OFFICER-ENLISTED MAN RELATIONSHIPS

REPORT
OF THE
SECRETARY OF WAR'S BOARD
ON
OFFICER-ENLISTED MAN RELATIONSHIPS
TO
HON. ROBERT P. PATTERSON
The Secretary of War
MAY 27, 1945

PRESENTED BY MR. THOMAS OF UTAH
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I. PURPOSE

A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The Board was directed in a memorandum dated March 18, 1946, to study officer-enlisted man relationships and to make recommendations to the Secretary of War as to changes in existing practices, laws, regulations, etc., which are considered necessary or desirable in order to improve relations between commissioned and enlisted personnel.

B. PLAN OF INVESTIGATION

The Board has concerned itself with an examination of the following:

1. Complaints and comments on lack of democracy in the Army, instances of incompetent leadership, and the abuse of privileges. Such criticism and comment were obtained from:

   (a) Prepared statements and recorded testimony of witnesses.

   Views of soldiers and civilians were obtained. The civilians included many former commissioned and enlisted personnel.

   The witnesses were selected in such a way as to procure a truly representative cross section of thinking on the subject of officer-enlisted man relationships. It is felt by the members that the testimony of witnesses who personally appeared before the Board was particularly valuable due to the opportunity for discussion which the hearings afforded.

   (b) Comments contained in over 1,000 letters received by the Board as of April 30, 1946.

   (c) Newspaper articles, editorial comment, and "Letters to the editor."

   (d) Magazine and journal articles.

   (e) Radio commentary.

2. Pertinent War Department materials which enabled the Board to know in detail the differential treatment accorded commissioned and enlisted personnel (a) based on statute, (b) manifest in regulations, and (c) of usage expressed through custom and tradition. Such materials included:

   (a) Findings contained in research studies.

   (b) Report from the Inspector General.

   (c) Policies as promulgated by the Personnel Division.

   (d) Reports from the Judge Advocate General, The Adjutant General, and other staff agencies.
Essentially the problem resolved into the following questions:
1. What were the factors that precipitated the criticism leveled against the Army after this war,particularly in reference to the subject under consideration?
2. To what extent did irregularities, injustices, abuses, etc., which allegedly occurred during the prosecution of the war, actually exist?
3. Upon what conditions and circumstances,are the difficulties of the Army system plus the personality of those in command, the combination of circumstances, plus the world-wide thinking, a world-wide need for action?
4. Keeping in mind the mission of the Army and the elements essential to accomplish this mission, what portion of the criticism is justified and what changes in the military organization and its customs, rules and regulations may be made which will achieve intelligent manpower utilization and improve relations between commissioned and enlisted personnel?

II. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

A. HISTORICAL

The American military system was originally derived from the European, specifically from the Prussian and British organizations. There is a very close relationship between the present system of our Army and that of the old continental system. In the early European system, as in our own, only those who were of the landed gentry were permitted into the officer corps. Commissions in the armed forces was purely hereditary. This practice did result in a rude system. However, in the strict sense, the "aristocracy," is appropriately applied to our Army at the present time since the selection of individuals for commissioned rank is based on hereditary principles. It is recorded that, during the trysting years of the Revolutionary War, one of the difficulties expressed by General Washington in maintaining a fighting army, pertained to strained relations between officers and men. Even in the days of the Civil War, some men in the ranks of the North and the South voiced resentment against those "aristocratic" officers who were more interested in rank and privilege, failing on occasion to concern themselves with the welfare of their men. A report of the Secretary of War during World War I, submitted by one of his assistants after a survey of conditions in the Army, called attention to these bitterness engendered among the enlisted men by special privileges accorded the officer personnel privileges that have no military significance nor which are in many instances inertial and moral influence of half their subordinates. He anticipated that, following the war, criticism would be leveled against the Army by soldiers returning to civilian status, and that much of such criticism would relate to the inequity in treatment of enlisted men as compared to officers.

5. In the wake of a second world war of global proportions, similar reaction to the Military Establishment is appearing. Concurrently with widespread discussions of demobilization, retirement and re-establishment of the armed services, a host of other problems involving both the Army and Navy and their relation to national and international issues, much is being written and spoken on the subject of officer-enlisted man relationships.

Soldiers who are conscripted into service, often against their will, are not inclined to look kindly on the life that resulted from this conscription. From the beginning, there was a manifest dislike for regimentation and for the feeling of loss of individual identity in the military machine. By reason of their historical dislike of the military system, Americans have a deep-seated feeling against and strongly resist any growth of an old-world type of military caste because such system would be out of keeping with our democratic government. Therefore, as soon as soldiers returned to civilian status, many became articulate in some vociferously and a few, outright abusive. The peak of criticism of the Army was reached in the spring of 1918.

