

CHAPTER III -- THE AGE OF DARKNESS

We was rotten 'fore we started -- we was never disciplined;
We made it out a favor if an order was obeyed.
Yes, every little drummer 'ad 'is rights an' wrongs to mind,
So we had to pay for teachin' -- an' we paid.

From Rudyard Kipling's
"That Day"

The decade between the end of World War II and the post-Korea prolapse was dominated by democratization of the Army and deemphasis of distasteful military pursuits. The Four Freedoms, mom's apple pie and the right to boo the Dodgers prevailed over all.

Distinctions between elite and hoi polloi were dulled or disappeared. Privates shrank to less than 18 percent of the active Army strength.¹ Rangers were disbanded. Paratroopers lost their go-to-hell uniforms. Pinks and greens went into mothballs, and everyone sported O.D.'s.*

Abuses of power during World War II evoked a deafening hue and cry before the ink was dry on the German surrender. Congress and the Press were deluged with factual and fanciful complaints of in-Service inequalities, castes and allegedly rampant incompetence.

Investigations were raised, and injurious reforms ensued.

The strait-laced Articles of War were junked in favor of a lady-like UCMJ. Commanders were sheared of promotion and reduction

* Mandatory for formations only.

authority; reward and punishment henceforth were bestowed impersonally from the summit of Mount Olympus. By the time the dust settled, it took an Act of Congress to winnow out dead wood.

With the fine edge of discipline blunted, NCO's found it harder and harder to make their orders stick. Who has much time for Sergeants who've been told to be one of the boys? Ramrods fought the problem, but weaklings hopped on the gravy train and rode to the end of the line.

Professionalism slowly was dying. The Army once had been a religion -- now it was just a meal ticket, another way to make a buck. Devotion to duty above family or self became rare enough to excite special attention. After all, most "New Army" noncoms were married, and no longer lived with their men. They were shooting for early retirement. Hardly anyone was in for the whole ride.

By the mid-1950's, the officer RIF* program glutted top enlisted ranks with cheerless commissioned rejects who filled every room in the inn. These cast-offs mixed with other NCO's like cats going over Niagara Falls in a barrel.

As quality plummeted, the tempo really picked up. Gone were the days when scruffy Willie said to Joe, "I wanna long rest after th' war. Mebbe I'll do a hitch in the Regulars."² The 30-hour day was in vogue. Non-commissioned officers began to rotate from unit to unit faster than turnstiles were clicking at Yankee Stadium, unable to identify with any one outfit or to develop well-oiled teams.

* Reduction in Force.

Faint hearts, faced with rapid-fire changes in tactics and technology, leaned more and more heavily on their officers.

Standards continued to drop.

Commanders lost faith and trust.

Responsibility and authority were withdrawn.

The Age of Darkness closed in.

* * * * *

Most sensitive intellectuals had fled the Army by early 1946, leaving once again a hard, professional core.

These lads had to be hard, for it sure was tough to get in. Nobody switching from AUS to Regular Army was entitled to mustering out pay, travel pay, transportation for dependents or shipment of household goods until terminal separation from the Service. And pending legislation, AUS enlisted men pocketed no reenlistment bonus. Former Regulars got a pittance based on permanent grade --which for many temporary Master Sergeants was Private or PFC.³

Re-up rates sank clear out of sight (Figure 11).⁴ Scarcely 400 standbys shipped over in August '45, and only 90 were RA.

Regulations were hastily amended 14 September 1945. Thereafter, things began to pick up,⁵ but applicants still were chary; half committed their futures for less than two years.⁶

These men cottoned to Service discipline. Some who got out did not. Once freed from the shackles of military restraint, every runny-nosed ragamuffin nursing a real or imagined grievance against his former boss indulged in a wildly emotional enema, wherein half-truths and inconsequential buried the few deserving facts.

"PUTTING UP WITH OFFICERS WAS THE WORST THING IN THE WAR,"⁷
blared the headlines.

