

CHAPTER VII -- THE COMICAL CHEVRON SWEEPSTAKES

It ain't the things you don't know
What gets you in trouble --
It's the things you knows for sure
What ain't so.

Uncle Remus

Pubescent Colonels, the terror of flak-filled skies, manned crack AAF fighter groups with unequalled dash and élan during the darkest days of the air war over Hitler's Fortress Europe. Their kill records were Goering's despair. Some of the sauciest of all World War II pursuit pilots were in the swing: Zemke, Gabreski, Shilling and colorful Walker Mahurin -- great aces every one. In the hamlet of Halesworth, neighboring an aerie on the wind-swept East Anglia coast, one puckish pub posted notice that no 23-year-old Colonel would be admitted without his parents.

Militarily, these prodigies were infant marvels.

Militarily, some were also freaks.

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Nevertheless, the Army has struggled spasmodically to top the AAF's record ever since. Failure follows failure, but personnel staffers in DA never seem to say die.

Precocious promotion policy is the most persistent ploy, for having ginned up preposterous organizations, Pentagon pundits seem

to be perennially convinced that each slot must be filled by men in the authorized grades.

Unhappily, "gittin' thar fustest with the mostest" don't necessarily apply sagaciously to enlisted promotions. Rollicksome rookies with their collar insignia on backwards are propelled into non-commissioned prominence when they oughta be out cuttin' weeds with a messkit knife.

Ten years ago, Cordiner and his henchmen were aghast that "the average man progress(ed) from pay grade E-1 to E-2 in less than one year."¹

Sakes alive!

Private John Doe now may pass PFC in 60 days,² and doughty Draftees in Vietnam, only recently dragged kicking and screaming into the ranks, can make Sergeant well before the calendar ticks off twelve months.³

Such frivolity was unthinkable in the "Old Army," when grooming gifted NCO's was like training professional fighters. Dempsey, Tunny, Louis and Marciano knocked over a lot of set-ups on the way to the crown -- young noncoms in the '30's did too. It took three years or more to don even one stripe, but brother, that day you arrived. PFC's were assistant squad leaders.

Distorted enlisted grade structure and huge over-strengths at the top, combined with pulsating expansion and contraction of the military establishment, effectively changed all that.

Since Anno Domini 1940,, the enlisted promotion train has careened down the track with a drunken engineer, alternately speeding up, then slamming on the brakes, keeping non-commissioned passengers off balance or pitching them from their seats. The most splendid effect was achieved during the period after Korea, when the Feckless Flier came completely uncoupled -- half the cars roared recklessly on, while the rest were fixed firmly in place.

Creation of two Super Grades did little to restore control. Draftee drifters and first-term RA's revelled in advancement opportunity, but promotions above grade E-5 remained as scarce as Sam Browne belts: ⁴⁻⁷

	<u>FY 59</u>	<u>FY 60</u>	<u>FY 61</u>	<u>AFS* in Yrs</u>
E-9	670	995	888	19.6
E-8	2,901	5,233	4,105	17.7
E-7	2,866	2,812	4,674	15.0
E-6	5,376	3,762	7,434	11.0
E-5	29,612	24,081	31,278	4.7
E-4	148,611	125,376	129,920	2.5
E-3	232,607	224,485	214,129	1.0 (+) (-)

Sergeant Buck, having been led down the garden path by the lure of pie-in-the-sky, suddenly ran into a brick wall; cliques at E-6 and E-7 might as well have been posted "OFF LIMITS." Squishing through the mud as a small potatoes fire team leader may be "the natural school for....aggressive soldier(s) who (haven't) yet quite enough finish to lead (a) full squad,"⁸ as SLAM Marshall once pointed out, but not year after profitless year -- there's not that much room to grow. No one

* Active Federal Service figures are average for early 1960's. Men on horseback cut time to E-5 'most in half.


becomes a non-commissioned paragon in Limbo leading three or four lost souls.