Most of this writing is a discussion of the social distinction and resultant social privileges created by the official breach, effected by tradition and custom of the service, between commissioned and enlisted personnel.

B. DEMOCRACY AND THE ARMY

Many who were most outspoken wrote of the need for some changes in officer-enlisted man relationships in an Army whose members are citizens of a democracy. These writers and critics who understood the mission or objective of an Army, whether in peace time or in an emergency, did not argue for an abolition of rank or privileges in the military service. They understood that discipline and obedience can only be accomplished by creating rank and by giving necessary privileges to accompany increased responsibilities.

A review of the Russian experiment with their own military system, during and after the revolution of the winter of 1917-18, when the Red Army abolished rank and privileges, brings to light the fact that sufficient recognition was not given by the Russians at that time to the essentials referred to in the preceding paragraph. In subsequent re-vamping of their military system in terms of these basic principles, the pendulum swung in the other direction and the Russian officer corps now has greater prestige and privilege than before the organization was attempted and far more than accorded officers in our Army.

There were, however, other governmental changes which accompanied the changes in the Army during this period. It must be pointed out that the system of political commissars, which undoubtedly had an effect upon the military establishment, was in operation at the same time.

C. PHASES OF THE ARMY

An evaluation of real and alleged injustices, irregularities, and abuses during this war, requires some attention be directed to the phases of contemporary military history.

1. The peacetimemilitary establishment

In September 1918, the military force totaled approximately 160,000 of which about 150,000 were officers. This force was composed of individuals who chose the military service as a career; it therefore did not contain conscripts or draft. In this peacetime peacetime Army there was, in addition to the official gap between commissioned and enlisted personnel, a breach based upon the general caliber of the
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The period of mobilization preceded, in its initial stages, the actual declaration of war. It was in this period that requisition of non-military body began. Selective service was put into operation. Reserve officer were called to duty, National Guard units were ordered into the service—civilians were entering the armed forces. It is now easy to forget that the Army was being multiplied in size more than 60 times in a period of less than six months and it was inevitable in any system whatsoever. Training and organizations were speed up and demands were created which resulted in the assignment of untrained or partially trained and, in many cases, unqualified individuals to jobs of great responsibility. Some methods of prompt, quick and more efficient way to train the enlisted personnel for the Army had been receiving in its enlisted ranks those who were often far superior by training, education, and work experience, to men in the commissioned ranks. As one officer put it:

I would recognize the high average intelligence level of our enlisted personnel as a continuation asset and liability. It enables us to accomplish missions but it also becomes the problem of leadership transversely.

In addition, many men were commissioned because of their technical skill, and it was soon feared that high technical skill did not necessarily imply competent leadership ability.

5. Actual war

In this period geographical and functional variation in duties arose to be considered, i.e., the combat zone, rear areas in foreign theatres, isolated installations, and home front.

The complaints, griefs, and criticisms voiced by the Board indicated that the problem of officer-enlisted man relationships was significant in the fighting forces and personnel at the front. This was in the rear areas and isolated outposts, such as the Avantinian, and on the home front, where most of the abuses of privileges, irreverence, and poor discipline occurred. In the rear areas, men experienced the criticism might be ascribed to the following: Freedom from fear of death and more time for consideration of fewer important things, more opportunity for boredom, consequently more abuse, often, post-service, without command experience, and ability with less knowledge of human reactions and less how to deal with people and less experience with troops. In the isolated installations throughout the world, there was little chance for contact with the enemy, inadequate facilities for recreation, a general feeling of futility and frustration, surplus energy, and excessive free time, there was inevitably greater opportunity for development of strained relations between commissioned and enlisted personnel. Abuses of privilege and authority, as some of these areas, were frequent. The home front, although smaller in its contours to the rear areas overseas, did not show as much evidence of complaints and criticism. Many of these troops were new; they had not had time to formulate ideas about the Army and therefore develop dissatisfaction. Home men were not broken, as in the case of overseas troops, and soldiers were near enough to have frequent home contacts. Furthermore, there is evidence to believe that many of the men on the home front were satisfied with their lot "over here."

The postwar phase may be considered as a division into (a) dismobilization and (b) the interwar Army period. In the immediate postwar period, but, now out of combat, wanted out of the service and most of them wanted to come home. There was the clamor of those who wanted to get out and the criticisms of those who already had been separated. The criticism which began in this period of demobilization carried over into the period of the interwar Army. It is a well-known fact that among military personnel, the warts and faults and deep resentments which have been engendered by war experiences are often best expressed in outbursts against their authorities, and it must be remembered that the mass of majority consisted of conscripts. Some of the complaints, voiced by those who had been separated, were the result of deep-seated personal frustrations and individual animosity to the military in general. Some of the more service minded wanted to make known what they considered bad features of the Army in order that our Nation could avoid any repetition of them in the future. Such individuals offered constructive ideas with the hope of improving future conditions. There was also some criticism from a minority who now a chance to "get on the bandwagon" and to use this moment for advancing some selfish or ulterior motives.