"NYLON SALES TO OFFICERS ONLY"⁸

"RED CROSS GIRLS GO WITH OFFICERS JUST BECAUSE OF REGULATIONS"⁹

"GI'S SKIP CHURCH TO AVOID THE BRASS"¹⁰

"MILITARY 'CASTE' SYSTEM DIVIDES OFFICERS AND GI'S EVEN IN DEATH"¹¹

No doubt, there had been some malfeasance, but this pogrom was a poor cure. Lashing out maliciously against the Officer Corps, the Army's assailants inadvertently castrated an innocent bystander: the professional NCO.

The funny thing is, no General in his right mind would consider substituting sawdust for gun-powder, no matter how great the duress, but beset by civilian critics, Army policy-makers were brow-beaten into replacing rough-hewn leaders with Pristine Prissy's raised on pap.

Degeneration got under way in March 1946, when the War Department convened two special investigative bodies to look into officer-enlisted man relationships and the whole field of military justice.

One was the little-understood and much-reviled Doolittle Board, chaired by ebullient Jimmy Doolittle, whose audacious raid on Tokyo in April 1942 had captured the hearts of the nation. Five of its six members had outstanding combat records. Two won Medals of Honor. Four were, or had been, enlisted men.¹² Their motives were beyond reproach.

The group worked fast. In two months, it interviewed 42 witnesses, studied more than 1,000 letters and produced the final report.

Most of the 14 unanimous recommendations based on this remarkably biased and slender sample were unassailable, like being for Motherhood and against Sin.

Who can argue against improving the Officer Corps? Or better pay and allowances? Who can deny that both enlisted and commissioned personnel should be held "equally liable for errors and faults, (and) that the higher the rank, the more severe be the punishment?" Who would deprive enlisted men the right to sit on military courts -- except perhaps other GI's, who've found to their everlasting sorrow how unsympathetic their peers can be?¹³

Five seemingly innocuous, but explosively controversial, exceptions reportedly let down indispensable bars.

First, the Board suggested that "all military personnel be allowed, when off duty, to pursue social patterns comparable to our democratic way of life," and reinforced this with the belief that the Army should erase "all statutes, regulations, customs and traditions which discourage or forbid social association of soldiers of similar likes and tastes, because of military rank." Further, the Board recommended "that the hand salute be abandoned off Army installations and off duty, except in occupied territories and under conditions....necessary to properly convey military dignity to local populations." Close contact and association with civilians was to

"be encouraged and maintained, since a mutual exchange of information will enhance the military organization."¹⁴

To tie it all up with a pink ribbon, the authors advocated increased powers for Inspectors General, with findings "transmitted to the War Department outside regular command channels, in addition to normal procedures, in order to eliminate political aspects of control...."¹⁵

Under trying circumstances, it seems, the Doolittle Board did little. Its report was rational and moderate, in no way, shape or form an invitation to go ape. Fraternization was to be catch-as-catch-can, off-duty, with no compulsion involved, and no one need fear inspections, unless his nest is foul.

More direct intervention in affairs of law and order sprang from the nearly-forgotten War Department Advisory Committee on Military Justice, which met concurrently with the Doolittle Board, discovered that sentences imposed during World War II "were frequently excessively severe, and sometimes fantastically so," and recommended safeguards be supplied.¹⁶

After further study, more than one third of the Articles of War (AW) consequently were over-hauled, effective February 1949. Many changes were procedural, but a couple are germane to this case.

New AW 88 put the quietus on conniving commanders and appointing authorities behind the scenes who were tempted to tip Blind Justice's scales. Denying them the privilege to "censure, reprimand or admonish (any court) or...member thereof, with respect to findings

or sentence"¹⁷ may have diluted discipline -- but so did outlawing the cat-o'-nine-tails.

Juggling company punishment was another matter (Figure 12).

The King James version of AW 104, dated 1920, seized transgressors where the hair was curly and short. With this blunt instrument, company commanders could work a man over good, orally tearing great strips from his tender hide before slapping him with loss of privileges, extra fatigue, restriction and hard labor without confinement for "not to exceed one week." Seven days really ain't a very long time, but it gave recipients ample opportunity to contemplate past sins, for no civilized stipulations prevented pouring on the punishment for many hours a day.¹⁸

Then, one fine morning, Army Company commanders awoke to find that the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), still hot from the press, had stealthily clipped their wings. Non-judicial chastizement could be imposed for two weeks in lieu of one -- but beyond admonition or reprimand, a single penalty was allowed, instead of a string, and extra duty limits were cut to a brace of hours per day.¹⁹

To counterbalance this humane gesture, framers of the UCMJ slyly slipped in the right to bust wrong-doers "to the next inferior grade, if the grade from which demoted was established by the command (concerned) or an equivalent or lower command."²⁰

Too bad, Jack. This well-meaning assault on the pocketbook backfired.