The way out led through devious promotion paths that worked like a dollar slot machine in a joint where odds strongly favored the house. Line up time-in-grade, time-in-service, position vacancy and a genuine quota with the Top Kicker's blessing, the Old Man's recommendation and a Board decision, and then maybe -- just maybe -- you hit the jackpot. If DA didn't pop some outsider into the chair first.⁹ Anything less rang up lemons. Lord Fauntleroy could be a model boy three years hand-running, but let him get a D/R for spittin' on the sidewalk three days before the list went to press, and he was dead as a Dewey sticker.

To readjust this Rabelaisian jumble, Department of the Army proudly produced an even more complicated machine in May 1966,^{*} but ambivalently shot holes in its product (Figure 26). Two waivers immediately were authorized, back-to-back -- for time-in-grade, time-in-service, education or physical fitness -- in any combination. Promotion Qualification Scores (PQS) 35 percent under the published norm of 110 soon will be in the offing.^{10**}

* Far more complex than enlisted promotions in the "Old Army" or the commissioned officer system today.

** The original target date of 5 February 1967 subsequently was extended to 30 June by DA Message. The PQS, compiled from MOS examinations and the Commander's Evaluation Report, is pegged by DA so that approximately one third of all EM tested register 110 or above. Proposed substitution of 70 as a criteria for promotion is droll -- 95 to 97 percent beat that score, depending on MOS. Quintly, the performance of each man is evaluated at his present grade, rather than at the level to which he aspires, thus curtailing usefulness in relation to promotion. The tests, incidentally, make little differentiation between Specialist and NCO.12-14



7. Professional NCO in the 1960's, Special Forces Master Sergeant Stanley S. Reed - jungle fighter, mountaineer, multi-linguist and unconventional warfare expert.

That same month, just before the end of the Fiscal Year, Department of Defense parcelled out bonus promotion allocations to the four Services. DA disseminated its share to world-wide commands, using drastically dissimilar criteria.¹¹

In Vietnam, forces facing Charlie were bemused, but delighted. The 25th Infantry Division, with no clue to the rationale, fell heir to 10 E-7, 26 E-8 and 3 gratis E-9 permits in May, plus further windfalls in June. As the Division Adjutant General noted, all "were in addition to the regular quotas," and neither "position vacancies (nor) DA cancelled requisition items (were) required." In fact, the AG continued, "personnel eligible for appointment against position vacancies during the months of May and June 1966 (were) not eligible for appointment against the special quotas."¹⁵

This strange procedure produced some strange results.

To wit, the Division Signal Battalion's Acting Sergeant Major, whose name had been tossed in the pot for official approval, was left in the lurch. Eventually, he got his new stripes, but not for three more months -- after second and third choices in other outfits had walked away with free ones. This sad tune echoed fairly frequently.¹⁶

DCSPER found time for some secret misgivings, too, in the hectic months that followed. Local imbalances are a common result. Headquarters, U.S. Army Air Defense Command (ARADCOM), for example, is authorized 14 E-9's and 75 E-8's. In February 1967, it was saddled with an overstrength of 68 Super Grades, largely traceable to out-of-season Christmas gifts delivered the summer before.¹⁷⁻¹⁸

Between May and October 1966, the promotion cadence really began to pick up, particularly in Vietnam. Little ole 125th Signal Battalion was given the green light to christen 3 new E-6's, 33 E-5's and 94 E-4's in one day!¹⁹

Quotas not only were available, but pressure was on to fill 'em.

In a message to all U.S. Army Vietnam (USARVN) commands on 4 October, Chesty Westy Westmoreland expressed concern over the "great difference (between) cumulative vacancies and (the) number of personnel eligible for promotion in grades E-4, E-5 and E-6," and gently chided his chillun for failure to "request quota allocations for all (eligible) personnel." He cited one glaring example:²⁰

	<u>Cumulative Vacancies</u>	<u>Eligible For Promotion</u>	<u>Actually Promoted</u>
E-6	121	165	103
E-5	1,207	444	150
E-4	3,281	1,824	575

Like many others, the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, activated with "train and retain" people the year before, scored inadequate time-in-service as the prime reason for inability to promote -- 90 percent of assigned E-4's were Johnny-Come-Latelys, hopelessly junior, even though some had "occupied E-5 TOE positions since completion of basic training."²¹ Frozen MOS's, medical evacuation, plus other administrative restrictions, accounted for a good number more.

