. He enlisted in the Regular Army March 3, 1910.

Robert Neville, of New York City, who was on the staff of Yank Magazine as an enlisted man and became editor of the Stars and Stripes in Italy. He was a lieutenant colonel when he went on terminal leave to return to civilian writing. His views on officer-enlisted man relationships were published recently in magazines of national circulation.

Adna H. Underhill, of Freeville, N. Y., who rose from platoon sergeant at Camp Lee to paratrooper captain by way of the Fort Belvoir Officers School and the First Special Service Force School at Fort Harrison. He has the Purple Heart, and won a Silver Star at Anzio while leading his company. At present, he works for the bureau of game, New York State Conservation Department.

Jake W. Lindsey, former technical sergeant, of Lucedale, Miss., who was the one-hundredth infantryman to win the Medal of Honor. He got the award for action near Hamich, Germany, November 16, 1944, when he killed 20 of the enemy, wounded an unknown number, and captured three, in addition to knocking out two machine guns and capturing two other machine guns. He now works for the Veterans' Administration at Lexington, Mass.

Meryll M. Frost, of Hanover, N. H., who was seriously wounded at Bari, Italy, when he was a sergeant with the Four-hundred and Fifty-first Bomb Group. He spent 18 months recuperating at Valley Forge General Hospital, then resumed studies last July at Dartmouth College where he is scheduled to be graduated this June. Last fall, Frost was captain of the Dartmouth football team and recently he won the Philadelphia sportswriters' award as the most courageous athlete of the year 1945.

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