You see, by 1949, the company commander had precious little authority to pull anybody's stripes, above a PFC.

In the "Old Army," C.O.'s with a mind to unseat noncoms for misconduct or inefficiency simply had a fireside chat with the appointing authority, who, quite perfunctorily, would examine the facts "through a board of officers, or by similar methods, if he so elected....to determine....whether or not there (was) just cause for termination of the appointment."²¹

Nearly always, the answer was "yes." After all, as former Chief of Staff Matthew B. Ridgway so tersely points out, "if an officer is fit to lead men in combat, he surely must be assumed to have the character and judgment to discipline them in time of peace."²²

Post World War II redresses changed all that.

By early 1946, appointing authorities, whether they liked it or not, were duty-bound to designate an investigating board comprising "a minimum of three disinterested officers." If reduction were disallowed, regulations demanded that either the immediate commanding officer or the NCO concerned be shipped out!²³ Apparently, the old maids who dreamed that one up had second thoughts, because AR 615-5 mercifully was amended within two months, specifying that Himself could stay, but the noncom had to go.²⁴

This tediously drawn-out process doubtlessly served some useful purpose. It curtailed arbitrary autocracy exploited by a perverse few, but capable company commanders were placed in the position of parents who had to wait for the Minister's nod at Sunday dinner before switching a sassy child.

* Author's italics.

More important, from the enlisted point of view, reduction was a permanent or protracted debility. Top grades were heavily over-strength everywhere, and with the advent of major command promotion ceilings, plus minimum time-in-grade, local commissioned leaders no longer had control. Below the level of Master Sergeant, NCO's were frozen in place like mammoths in glacial ice.²⁵

In this context, it took a Solomon's Judgment to make punishment fit the crime. And since stripping stripes encouraged mountainous debts, moonlighting, AWOL's and other infractions, border-line offenders often were let off scott free.

In short, massive retaliation in the guise of courts-martial or non-judicial reduction was scant comfort to discomfited company commanders, who yearned for more flexible response.

However, let us lay to rest, now and forever, the myth that either the Doolittle Board or the UCMJ, single-handedly or in concert, brought about the demise of discipline in a 171-year-old institution as firmly established as the U.S. Army. That dubious honor must be laid at the doorstep of a national frame of mind.

It wasn't so much what the new regulations said as it was how they were viewed. The Army was afraid of its shadow, and was constantly walking on eggs. Commanders lived in fear of censure, and to avoid any possibility of mishap, held all reins tightly in hand.

This produced some untenable problems.

Soldiering, first, last and always, is a man's business, and when an outfit's combat serviceable, its members are apt to be

boisterous. That's natural. You can't spend 12 hours a day teaching healthy young animals to knock hell out of things, and expect a house full of fops after Taps.

Once upon a time, as greybeards dimly recall, noncoms were firmly in charge. But under the new regime, Sergeants -- once chosen to sit at the right hand of God because of singular ability to soldier and make jar-headed Privates see things the Army way -- now shrank from shouting at psychoneurotic yardbirds because it might get them in a jam. Under a smoke screen of simpers and silly smirks, they simply chided roughnecks for being rude, and sent them on their way.

Let's face it. The once vaunted backbone of the Army was afflicted with a slipped disc.

Some Sergeants, realizing the score, started to hob-knob with the boys, hoping -- vainly -- to weedle cooperation by winning popularity contests. Junior officers, in turn, decided that the better part of valor was to refrain from posting distasteful orders.

This was very democratic and pleasant, but of course it didn't work. T-5's crowded the NCO Club, where real noncoms once sipped their beer, and soldiers told Sergeants to "blow it!"

Why not?