During this postwar phase, note must be taken of changing concepts, social unrest, a transitory period in which training is directed toward the perfection of democratic processes, with greater emphasis on human relations, the dignity of the individual—all the result of the war years and many other factors, i.e., greater education of the masses, greater world wide dissention of information, increased speed of transportation, geographical distribution of peoples, etc.

The difficulties now encountered by the Military Establishment, in recruiting (collecting and mustering) a force to meet international and internal needs and commitments for policing defeated territories, and to care for equipment, worth billions of dollars, are indicative of strong public sentiment against certain features of the Army. Having experienced the regimentation, the distinctions and privileges which were the bane of almost, and never quite understanding the military, thousands of men who served admirably in a victorious army are now offering their protests against the existing military system.
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D. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COMMISSIONED AND ENLISTED PERSONNEL—STATES AND BENEFITS

The following facts indicate to some degree the differential between commissioned and enlisted personnel as based upon existing statutes, regulations, customs, and traditions:

1. Some of the differences based on existing statutes:

Base pay:
- For service or sea-duty pay:
  - Commissioned personnel: 10 percent increase.
  - Enlisted personnel: 20 percent increase.
- Allowance for quarters and subsistence:
  - Commissioned personnel: Subsistence allowance fixed at 70 cents per day—number of allowances depends upon pay period and dependents. Allowance for rental of quarters ranging from $4.15 to $130 per month.
  - Enlisted personnel: Value of allowance for quarters and messes, where not furnished in kind, depends on duty performed, not to exceed $5 per day, based on Presidential regulations. First three months entitled to receive monthly allowance for quarters where public quarters not available for dependents.

Family allowances for dependents:
- Commissioned personnel: No provision.
- Enlisted personnel: Dependents receive monthly allowance consisting of Government contribution and change to pay of men, amount varying with number and class of dependents.

Rental allowance: Enlisted personnel only.
Furlough travel allowance or reimbursement: Enlisted personnel only.

Travail allowance:
- Commissioned personnel: Mileage of 5 cents per mile regardless of mode of travel, transportation in kind, or monetary allowance in lieu thereof; transportation of dependents on permanent change of station for those in first three grades only; allowance of 3 cents per mile from place of discharge to home of enlistment or induction.

Arms qualifications:
- Commissioned personnel: No provision.
- Enlisted personnel: $1 to $5 per month additional compensation for special qualifications.

Parchment's pay:
- Commissioned personnel: $100 per month additional pay.
- Enlisted personnel: $50 per month additional pay.

Additional pay for decorations:
- Commissioned personnel: No provision.
- Enlisted personnel: Additional pay of $2 per month for original award of Medal of Honor, Distinguished Service Cross, or Distinguished Service Medal, and soy additions.

Expert or combat infantryman badge:
- Commissioned personnel: No additional pay authorized.
- Enlisted personnel: Entitled to additional pay of $2 per month for expert infantryman badge and $10 for combat infantryman badge.

Mustering-out pay:
- Commissioned personnel: Payment authorized to those in first, second, and third pay periods (second lieutenants, first lieutenants, and captains); none authorized for those receiving pay at a higher rate than base pay of third pay period (e.g., base pay of captain).
- Enlisted personnel: All enlisted personnel entitled to payment.

Uniform allowance:
- Commissioned personnel: $250 paid officers below the rank of major for uniform and equipment when entering on active duty. (West Point cadets graduates not authorized this allowance since they are provided a uniform allowance while at the Academy.)
- Enlisted personnel: No monetary allowance provided; clothing and uniform issued in kind.

Retirement benefits:

Considerable variance exists in payments to military personnel:

Commissioned personnel:
- For 30 years' service completed and upon request to retire, approved by Secretary of War, personnel are entitled to benefits of 75 percent. After 35 years' service completed (by AR 35-170), request may be made for retirement, and, if approved by Secretary of War, benefits vary from $3 to $4 per week of base and longevity pay for each year of service; however, as a matter of policy, Secretary of War will not approve requests of those with less than 25 years' service.
- Commissioned personnel required to retire on basis of age 60 years for all officers other than general officers; for latter, 62 and 64 years.

Enlisted personnel:
- 30 years' service completed entitled an individual to retirement benefits amounting to 25 percent; no provisions for mandatory retirement on basis of age.
- After 20 years' service completed, provisions for retirement on basis of disability, at full retirement pay.

(Notes: Retirement of commissioned personnel for disability is considerably involved and depends upon specific cases. All existing statutory provisions and regulations pertaining to retirement are under scrutiny at the present time, and changes are being considered by Congress.)