Reluctance to promote, as opposed to inability, was another matter. Basic eligibility, in itself, doesn't mean a man is qualified. Of the organizations replying to the poll, 65 percent cited misconduct,

malfeasance or mediocre performance as reasons for refusal to promote old timers or to request waivers for soldiers on the fence. The USARVN G-1 made no attempt to secure quantitative data, so the number of duds must be surmised, but experience suggests that the number was middlin' to high.²²

Actually, General Westmoreland's worries were academic within 24 hours, for on 5 October 1966, Department of the Army disgorged a series of exceptions for Vietnam that mirthlessly mocked the rules (Figure 27).²³

Every hammerhead off the boat now is ordained PFC the minute his left foot strikes Vietnamese soil. Exclusive of the 2,256 bodies Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) is authorized to upgrade annually, without regard for position vacancies, USARV may fill open TOE/TD slots in grades E-4 through E-6, irrespective of DA quotas. Privates who put out at all thus are assured of two promotions during their one-year tour; young noncoms can bank on one.²⁴

Further, DCSPER then recognized "truly outstanding performance," by giving USARV free rein to boost two percent of authorized E-5 strength from E-4 to E-5 and one and a half percent of E-6 strength from E-5 to E-6 "as a second promotion within a 12-month period"²⁵ -- three in the case of jumps from E-4 to E-5, since the dockside hike to PFC doesn't count.²⁶ Time-in-grade and time-in-service requirements to E-5 and E-6 later were waived so that deserving NCO's, such as fire team and squad leaders, could quickly be sanctified in the authorized grade.²⁷

Under this set-up, General Westmoreland ladled out chevrons at the following rate in mid-term FY 67:²⁸

	<u>E-4</u>	<u>E-5</u>	<u>E-6</u>
Dec 66	10,106	2,581 (17)*	1,068 (8)*
Jan 67	13,155	3,150 (56)*	975 (10)*

Elsewhere around the globe, quotas continued to soar. By January 1967, they were the highest since the Korean War; 3,500 E-6's and 32,000 E-5's for that single month nearly duplicated or exceeded allocations for the entire Fiscal Years of 1959, '60 and '61 (see Page 142) -- and, of course, 1967 figures don't include Vietnam.²⁹

However, none of this solved crucial shortages in 105 engineer, medical, ordnance and signal MOS's, nor did lackluster efforts to retrieve retired enlisted experts, who long since had retreated to civilian arm chairs.³⁰

Whereupon, DCSPER ran another idea up the flag pole, just to see who'd salute: pre-packaged promotions for revitalized pensioners.

They got high-balls from more than a few.

Under provisions of this so-called "Expanded Recall Program," something like 1,000 patriots responded cheerfully to the Chief of Staff's personal supplication, in return for automatic one-grade increases to levels E-6 and E-7.³¹⁻³²

The plot then thickened -- noncoms and Specialists on active duty took a right acid view of such blatant discrimination. To avoid charges of unfair labor practice, DCSPER opened up equal privileges

* Parentheses indicate more than one promotion in 12 months. Sound judgment by practitioners has kept the proportion very small.

in July 1966 for these poor but honest lads, vouchsafing a one-grade leg-up to deserving E-5's and E-6's when they reached 20 years' service, providing their C.O. concurred.³³

Spontaneous promotions of this ilk accomplished their short-term mission late in 1966, and unobtrusively faded from view, leaving in their stead the original, colorless come-on, which still offered scant inducement to answer the call, save a chance to serve King and Country. More than 140 MOS's now are open all the way to E-9, but with "nothin' in it for me," takers have been bloody few.³⁴⁻³⁶

Accelerated advancement in response to Vietnam no doubt is well meaning, but to quote an old cliché, the road to Hell is paved with good intentions. No less an authority than Lieutenant General James Polk, present commander of U.S. Seventh Army in Germany, views quickie promotions with undisguised suspicion, warning that "we shouldn't set our sights too high or expect too much" of Sergeants who won their stripes under Vietnam's "raunchy conditions."³⁷ Numerous exceptions no doubt will prove this rule.