There's nothin' very sacrosanct about three-stripers who snore in the squad room, fall in at the tail of the chow line and hustle for a seat in the mess hall amid the maddening crowd.

The hell of it is, the upper crust was scarcely affected. Generals still gloried in position, pomp and ceremonies. Surrounded

by old school professionals, largely field grade, some still thought their rod was iron.

Secretary of War Kenneth C. Royal, in a supplement to his annual report just one year before North Korean tanks and infantry ruptured the 38th Parallel, reflected the national mood. "While many things remain to be done," he intoned, "statistical indications on morale, morals and good health give a picture of an American Army which, although not the largest in the world,...is quite possibly the best peacetime Army ever seen in history."²⁶

Admissions to hospital, venereal disease and courts-martial rates were less than half those of World War II, he declared proudly, "in great measure through application of a broad program of character development carried on by the religious, educational, recreational and administrative agencies of the Army, aided by parallel national and intra-Army efforts to guide the soldier in his career and improve (living) conditions...thus strengthening his dignity as an individual."²⁷

Good show.

Rescue operations in the snowbound Far West, flood control, housing and integration were the towering problems. Training was not even mentioned.²⁸ During this period, Class "A"'s were the duty uniform for the 82d Airborne Division, the Army's most mobile strategic reserve.

Such peaches and cream were hard to stomach, though, when served simultaneously with Secretary Royal's basic report the year before.

Volunteer forces had failed to cut it, necessitating the first real peacetime draft in U.S. history. And we took the culls of the crop. Minimum General Classification Test score requirements receded to a bed-rock 70 -- in contrast with the Navy and newly-independent Air Force, which held the line at 87 and 90 respectively.²⁹ Yet when over-all strengths reached the low water mark in mid-1948, non-commissioned ranks burst at the seams:³⁰

	<u>July 1947</u>	<u>June 1948</u>	<u>Difference</u>
1st Sgt	23,264	24,106	+ 842
M/Sgt			
T/Sgt	19,552	24,579	+ 5,027
S/Sgt	42,753	49,959	+ 7,206
T-3			
Sgt	68,572	71,533	+ 2,961
T-4			
Cpl	113,668	93,973	- 19,695
T-5			
PFC	173,625	136,395	- 37,230
Pvt	<u>133,527</u>	<u>83,516</u>	- <u>50,011</u>
Total	574,961	484,061	- 106,972

During this same sad time, ever-increasing "requirements for essential operations and special tasks (plus) an enormous turn-over... made effective unit training virtually impossible. General Reserve units could undertake company or battalion exercises only by consolidating all available regimental personnel into one battalion."³¹

Strictest economy permitted Exercise ASSEMBLY at Camp Campbell, Kentucky during FY 47, the first full-scale division maneuver since World War II. The three other exercises in CONUS and Alaska were combat command or battalion-sized affairs, "substituted for the planned full-scale corps maneuvers."³²

In short, officers and NCO's, who were fire-hardened veterans in 1945, had been permitted to forget their battle drill. For five years, in the opinion of combat historian S.L.A. Marshall, they had been victims of "training and information programs balanced so as to suggest that from total World War II experience had come no special values to be treasured and circulated....Of the materials produced by the Army's I&E Division, approximately 90 percent were altogether tangential to the Army's past achievement and future fighting purpose, and dwelt upon topics which might have been of equal interest, or inconsequence," to drug store cowboys remote from military ranks.³³

Louis Johnson, the economy-minded Secretary of Defense, then shook the Army further back on its haunches by announcing his intention to pare over a billion bucks from the next year's budget to extirpate the fat.³⁴

On the eve of commitment in Korea, the new legions still bore old names and displayed long-revered colors. Their regimental mottos boasted "Always Forward" and "Can Do". But when Task Force Smith, the sacrificial lamb, was thrown to the Communist lions on 5 July 1950, it was immediately and painfully evident that the quest for Camelot had failed. The pampered, undisciplined, egalitarian Army U.S. society forced upon us was unveiled as a soft and hollow shell.³⁵

Out-numbered, out-maneuvered, out-gunned and out-trained, senior noncoms stuck by their guns, but many younger ones melted away. Crew-served weapons were abandoned to the foe -- machineguns, recoilless rifles and mortars. Straggling groups of infantry fleeing

east to Ansong threw away everything loose, helmets, shirts and shoes in some cases. Task Force Smith dead and wounded were left in the pelting rain.^{36*}

The Late Company "A", 34th Infantry fared little better the following day. Its soldiers bore RA serial numbers, but they lacked "Old Army" style. On first contact, only squad and platoon leaders pulled a trigger; during the entire engagement, less than half the company ever squeezed off a round.³⁷

Before long, the term "bug-out"^{**} was coined.