Leave or furlough:

Commissioned personnel: Granted 30 days in 1 year, and paid for money accrued leave for termination of service.

Enlisted personnel: No statutory limitations on length of furlough, no terminal-leave pay.
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In September 1943, out of a total of 166,336 men in the Army, there were 14,016 officers, male, female, warrant, and flight. The peak of commissioned strength was reached in July 1945 when the number of approximately 12,000 had grown to 877,778.

Of this latter total, only 2 percent were Regular Army officers—1 percent representing graduates of the United States Military Academy; about 2 percent were National Guard officers; about 15 percent were from the Officers' Reserve Corps—those holding commissions from ROTC units; about 12 percent represented officers commissioned directly from civilian life, such as doctors, dentists, chaplains, etc.; the total of this group of officers represented 33 percent. The balance, or 67 percent, were (a) officers commissioned through the officer candidate schools, (b) aviation cadets, (c) battlefield commissions, (d) direct commissioning of enlisted personnel, and (e) direct commissioning of warrant and flight officers. Thirty-two percent were graduates of officer candidate schools.

During the period between September 16, 1943, and April 15, 1945, a total of 6,790 officers approved before reclassification boards. Of this number, 227 were denoted, 4,133 were separated from the service, and 2,230 were reclassified. In addition to this total of 6,790, an additional 1,897 officers were reclassified without reference to a board proceeding. The total figure of 8,687 officers represents approximately 1 percent of the peak commissioned strength referred to above.

B. FINDINGS CONTAINED IN RESEARCH STUDIES CONDUCTED BY

INFORMATION AND EDUCATION DIVISION

In a post-V-J-day survey of leadership, a wide variation in the proportions of men within any one company with favorable or unfavorable attitude toward their officers ranged from as high as 40 percent favorable to as low as 10 percent favorable. Only one out of four men stated that in general their officers were of poor quality and that much better officers could have been picked. These findings indicate that there is no over-all tendency to criticize all officers indiscriminately, on the part of enlisted personnel. Specific comments about officer-enlisted man relationships may be broken down into three categories as follows:

1. Leadership practices

The attitudes of enlisted personnel tend to emphasize the need for better leadership practices, especially in regard to personal relations. In the post-V-J-day cross-section survey, 55 percent of the enlisted personnel state that few or none of their officers take a personal interest in their welfare. 52 percent state their officers did not do what they could to help the enlisted personnel. 50 percent felt their officers did not understand the enlisted men's problems or needs, and 70 percent stated their officers rarely ever or never gave recognition or praise to a particular well-done job. All surveys in the United States and overseas have shown the same sensitivity of enlisted personnel toward the personal leadership relations between themselves and their officers.
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two general categories, namely, those regarding the established relationship itself and on the grounds that it is not demoralizing and those arising from the abuse of established privileges and privileges.

Complaints alleging discrimination with respect to privileges granted commissioned personnel are compared to those afforded enlisted personnel are in general:

Better quarters.
Better and more abundant food.
Smaller and more agreeable facilities for officers only.
Liquor available to commissioned but not to enlisted personnel.
More and better travel privileges available to commissioned personnel for recreation.

A distinction is drawn between commissioned and enlisted personnel.

Ready access by commissioned personnel to a greater number and better female society.

Enlisted personnel required to assist and be a part in securing and providing any of the foregoing special privileges for commissioned personnel.

H. SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY OBTAINED FROM WITNESSES

Observations of troubles—The testimony of witnesses, the great proportion of which centered criticism of present officer-related man relationships, included some few statements supporting the present system itself. In the main the complaints and grievances were against officer personnel. They included general condemnation of commissioned personnel, complaints of poor leadership, situations of irregularities and injustices, and complaints of abuse of privilege.

The causes for the failure of a small percentage of the Officer Corps were held to be the result of poor and faulty selection, inadequate training, or indoctrination by undisciplined officers, insufficient training, and in some cases poor followers.

Witnesses testified that the military system, in itself, is in some cases responsible for deficiencies and the inefficient performance of commissioned personnel. It was claimed that there is no adequate method for prompt elimination (or removal) of incompetents and undesirable, that commissioned personnel are not subject to the same rigorous procedures in military justice as are enlisted personnel, that, in tradition, they are not as morally responsible for their acts, and that there are other weaknesses in the system of administration and control of commissioned personnel.