More important, DA's zebra derby runs the risk of clogging NCO ranks with a gaggle of half-formed enlisted leaders*, who'll be hanging on with both hands when we begin beating swords into plowshares and television sets at the end of the war.

Already we've established a trend.

* The game of "instant leaders" is equally perilous among commissioned officers, for Captains now pin on tracks after 30 months Active Federal Service.³⁸

In five brief months between 30 June and 30 November 1966, the Army added 189,978 troops. Percentages in grades E-4 and above didn't increase appreciably, but total numbers did -- and beyond E-5, most gains were NCO's. As strengths climbed rapidly, time-in-service came tumbling down (Figure 28).³⁹⁻⁴¹

This problem is partly self-adjusting, at the bottom of the heap. Of 120,000 enlisted men returning from Vietnam last year, 72,000 reportedly were in mufti almost as soon as they hit port. Soothsayers in a position to know postulate a departure rate neighboring 60 percent during 1967.⁴² Losses are mainly E-4 and below. Those remaining are professionals, or young soldiers toying with thoughts of a military career.

DCSPER is actively concerned, but apparently not enough to close the tap. Several potential counter-measures are under consideration, including reversion to permanent promotion criteria during any forthcoming reduction in force -- many Sergeants would slip back to PFC -- but no approved solution's in sight.⁴³

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Is this diatribe knocking promotion on merit?

Hell no.

If a gung-ho guy's got responsibility, he oughta draw compensatory pay.*

* Such is not always the case. Lax standards and expediency during a crisis often favor individuals whose sole qualifications consist of being the best of a poor lot.

But there's more than one way to skin a cat. Coin of the realm is great, Old Cock, but let's not cheapen chevrons to get it.

The "Old Army," in its modest way, had the right idea. Pay tables in canvas leggin' days unfortunately espoused the historical principle of longevity, which for over 100 years had provided periodic increases for cumulative service, but there was an acceptable reason: recurrent and drastic reduction of personnel strength between wars, accompanied by promotion stagnation.⁴⁴

Nevertheless, the scales made common sense. At no point in service did the pay of any rank exceed that of a higher, with the single exception of Staff Sergeant. Privates and PFC's were paid extra for commendable skills, but no one wore stripes, 'cept real non-coms. (Figure 3).⁴⁵

Cordiner's canny committee tackled remuneration problems of the "New Army" in 1956. It quickly zeroed in on procedures which permitted leeches and loonies "to receive regular periodic increases in pay for the balance of their careers, without having to achieve higher levels of performance," and put several rounds in the Five Ring labelled "pay inversions, wherein juniors receive more pay than their seniors."⁴⁶

Such defects were patently obvious, even to untrained eyes.

Since 1942, "Old Army" pay tables had deteriorated to the point that crass Corporals, without a shred of responsibility, could effortlessly rake in foggies year after vacuous year until their checks were fattened by \$96.10 over the original base (Figure 29). Eventually, these same parasites theoretically might walk off with more lettuce

than a budding Master Sergeant -- although in all honesty, it's hard to imagine an E-7 in those days with less than two years' service. More realistically, the \$120.00 Corporals drew after 16 beat SFC's who'd been in for 6.* Such absurdities afforded scant incentive for men to excel.⁴⁷

Cordiner's recommended corrective action stressed "elimination of longevity as a basis of compensation." In its place, he proposed step-in-grade increments, geared to achievement, with "a marked pay differential between grades" (Figure 30).⁴⁹

Foggies were "to span only that period in which increased effectiveness could be anticipated." Husky in-grade accretions were prescribed for postulants, particularly E-4's, but bonuses dried up to a paltry 10 samoleons a month once career men were hooked, on the premise that the carrot should be "readily recognizable to the recipient, but not so great as to reduce promotion incentive."⁵⁰

So far, so good.

However, the Committee failed to subscribe completely to its own published views, for step-increases were predicated not on merit, but on time-in-grade.⁵¹

Bagatelle.