Don't sneer.

This was the legacy of permissiveness. Privates and untried NCO's now learned in the School of Hard Knocks that -- contrary to mid-century amateur sociologists -- it's the soldier's lot to suffer, and his destiny may be to die. Some learned their lessons too late.

Fortunately, the view wasn't all that drab.

Having been repressed for half a decade, top noncoms quickly bounced back. As chronicler Marshall saw it, nearly all were mature combat veterans, less disposed than their World War II predecessors "to wait for official approval before taking local decision in an emergency situation. In consequence....the ranks (got) better personal direction, and officer time (was) less monopolized by attention

* Account corroborated in January 1967 by LTC John J. Doody, then a rifle platoon leader with Task Force Smith.

** "Bug-out" actually was in general use among U.S. troops garrisoned in Japan prior to the Korean War. In that environment, it meant to go AWOL.

to small detail. It can be said without exception, that in every outstanding company performance included in (my operations research) survey, there was conspicuous participation by a number of NCO leaders."³⁸

These mainstays soon developed relationships with company officers similar to those of their fathers in Pershing's AEF -- not palsy-walsy, buddy stuff, but comraderie built on mutual respect.³⁹ Dour paratroop First Sergeant Roberts -- since sainted and gone to his reward -- scoffed at wet-eared subalterns commanding companies, until he met his match in Black Irish Rudy Tamez, a no-nonsense throw-back to "Old Army" pros, and holder of a DSC. "I'll command this outfit," snapped the Lieutenant at his glowering Top Kick, "but I damn well expect you to run it!" Within a month, Roberts publically avowed that if he had to choose between Tom and his loving bride, he'd take the Loot every time. "You can always get another woman," he quipped, "but a good company commander's hard to find."

Naturally, even these stalwarts had their drawbacks. "There is a continuing prodigal waste of equipment, due (mainly) to the lack of an insistant discipline," reported Marshall. Small arms care proved fair, but Army noncoms failed to make this a universal "point of pride, as in the average Marine fighter in Korea." Bayonets, grenade launchers, mines and trip flares all were discarded along the trail as soon as the going got rough. Some artillery battalions had to collect hand grenades during slack periods as a matter of self defense; otherwise, feeble-minded cannon-cockers let them roll free

in vehicles until "the pins shock loose, and the unit was minus a truck."⁴⁰ Not to mention everything else within a 10-yard radius.

The chronic state of mind seemed to be, "if we leave it, we can get more of it later on. This....enabled the enemy to use much of our material against us, since he invariably (came) back over the same ground."⁴¹

As the war wore on, and discipline picked up, perennial organizational problems still remained to plague NCO's.

During the rapid expansion, temporary enlisted promotions once again were authorized "without regard to local grade vacancies or major command promotion ceilings," provided time-in-grade or time-in-service requirements were met.⁴²

In addition, commanders of infantry TCE regiments and separate battalions, including airborne and armored infantry, were encouraged to promote "non-commissioned officers to fill vacancies which exist.... for 60 days, regardless of major command ceilings or major unit Tables of Organization and Equipment."^{43*} Presto! The thumb was out of the dike. As in World War II, a lot of soft-shoe artists who couldn't tell an aiming stake from a rusty field range got stripes just because they were there. Some experts pulled this neat stunt twice.

As it turned out, quickie promotions fit well in the scheme of things. Rifle companies which faced the Chinese at Hyesanjin, and later along the Han, knighted squad leaders with the same glorified pay grade reserved for lordly First Sergeants eight short years

* Author's italics.

before. Corporals now were nothing -- riflemen, gunners and second cooks (Figure 13).⁴⁴ Half of the unit were NCO's.