It is in the realm of social behavior that the feeling of superiority, the lack of appreciation among commissioned personnel, and the collected perceptions of the social distinction, both on and off duty, directed attention to the unfortunate situation suffered by soldiers—intelligence which had no positive effect upon discipline and military efficiency. It was in this category that abuses were most rampant, violations secured most frequently, irregularities were most apparent. Fundamentally, these manifestations of social distinction are rooted in the old traditional officer concept, and the sharp line of demarcation between officer and enlisted personnel, which is not established differentials, makes possible such abuses. In addition, the results of faulty selection, insufficient indoctrination, and inadequately, training in responsibility increased the number of instances of abuse, and arrogance displayed by officers.
In such personnel. Specific recommendations were made concerning requirements, methods of selection, materials for orientation and indoctrination, steps in the training program, with particular emphasis on personnel management, more rigorous methods for elimination of incompetent and undesirable, placing in regulations controls which could be utilized to thwart the undependability in privies, a system of demotion, more intelligent reassignment, eliminating technicians from command positions, and a host of other intelligent suggestions.

The majority of recommendations, which pertained to the inequities or disparities of treatment of commissioned and enlisted personnel, resulted from the system, were general in nature. Recommendations were made to "strip out all inequity and establish a system of pay, rank, promotion, and discipline on the basis of merit"; make it impossible for social distinctions and discriminations off duty; review the machinery for administering military justice and the courts-martial procedure with the view of ranking all military personnel subject to the same types of punishment as based upon infractures of rules and misconducts; make available to all personnel the same food items, the same mess facilities, etc.; permit accumulation of leave and provide for terminal leave to enlisted personnel; charge the ruling on passes, lost check, physical examinations, etc., which pertain only to enlisted personnel; provide for a common uniform; equalize the housing facilities on posts, camps, and stations, in terms of family size and rank; abolish saluting, except for ceremonial occasions, on duty, and in parades; and a number of other specific suggestions were made available to the Board for rectifying many of the inequities in the military system.

There were recommendations which related to the improvement of the status of enlisted personnel, all of which, as mentioned, might indirectly affect an improvement of officer-enlisted relationships.

Recommendations concerning the Office of the Inspector General included the following: Stuff with more highly qualified personnel, fitted for the particular task, increase the allotment of personnel, make the inspectors general in full installations responsible directly to the Office of the Chief of Staff, or the Secretary of War, or the President; use civilians instead of military personnel, give certain authorities in order that actions may be taken immediately upon discovery of deficiencies.

1. SUMMARY OF COMMENTS RECEIVED THROUGH THE MAIL

Observations of those who wrote to the Board.—The letters contained many more abusive statements than were obtained from witnesses who appeared in person; there were many more citations of specific grievances; relatively few had an over-all comprehensive view of the problem of officer-enlisted man relationships. However, upon analysis it was found that the majority of unmediated opinions did cite about the same categories of problems as revealed in the testimony of witnesses. There was an overwhelming reaction against commissioned personnel, criticism even being leveled against specific groups, e. g., West Point graduates, Officer Candidate School graduates, National Guard officers, service officers. There were many cries of the selection, indoctrination, and training of commissioned personnel, there was as much, if not more, critical comment which pertained to abuse.
of privileges, social distinctions, social barriers, and the unnecessary indignities suffered by enlisted personnel.

Assuming the theory that any voluntary act done to the Board followed somewhat the same pattern as the testimony received by the officers, the most frequently occurring complaint was against the injustice made personal by a system in which law, regulations, and tradition favored the commissioned officers over the enlisted personnel. It is apparent that creation of the committee, resulting from the system which affords rank certain privileges, represents another approach in the attack on the Army because of alleged undue suffering at the hands of commissioned personnel. In other words, had all commissioned personnel been screened more carefully, had been scrutinized and corrected as thoroughly and had the incompetents been relieved or dismissed "on the spot" when alleged justifiable complaints were rendered, there might not have been nearly so many criticisms against the system.

The more glaring disparities cited as resulting from the system were:

- The misadvice of the maintenance, justice court, medical, terminal leave pay, travel allowance for dependents, etc.

More comment was received through the mail referring to the comparison of enlisted men's pay with the pay of civilian men than was received from in the service.

Considerably more comment was made concerning enlistment and the deferment educational system. A small majority of the statements of defense of the system as now exist were of those charging that the system was unsatisfactory, were due to the fact that men that were not trained to defend the system and the efficiency of the military.

A high percentage of those who wrote in admitted that, in order to have an effective fighting force and army, there must be discipline and strict obedience to orders. Many spoke of discrediting the Army but only a few went to the extreme of stating that discipline, rank, authority, and privileges were totally unnecessary.

Recommendations of those who wrote to the Board—As was found in the testimony of witnesses, the recommendations of those who wrote letters to the Board followed closely the complaints and grievances listed. There were many recommendations offered to improve the Enlisted Officer Corps. Everything from methods of selection to a very effective internal selection system which would result in elimination of the inefficiencies more readily. Recommendations in the field of education due to the system were in the main directed toward the administration of military justice.