John Q. Commonman might make E-5 in 12 months or 12 years -- it really made no difference. After six years in that grade and two prefuntory shots in the stipend, greater entitlements rated he not,

* Typical career patterns placed EM at grade E-6 after eight years. Many made it earlier.⁴⁸

unless he reared off his haunches and advanced to E-6. The whole project worked that way.⁵²

The bastardized version now in effect has opaquely missed the message (Figure 31)⁵³, despite acknowledged improvements since 1956.

Without exception, lower pay grades overlap the next higher at one or more points in time and space. Corporals still may pocket more cash than their squad leaders; antique Platoon Sergeants can outdraw youthful E-9's, when Pay Call sounds at the end of the month:⁵⁴

	<u>Floor</u>		<u>Ceiling</u>
E-9	\$510.60	E-7	\$528.60
E-8	428.40	E-7	528.60
E-7	269.40	E-5	328.80
E-6	232.20	E-4	252.60
E-5	200.40	E-4	252.60
E-4	168.60	E-3	193.80
E-3	121.80	E-1	129.00
E-2	100.50	E-1	129.00

Far from revering merit, step-increases today honor longevity, the very practice Cordiner sought to squelch. If they so choose, Golden Boys who waltz away with Sergeants insignia before they've put in a full year may sweeten their pay by \$128.40 over the next 13 without the need to add a stripe. E-7's hypothetically could vegetate profitably for 26 years, secure in the Divine Right of Kings.⁵⁵

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Manipulating basic pay tables is only one way to increase remuneration without awarding wanton stripes. As father of Proficiency Pay, Cordiner had an even better idea.

In essence, his Committee proposed an incentive program through which "selected (career) enlisted personnel could be advanced one or two pay grades above their military rank(s)." Eligibility hinged on exceptional competence in areas "critical by reason of both poor retention and high training investment." E-4's to E-8's inclusive were invited to try their hand.⁵⁶

At first blush, this seems inconsistent with his insistency that higher ranks take home higher pay.

Discrimination was the key. Scholars reading the fine print find that, in Cordiner's view, Pro Pay, "to be effective, as well as economically feasible....should encompass a relatively small percentage of selected personnel -- in the neighborhood of 15 percent" -- and that "to avoid stagnation, proficiency advances must be phased toward the computed figure over a period of at least four years."⁵⁷

This was no innovation. It revived a successful plan.

In the "Old Army," an enterprising Private, drawing First Class Specialist pay, made very nearly as much as a Sergeant; in effect, he enjoyed a three-pay grade jump without stripes (Figure 3).⁵⁸

He earned it.

Fourth Class Specialist was the peak in pre-war rifle companies, which led the simple life, and only three grunts were so fortunate. Guys in those slots were loaded for bear. Half a dozen other bravos pulled down Specialist Fifth and Sixth (Figure 2).⁵⁹ That's all there was -- there warn't no more.

"Old Army" precedent and Cordiner's preachments have unwisely been ignored.*

Proficiency Pay in 1967 is a Janus-faced monstrosity which smiles simultaneously on critical specialties and superior performance, which together embrace about 10 percent of the total enlisted population above the grade of E-2.** Criteria are different, standards are different, pay is different for the two categories, but results are much the same: defamation of what might be a very good thing.⁶¹⁻⁶²

The more exclusive of this mis-matched pair -- Proficiency Pay (Specialty) -- really isn't Pro Pay at all. In truth, it's compensation for merely being adequate in any one of 149 vital military occupations which demand "relatively long and costly training, and in which.... the supply of qualified career personnel has been, and is projected to be, inadequate to meet Army requirements." The element of selectivity within these confines is curiously AWOL.⁶³

Credentials are tol'able simple. Just be at the right place at the right time in the right MOS. Annual verification of competency is as good as rubber-stamped; the minimum passing score of 70 on evaluation tests (identical with the PQS) is attainable by nearly all.⁶⁴

Felicious fellows, mainly marvelous masters of misslery, find themselves in hawg heaven known as P-3, drawing a crisp \$100.00 extra

* By Department of Defense, as well as DA, for pay is a Service-wide matter.