By this time, every enlisted man above the grade of PFC was a bona fide NCO. Technicians had evaporated in 1948, along with Sergeant Buck. Editors of the Infantry Journal were conned into defending this sacrilege on grounds that it gave Corporals "the authority, prestige and pay of the former grade of line Sergeant," and swore up and down that the new structure significantly embellished the stature of Privates and PFC's!⁴⁵

How everlastingly amusing.

On the contrary, all sorts of dime store gee-gaws were needed to connote leadership and command. Little green tabs were affixed on epaulets;⁴⁶ multi-colored NCO chevrons were introduced -- blue on gold denoting combat career fields, gold on blue for others -- but in three years this gimmick was dropped.⁴⁷ In any event, such tactics ducked the real issue, for they had meaning only in tactical organizations.

Warrant Officers (Unit Administrator) were the frosting on the cake. In theory, these mimeograph crankers relieved company and battery C.O.'s from the onus of paperwork, but in fact, they inserted an insufferable idling gear between two essential pinions of the military machine: the Old Man and his Top. First Sergeants, once the trusty right hand, were by-passed, their prerogatives trimmed, their influence weak and wan.⁴⁸

Small wonder that the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed alarm at the "growing lack of confidence...in military service as a



3. Non-commissioned watchman in Korea. This Sergeant, whose primary duty on the Nakdong River Line was repairing watches, epitomizes the plight of the NCO Corps before the advent of Specialists.

worthwhile and respected career." President Eisenhower himself reiterated this concern on 30 April 1953, and the Womble Committee was born.⁴⁹

Findings submitted five months later to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel isolated four substantial causes, not the least of which was diminution of leadership and military authority.⁵⁰

The Chairman may have been a Navy Admiral, but his analysis sure made sense: restore officer and NCO command authority; eliminate over-supervision; emphasize leadership, as distinguished from technical skills; revise the UCMJ; make discipline more stringent; radically reduce the number of MOS's.⁵¹

The first follow-up reform, in 1955, was a reincarnation of the bankrupt technician program which got the deep six a scant seven years before. This time, incumbents were called specialists.

The mission was to separate troop leaders from the common herd, not just in the ground gaining arms, but Army-wide. Non-commissioned officer chevrons were reserved for kickers of backsides and takers of names; specialists got the bird.⁵²

Four grades only were involved:⁵³

First Sergeant	E-7	Master Specialist
Master Sergeant		
Sergeant First Class	E-6	Specialist First Class
Sergeant	E-5	Specialist Second Class
Corporal	E-4	Specialist Third Class

Tables of Organization and Distribution were screened to determine who would get the axe. This was a matter of excruciating

concern, since NCO's were to outrank all other enlisted men. Regulations exempted the top two specialist grades from fatigue and guard, "except in unusual circumstances," but this loophole nevertheless raised the spectre of technical patriarchs shootin' snipes 'round the Day Room before Reveille under the baleful eye of some Corporal with less time in chow lines than they had in pay lines. Much jostling for position ensued, as former noncoms entrapped in newly-created specialist slots were given a chance to rebutt.⁵⁴

This well-meaning scheme was basically sound, but in practice, it whelped some perils.

Only a handful of E-7's or E-6's ever were converted, on the speculation that most high mucky-mucks lead. Unfortunately, this was not -- and is not -- so.⁵⁵

At the other end of the spectrum, planners rashly excommunicated Corporals, who nearly disappeared.⁵⁶ Rifle companies lost all but three, a trio of machinegunners who doubled as Assistant Squad Leaders in each of the Weapons Squads.⁵⁷ Reduction of these junior noncoms had a discouraging effect throughout the Army, for young leaders must be brought along -- they don't suddenly emerge full-bodied at Grade E-5,* like Venus from the sea.

This prototype specialist program helped, but it did nothing to loosen the log jam at the top.