All such material received was submitted to the War Department Advisory Committee on Military Justice which is now studying this problem. There were the usual recommendations concerning substance, housing, uniform, athletics, decorations and awards, recreational facilities, medical treatment, retirement, leaves and furloughs, etc.

As was heard in the testimony of witnesses, the mail contained a great deal in the way of constructive comment as to the improvement of the Office of the Inspector General.

Several broached the idea that a "book of rules," or "a handbook on the rights of enlisted men" in the form of the book, should be written; such a handbook should cover completely all rules and regulations and be used as part of the training of recruits as they enter the service. It was pointed out also that if anything of this nature was prepared, it would make more apparent the wide differential in the social rights and privileges of the enlisted personnel as compared to the commissioned group.

A number also suggested that there be a greater exchange of information between the military body and the civilian world; such an exchange would enable the military to understand the citizen's point of view, and also correct many misconceptions which the public now holds concerning the military organization and its administration. In other words, some steps should be taken to educate both the military and the civilian population in each other's problems.

2. AN ADVANCED CONCEPT

Contained in the testimony of witnesses and the comments received in letters to the Board was a recommendation that a new system of personnel organization be established in the Army. The plan, as

officer enlisted man relationship

suggested, would eliminate the main defects, or, line of demarcation, between the so-called officers and enlisted groups. It is claimed that this feature of the present Army system is the basis for the majority of criticisms and that a great many of the problems resulting from the system would cease to exist if the new plan were put into operation.

Although not presented entirely detailed, the plan calls for a gradual graduation from the lowest to the highest rank in the Army, with each step up the scale involving an increase in duties, responsibilities, and authority. Further, selection of individuals for any position in the scale will be made only on the basis of competitive examination. Likewise, promotion up the scale would involve complying with specific requirements and passing of examinations. The new plan, it was stated, will permit more effective placement of technically trained individuals, specialists in many lines, although each such specialist will be required to receive training in military philosophy and organization. No specialist would be given command responsibility unless he is qualified.

Under this proposed plan, the pay scale would correspond to that which now prevails in the most advanced personnel-management systems in the field of business and industry. Commensurate with duties and responsibilities up the scale. Monetary allowances will be on a graduated basis but factors other than rank will govern the amounts granted at each level in the scale. Such a system will provide incentive for advancement, the elimination of any possibility of incompetents getting into positions of responsibility, and a motivation to follow the military as a career.

Such a plan would involve considerable change in existing statutes, a complete reorganization of Army Regulations, and a breakdown of many customs and traditions.

X. CONSIDERATION OF INVASIVE GROUPS

Military Intelligence Division, G-2, War Department General Staff, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation were consulted in an effort to determine whether or not there is evidence of concerted action on the part of subversive elements to precipitate mass criticism against the Army including, specifically, officer-enlisted man relationships. This material is in the hands of Military Intelligence Division.
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the most qualified individuals for commissions in the Regular Army. Congressional authorization provided for 25,000 officers in the Regular Army; deducting those already in the Regular Army, there remained around 10,000 vacancies to be filled.

7. Accumulation of leave and terminal-leave pay for enlisted personnel. Instructions were contained in recently issued regulations, AR 615-275, April 5, 1948, providing, effective July 1, 1948, a system of granting leave to and recording furlough time of enlisted personnel similar to the procedure for commissioned personnel. Providing terminal-leave pay for enlisted personnel required congressional action. However, the War Department has reported favorably on a bill now before Congress, S. 721, which will provide that enlisted personnel may accumulate furlough time at the same rate as commissioned personnel and be paid for unused leave upon separation from the service.

The War Department advises that they contemplate further actions in the future based on additional studies now being conducted.

III. CONCLUSIONS

This Board has arrived unanimously at the following conclusions:

1. The rapid expansion of the Army, from an establishment of 198,335 in September 1929 to 8,701,316 in May 1945, created an unprecedented personnel problem. When due consideration is given to all difficulties experienced in preparing for war in a democracy, it becomes obvious that the Army did a truly magnificent job in this Second World War.

2. A comparison of the aftermath of World War II with similar periods following other wars, in this country was involved, indicates that the present tension against the military organization is not unique and has occurred in varying degrees despite the fact that we emerged victorious.

3. Because of the distrust of citizens in our democracy for a regimented life in which an individual to some extent loses his identity, and because the majority who served were conscripted or drafted—many against their will, much of the general criticism could be expected.

4. Americans look with disfavor upon any system which grants numerous privileges to a particular class of individuals and finds distasteful any tendency to make arbitrary social distinctions between two parts of the Army.

5. There were irregularities, injustices in handling of enlisted personnel, and abuses of privilege in the recent war to such an extent as to cause widespread and deep-seated criticisms.