** 80,756 EM, grades E-3 and above, were qualified for Pro Pay on New Year's Day 1967. 40,918 were in the Specialty bracket; the remainder were mainly in combat MOS's.⁶⁰

a month. P-2 and P-1 make do with 75 and 50 -- enough to span one or two pay grades, as Cordiner envisaged.⁶⁵

Beneficiaries of Proficiency Pay (Superior Performance) come off a poor second best. These country cousins must "have attained or exceeded the Superior Performance Qualification Score (SPQS)" announced periodically by DA -- a tougher proposition by about 20 to 90 points than the picayune prerequisite of Specialty Pay, depending on MOS.* For this, recipients are rewarded with the contemptible sum of \$30.00 a month, hardly enough for an insult.⁶⁶⁻⁶⁷

In both instances -- Specialty and Superior Performance -- other essential ingredients are missing.

There is no gradation for skill levels, experience, rank or non-commissioned status. From the sound of the first whistle, everyone in the game draws the self-same pay. Schoolboy PFC's who have yet to serve a day on the job stand just as tall as troop-leading Master Sergeants who've been filling their box of practical tricks for more than 20 years. After the initial thrill for each and all, anticipation is stone dead.⁶⁹

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Among the maxims affixed to Poor Richard's Almanac, Benjamin Franklin long ago inscribed: "Experience keeps a dear school, but fools will learn in no other."

He seems to have been overly optimistic.

* SPQS cut-off scores in January 1967 listed a high of 160 for topographic survey specialists, HAWK maintenance chiefs and acquisition radar crewmen. The low was 90.⁶⁸

After 30 years of trials, errors, experimentation and disastrous failures in fields of enlisted precedence, promotion and pay, Army policy-makers seemingly haven't learned a ~~!!?#&%~~ thing.

FIGURE 26

BASIC CRITERIA FOR TEMPORARY ENLISTED PROMOTIONS

GRADES E-4 THROUGH E-9

(As Noted, Any Two May Be Waived Until 30 June 1967)

	<u>Time-in-Grade (With Waiver)</u>	<u>Time-in-Service (With Waiver)</u>
E-9	16 Mo in E-8 (8 Mo)	18 Yr (13 Yr)
E-8	14 Mo in E-7 (7 Mo)	15 Yr (11 Yr)
E-7	12 Mo in E-6 (6 Mo)	10 Yr (7 Yr)
E-6	10 Mo in E-5 (5 Mo)	5 Yr (3 Yr)
E-5	8 Mo in E-4 (4 Mo)	2 Yr (18 Mo)
E-4	6 Mo in E-3 (3 Mo)	1 Yr (7 Mo)

Further RequirementsWaivers

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. Be in promotable status. | None. |
| 2. Unit commander must recommend or concur. | None. |
| 3. Hold, or be fully qualified for, MOS in which promotion is made; if MOS is not primary, it must be so designated at time of promotion. | None. |
| 4. Register 110 or higher on latest Promotion Qualification Score preceding advancement to grades E-5 through E-9. Score of 110 is mandatory as long as two waivers are authorized. | When one-waiver rules goes into effect, scores from 70 through 109 will be acceptable. Personnel holding MOS not evaluated by test, and E-4's for whom results not available, are exempt. |
| 5. Be serving in pay grade next below that in which promotion is to be made. Two-grade promotions are not authorized. | None. |

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|-----|--|---|
| 6. | A projected position vacancy must exist within the command, and applicant must be assigned to that position upon promotion. DA assignment instructions providing E-7, E-8 or E-9 replacements cancels vacancies concerned. | None. |
| 7. | Passing score on Physical Fitness Test for promotion to E-5 or higher. | Waivable as a single item, except that a solitary limitation in a specific geographic environment requires no waiver. |
| 8. | Complete eighth grade or General Education Development (GED) equivalent for promotion to grade E-5. Have high school diploma or GED equivalent for advancement above E-5. | Completely waivable. |
| 9. | Have security clearance required by MOS or position. National Agency Check must be complete, or SECRET security clearance granted, for promotion to grades E-7, E-8 or E-9. | None. |
| 10. | Receive recommendation from Promotion Board for advancement to grades E-5 through E-9 (optional for promotion to E-4). | None. |