In the name of Reduction in Force (RIF), more than 5,000 Reserve Officers were passed over the second time for temporary

* Then one of the first three grades.

promotion to Captain, Major or Lieutenant Colonel during FY 55 alone, and were released from active duty.⁵⁸ Custed officers whose service began prior to 22 March 1948 were offered automatic appointments as Master Sergeants; those on active rolls fewer years were promised one grade less.⁵⁹

Not every Riffie accepted, of course, but many, seeking to protect retirement equities, were quick to snap at the bait. Heavy infiltration of upper enlisted ranks continued until April 1957, when even the most Doubting Thomases drew back from the havoc wreaked. Subsequent rejects were lucky to get an E-5.⁶⁰

Fifty-six months after the last throat was cut in Korea -- February 1958 -- the Army was bedeviled with more Master Sergeants and Sergeants First Class than we had at the height of the war (Figure 14).⁶¹ During the same time frame, total enlisted strength sagged by nearly half.

* * * * *

Most First Three Graders on active duty today are products of this period. They've lived through ignominy and grinding despair. Those who survived with their principles, loyalty, drive, spirit and professional integrity intact did so because of great personal character and initiative.

They owe little thanks to the Army.

FIGURE 11
ENLISTMENT RATES, AUGUST-DECEMBER 1945

	<u>Regular Army</u>	<u>Total*</u>
August	90	438
September	13,189	13,442
October	91,725	91,962
November	184,099	185,242
December	<u>107,004</u>	<u>107,807</u>
Total	396,107	398,891

<u>Length of Enlistment</u>			
<u>One Year</u>	<u>18 Months</u>	<u>Two Years</u>	<u>Total</u>
121,499	67,059	2,702	191,260

<u>Cross-Section of Branches Selected</u>			
<u>Air Corps</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Artillery</u>
92,000	26,000	4,000	9,000

* Note: 74 percent of all reenlistments were Privates and PFC's.

FIGURE 12
 COMPARISON BETWEEN ARTICLE OF WAR 104 (PRE-1949)
 AND UCMJ ARTICLE 15 (1951)
 (SELECTED EXTRACTS)

Article of War 104. Disciplinary Powers of Commanding Officers.
 Under such regulations as the President may prescribe, the Commanding Officer of any detachment, company or higher command may, for minor offenses, impose disciplinary punishment upon persons of his command without the intervention of a court-martial, unless the accused demands trial by court-martial.

The disciplinary punishments authorized by this article may include admonition, reprimand, withholding of privileges for not exceeding one week, extra fatigue for not exceeding one week, restriction to certain specified limits for not exceeding one week, and hard labor without confinement for not exceeding one week, but shall not include forfeiture of pay or confinement under guard.

Paraphrased Annotations

1. The punishments described are not exclusive of all others, but any punishment not mentioned must be similar to those named.
2. Kitchen police is military duty, but it is in the nature of fatigue, and may be imposed as punishment under this Article.
3. Following punishments are not authorized: contributions to unit funds; reduction in grade; punishments which tend to degrade rank, as fatigue or hard labor in the case of NCO's; military duties, such as extra training.

UCMJ Article 15. Non-Judicial Punishment. Under such regulations as the President may prescribe, any commanding officer may, in addition to or in lieu of admonition or reprimand, impose one of the following disciplinary punishments for minor offenses without the intervention of a court-martial:

Upon (enlisted men) of his command — withholding of privileges for not more than two consecutive weeks; restriction to certain specified limits, with or without suspension from duty, for not more than two consecutive weeks; extra duties for not more than two consecutive weeks, and not more than two hours per day, holidays included; reduction to the next inferior grade, if the grade from which demoted was established by the command or an equivalent or lower command.

FIGURE 13
 ORGANIZATION, INFANTRY RIFLE COMPANY
 1950




FIGURE 13 (CONTINUED)

ENLISTED STRENGTH*

1st Sgt	1
M/Sgt	4
SFC	19
Sgt	20
Cpl	54
PFC	83
Pvt	23
Recruit	<u>0</u>
Total	204


* Notes:

1. Both 1st Sgt and M/Sgt are E-7.
2. Sgt (E-6) corresponds to, and wears same insignia as, former S/Sgt.
3. Newly-established rank of Recruit is a basic Private.

FIGURE 14

ENLISTED GRADE STRUCTURE

JUNE 1952 VERSUS FEBRUARY 1958



* 690 Master Specialists too few to show.