6. The causes of poor relationships between commissioned and enlisted personnel are traceable, in general, to two main factors:

(a) Undesirable line leadership on the part of a small percentage of those in positions of responsibility.

(b) A system that permits and encourages a wide official and social gap between commissioned and enlisted personnel.

7. In most instances poor leadership resulted from the thrusting into positions of authority men who were inherently unqualified or were inadequately trained as leaders. This was brought about by the rapid expansion of the officer Corps called for by the national emergency. There were errors in selection. Indisciplina-
tion were inadequate. Training was abbreviated. All of this resulted in failure to emphasize the importance of moral, efficient, personal, managerial, and social responsibilities. In the training of the Army was limited to emphasizing technical proficiency. The rigors of time also prevented the Army from developing fully among commissioned personnel a more liberal understanding of responsibilities to their troops. In selecting officers the Army was forced to rely upon the character, background, and leadership which they demonstrated in the process of training.

3. The present Army did not adequately prepare officers for the varied job of leading civilian soldiers in a career. An officer, especially an officer in the enlisted ranks, was trained. The official gap between commissioned and enlisted personnel widened during the war by the circumstance that much of the training and qualification of the officer was done by enlisted personnel who were trained and commissioned en masse into the social role. This was a large part due to faulty interpretation of the customs and traditions of the regular officer corps.

4. In a military society, procedures to get rid of incompetents and undesirable among the officer group.

5. There is need for a new philosophy in the uniform order, a policy of treatment of men, especially in the "bradker." In terms of advanced concepts in social systems, the present system is not permitting recognition of the dignity of the citizen. More definite protection from the arbitrary acts of authorities is essential.

6. Under the present system enlisted men are dependent for the satisfaction of many of their needs upon the behavior and attitudes of their officers, but are denied a feeling of security and opportunity for development and self-realization. Despite the procedures established for this purpose, enlisted men junior officers have actually not enjoyed complete freedom in presenting their grievances. The most lacking yet important phases of the military structure is not so effective in soliciting service and in agencies providing a practical means of redress.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

The Board has kept constantly in mind weighing evidence, coming to conclusions, and in preparing its recommendations, the following:

1. There must be conscience that we, as a nation, have a modern, economical, efficient, and effective military establishment which can, if needed, defend the nation's rights and interests.

2. Maintenance of control and discipline, which are essential to the success of any military operation.

3. Maintenance of the highest order and under commend mention.

4. That the system of recruiting, from combat duty or service in Military Establishment, remains the best possible physical, mental, moral, and spiritual condition.

5. That responsibility be shared in order to create in the mind of the soldier a desire for advancement in the military service and the government.

6. Improvement of the character, the knowledge, and the competencies of those who have been found those who are in the service or are members of the Army.

7. Assurance of ready availability of all elements of a military establishment in case of an emergency.

8. Assurance of the expansion of a citizen's army in case of a national emergency.

The Board therefore strongly recommends

1. That steps be taken to improve leadership in the Office Corps of the Army in order that the corps will meet the respect of soldiers and civilians alike. This will be accomplished by: (1) Better selection; (2) more adequate orientation and indoctrination; (3) effective training; (4) proper assignments, (5) promotion on long service, (6) employment of a rigorous method of screening and selecting of incompetent and undesirable; (2) more effective internal policing system to prevent abuses of privileges of officers and organization facilities and services which enable us to do his job more effectively. The following specific actions are recommended:

2. Selection—That selection of men for positions of responsibility, up the scale, be based upon the most advanced practices in personnel selection found in industry, business, government, and those developed in the Army. Some of the criteria should be: (1) Previous military training, preferably 1 year in the enlisted ranks, except for those in positions not requiring considerable responsibility, especially technicians, who, unless they qualify, should not be placed in command positions.

3. Character—That emphasis is put on integrity and potential ability to work with and manage people.

4. Incentive and motivation—That sufficient time be expended in order to incorporate thoroughly.

5. A social appreciation of responsibilities, and especially to subordinates.

6. The intelligent use of authority.

7. The idea that privileges which accompany rank and responsibility are established to better enable an individual to perform his duties effectively and efficiently and are not for the purpose of improving his own personal interest.

8. An appreciation of the military service and its mission.

9. Training—That, in addition to the training in technical subjects, each candidate, whether at West Point, at ROTC unit, or officer candidate school, receive more complete briefing on the nature of training in command responsibility, personnel management, and human relations.

10. Assignment—That assignments to positions of responsibility in the Army be made on the basis of ability and training of the individual, thus enabling the Army to utilize talents where required.

11. Promotion and personnel—That a complete review be made of the system of promotion, and that a promotion system be made on a merit basis instead of building, making it possible to permit excessively competent individuals to be advanced ahead of any seniority, that some system of demotion be established whereby, after a trial period, if an individual does not meet the requirements and demonstrates that he is incapable of assuming
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be given to family size as well as to rating or rank of individuals; that, if quarters are not to be (or cannot be)
provided on military installations, civilian costs as well as
family size and rank be considered in granting of monetary
allowances in lieu of quarters.