Special Eligibility Criteria
For Promotion to Grades E-7, E-8 and E-9

1. Position vacancy may not be filled by promotion unless:
 - a. Replacement in grade has been requisitioned and unit notified that none is forthcoming.
 - b. Or, unit request for early cancellation has been approved.
2. Must serve at least two years in next higher grade to retire in that grade. Promotion is prohibited if subject is unable to comply before completing 30 years' active service, unless entitled to retire at a higher grade. DA may grant exceptions in best interests of the Service or if substantial hardship otherwise would result.
3. Position vacancies caused by retirement of the incumbent may be filled by promotion upon receipt of a DA quota, subject to restrictions above. Said action may not take place earlier than two months prior to effective date of retirement.

FIGURE 27

UNIQUE ENLISTED PROMOTION CRITERIA FOR VIETNAM

(Verbatim Extract From DA Message 785132, 052217Z Oct 1966)

All E-2s may be promoted to E-3 as soon as they arrive in Vietnam.

MACV may promote each month without regard to position vacancies 9 E-7s, 65 E-6s, 60 E-5s and 54 E-4s.

USARV may promote to fill local vacancies in grades E-4, E-5 and E-6 without regard to DA quotas. However, appropriate administrative controls will be instituted to insure that no individual will receive more than one such promotion in a 12-month period.

Notwithstanding this limitation, up to two percent of the authorized E-5 strength in Vietnam may be promoted from E-4 to E-5 and up to one and one-half percent of the authorized E-6 strength in Vietnam may be promoted from E-5 to E-6 each month as a second promotion within a 12 month period to recognize truly outstanding performance.

It is the intent of this provision that these promotions for outstanding performance will be allocated primarily to combat units at division level and below. The objective is to reward those individuals who are performing in an outstanding manner in leadership positions such as fire team leader, squad leader, tank commander and chief of howitzer section. This list of leadership positions is intended to be illustrative, not complete. It is believed that the existing liberal promotion allocation resulting from other current policies provides adequate opportunity to recognize outstanding performance in administrative and support tasks; so use of the provision of this paragraph for promotion of personnel in those types of duty should be rare.

With the exception of the 9 E-7 quotas to MACV, all promotions to grades E-7, E-8 and E-9 in Vietnam are controlled by DA, based on world-wide requirements.

Promotion in overstrength (frozen) MOSs is authorized on the basis of 1 out of 30 promotions for E-5s, 1 out of 25 promotions for E-6, 1 out of 20 quotas for E-7s, 1 out of 15 quotas for E-8s and 1 out of 10 quotas for E-9s.

FIGURE 28

TRENDS IN ENLISTED STRENGTH VS TIME-IN-SERVICE

30 June 1966 -- 30 November 1966

	<u>Strength</u>					
	<u>E-9</u>	<u>E-8</u>	<u>E-7</u>	<u>E-6</u>	<u>E-5</u>	<u>E-4</u>
30 Nov 66	5,087	16,217	48,540	98,076	160,897	264,487
30 Jun 66	<u>4,933</u>	<u>15,372</u>	<u>42,876</u>	<u>88,825</u>	<u>147,493</u>	<u>195,116</u>
Difference	+ 154	+ 845	+5,664	+9,215	+13,404	+69,371

Average Time-in-Service
At Time of Promotion

	<u>E-9</u>	<u>E-8</u>	<u>E-7</u>
30 Jun 66	20 Yr 6 Mo	18 Yr 2 Mo	16 Yr 0 Mo
30 Nov 66*	<u>20 Yr 3 Mo</u>	<u>17 Yr 11 Mo</u>	<u>15 Yr 7 Mo</u>
Difference	- 3 Mo	- 3 Mo	- 5 Mo

	<u>E-6</u>	<u>E-5</u>	<u>E-4</u>
30 Jun 66	10 Yr 9 Mo	5 Yr 6 Mo	2 Yr 0 Mo
30 Nov 66 *	<u>9 Yr 10 Mo</u>	<u>3 Yr 1 Mo</u>	<u>1 Yr 8 Mo</u>
Difference	- 11 Mo	-2 Yr 5 Mo	- 4 Mo

* Average for five-month period since rapid promotions began in Vietnam.

FIGURE 29
MONTHLY RATES OF ENLISTED BASIC PAY, 1956*
(In Dollars)

<u>AFS**</u> <u>In Yr</u>	<u>Pay Grades</u>						
	<u>E-1</u>	<u>E-2</u>	<u>E-3</u>	<u>E-4</u>	<u>E-5</u>	<u>E-6</u>	<u>E-7</u>
Over 26							335.40
Over 22					257.50	288.60	319.80
Over 18				218.40	241.80	273.00	304.20
Over 16				210.60	234.00	257.40	288.60
Over 14			163.80	202.80	226.20	249.60	280.80
Over 12			159.90	195.00	218.40	241.80	273.00
Over 10			156.00	187.20	210.60	234.00	261.30
Over 8		124.80	148.20	179.40	202.80	222.30	253.50
Over 6		117.00	140.40	167.70	191.10	214.50	237.90
Over 4	106.60	109.20	132.60	159.90	183.30	195.00	230.10
Over 2	98.80	101.40	117.00	140.40	163.80	187.20	222.30
Under 2	78.00***	85.80	99.37	122.30	145.24	175.81	206.39

* Top pay shown in each grade indicates maximum longevity increase.

** Active Federal Service in years.

*** Private E-1 drew \$83.20 after four months' service.

FIGURE 30
 CORDINER'S PROPOSAL FOR ENLISTED BASIC PAY*
 (Monthly Rates in Dollars)

<u>TIG**</u> <u>In Yr</u>	<u>Pay Grades</u>				
	<u>E-1</u>	<u>E-2</u>	<u>E-3</u>	<u>E-4</u>	<u>E-5</u>
4-6					230.00
2-4			117.00	180.00	220.00
0-2	78.00	85.80	99.37	140.00	210.00
	<u>E-6</u>	<u>E-7</u>	<u>E-8</u>	<u>E-9</u>	
Over 8				440.00	
6-8	280.00	330.00	380.00	430.00	
4-6	270.00	320.00	370.00	420.00	
2-4	260.00	310.00	360.00	410.00	
0-2	250.00	300.00	350.00	400.00	

* Top pay shown in each grade indicates maximum longevity increase.

** Time-in-Grade, as opposed to Time-in-Service on Figures 29 and 31.

FIGURE 31
MONTHLY RATES OF ENLISTED BASIC PAY, 1967*
(In Dollars)

AFS** In Yr	Pay Grades						
	<u>E-1</u>	<u>E-2</u>	<u>E-3</u>	<u>E-4</u>	<u>E-5</u>	<u>E-6</u>	<u>E-7</u>
Over 26							528.60
Over 22							469.80
Over 20							440.40
Over 18						387.60	434.40
Over 16						381.30	422.70
Over 14					328.80	369.60	411.00
Over 12					322.80	358.20	393.60
Over 10					311.10	340.50	381.30
Over 8					299.40	328.80	369.60
Over 6				252.60	287.70	317.40	358.20
Over 4			193.80	240.60	270.00	305.40	346.50
Over 3			182.10	222.90	258.60	293.40	334.80
Over 2	129.00	141.00	170.10	211.50	246.90	281.70	322.80
Under 2	90.60	100.50	121.80	168.60	200.40	232.20	269.40

* Top pay shown in each grade indicates maximum longevity increase.

** Active Federal Service in years.

*** Private E-1 draws \$96.90 after four months' service.

	<u>E-8</u>	<u>E-9</u>
Over 26	587.10	657.30
Over 22	528.60	599.10
Over 20	499.20	569.40
Over 18	487.20	558.00
Over 16	475.50	546.00
Over 14	463.80	534.30
Over 12	452.10	522.30
Over 10	440.40	510.60
Over 8	428.40	