3. Clothing and uniform: That clothing and uniforms be
issued to all military personnel, whether enlisted or commis-
sioned. The Board, however, sees no objection to personal
purchase, by any military personnel of clothing and uniform
in addition to that issued, provided that whatever is pur-
chased conforms in texture and cut.

4. Travel: That travel allowances for the individual and
for his dependents be proportioned without discrimination in
terms of rank, and be made equitable for both enlisted and
commissioned personnel.

5. That enlisted personnel be enabled to accumulate leave or
furlough time and be granted terminal leave pay on the same basis as is
now provided for commissioned personnel; that the War Department
support the legislation required to make this possible, thus eliminating
the termination injustices, including mustering-out pay, which now exist.

6. That all military personnel be allowed, when off duty, to pursue normal social patterns comparable to our democratic way of life.

7. That the use of discriminatory references, such as "officers and
their ladies; enlisted men and their wives," be eliminated from
directives and publications issued in military establishments.

8. That there be an definite equality of treatment of both enlisted and
commissioned personnel in the administration of military justice,
making all personnel equally liable under military law for errors and faults;
that the higher the rank the more severe be the punishment; that
there be a review of all cases where wartime operations necessitated
very strict handling, in order that there be due reconsideration and
decency bestowed where warranted; that enlisted personnel be
permitted on courts, but that every member of a court be senior
to the accused.

9. That the hand salute be abolished off Army installations and
off duty, except in occupied territories and under conditions where
the procedure might be deemed necessary to properly convey military
dignity to local populations, but be employed in all official greetings
in the line of duty and continue to be manifest at ceremonial occasions
where the national anthem is played or the colors pass by.

10. That steps be taken to establish a system of decorations and
awards which will provide for a more equitable distribution on the
basis of merit, and prohibit distribution to a degree that will tend
to cheapen them; that it be made more difficult to obtain an award
the higher an individual goes in the scale from the bottom of the
enlisted to the top of the commissioned ranks.

11. That the system for registering complaints be improved and
that inspections be for the purpose of prevention as well as investigation.
This will call for augmentation and possibly reorganization of the
Inspector General's section.

12. Staff of inspectors general must be composed of carefully
selected, highly competent individuals, whose experience par-
ticularly qualifies them for such assignment.
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(5) Staff of Inspectors general must be increased to the extent necessary to permit it to function properly.

(6) Continued study must be made of abuses with the objective of eliminating the causes.

(7) Copies of reports of inspectors general must be transmitted to the War Department outside regular command channels. In addition to normal procedures, in order to eliminate political influence and assure proper remedial action.

10. That all regulations and instructions be so written that they not only stipulate the limited "privileges" which are granted to the performance of duties in positions of responsibility but also will be regulated in such a way that no malfeasance, possible abuse of authority and the prestige that goes with higher rank and responsibility.

11. The abolition of all statutes, regulations, customs, and traditions which discourage or forbid social association of soldiers of similar general rank because of military rank.

12. That necessary steps be taken to eliminate the terms and concepts, "enlisted men" and "officer," that suitable substitutes be employed (e.g., members of noncommissioned corps, members of commissioned corps, etc.), and that all military personnel be referred to as "soldiers."

13. That close contact and association with civilians be encouraged and maintained since a citizens' Army is a result of combined interest, effort, and contribution of both military and public. A mutual exchange of information will enhance the military organization. Length of military service seems to automatically divorce military personnel from civilian outlook. A maximum of military personnel living in civilian communities, rather than in Army posts, will assist in accomplishing this.

14. That further study be made of accumulated materials on the subject under consideration by the Board for the purpose of extracting additional ideas which may be worthy of acceptance.

Following are the members of the Secretary of War's Board on Officer-Enlisted Men Relationships:

James H. "Jimmy" Dooblitte, Lieutenant General (Chairman), who commanded the Eighth Air Force, led the first bomber raid on Tokyo, and is now with the Shell Oil Co. He enlisted as a flying cadet October 6, 1917, and was commissioned a second lieutenant, Signal Reserve, Aviation Section, on March 11, 1918.

Troy H. Middleton, former lieutenant general, who commanded the Forty-fifth Division in north Africa and Sicily, and is now controller of Louisiana State University. He enlisted in the Regular Army March 3, 1917.

Robert Neville, of New York City, who was on the staff of Yank Magazine as an enlisted man and became editor of the Stars and Stripes in Italy. He was a lieutenant colonel when he went on terminal leave to return to civilian writing. His views on officer-enlisted man relationships were published recently in magazines of national circulation.